research

Research

Haftel, Yoram Z. 2007. Designing for Peace: Regional Integration Arrangements, Institutional Variation, and Militarized Interstate Disputes. International Organization 61 (1): 217-237.

Abstract: Does institutional variation have implications for questions of conflict and peace? Theory indicates that it does but extant studies that address this question treat such institutions as homogenous. Building on recent theoretical advances, I argue that a cooperation on a wide array of economic issues and regular meetings of high-level officials provide member-states with valuable information regarding the interests and resolve of their counterparts. This, in turn, reduces uncertainty and improves the prospects of a peaceful resolution of inter-state disputes. To test the effect of these two institutional features on the level of militarized interstate disputes I present an original data set that measures variation in institutional design and implementation across a large number of regional integration arrangements (RIAs) in the 1980s and the 1990s. Employing multivariate regression techniques and the regional unit of analysis, I find that a wider scope of economic activity and regular meetings among high-level officials mitigate violent conflict. These results remain intact after controlling for alternative explanations and addressing concerns of endogeneity.

Haftel, Yoram Z., and Alexander Thompson. 2006. The Independence of International Organizations: Concept and Applications. Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 (2): 253-275 (click here for related material).

Abstract: Despite its widespread use in studies of domestic political institutions, the concept of ‘independence’ has not been systematically applied to the study of international institutions. Most arguments regarding the ability of international organizations (IOs) to promote cooperation and mitigate conflict rely on the implicit assumption that such institutions possess some independence from states, and yet the field has failed to conceptualize—let alone measure—this institutional characteristic. Extracting insights from the theoretical literatures on both international and domestic institutions, we distill several design features that lend independence to political institutions and then generate coding rules for measuring the independence of IOs. Based on an original dataset of regional integration arrangements, we then use regression analysis to test several propositions for explaining variation in IO independence, shedding light on some important theoretical and empirical puzzles in international relations.

Gortzak, Yoav, Yoram Z. Haftel, and Kevin Sweeney. 2005. Offense-Defense Theory: An Empirical Assessment. Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (1): 67-89 (click here for related material).

Abstract: Proponents of Offense-Defense Theory (ODT) contend the offense-defense balance (ODB) forms the “master key” to understanding the question of peace and war. Critics challenge the theory on both conceptual and empirical grounds. While the debate has produced increasingly sophisticated theoretical arguments concerning the effects of the ODB, few attempts have been made to subject the theory to rigorous empirical tests. We take on this task. We do so by systematically examining the theory’s two primary claims: first, that shifts in the ODB have an important effect on the likelihood of international war and militarized disputes and, second, that ODT offers a more powerful explanation for conflict than other explanations in the IR literature. Using time series event count models of war and militarized interstate disputes at the systemic level, our results cast doubt on the empirical validity of the ODT and indicate that other IR theories have important explanatory power.

Sylvan, Donald A., Jonathan W. Keller, and Yoram Z. Haftel. 2004. Forecasting Israeli-Palestinian Relations. Journal of Peace Research. 41 (4): 285-303, (click here for an Online Appendix)

Abstract: this article addresses the issue of how international relations theories and experts do at forecasting Israeli-Palestinian relations. A group of academics who study the Middle East were brought together to set forth their logic and arguments concerning possible future scenarios of Israeli-Palestinian relations. The article reports on a “rule-based” computational model built upon the reasoning of these experts. Sensitivity analysis of the model is summarized, and four empirical tests of the model are reported. Relations between Middle East states, externally generated existential threats to Israel, and domestic structural factors such as coalition politics in Israel emerge as driving forces in the sensitivity analysis. Further examination shows that the model is in theoretical harmony with scholars who have employed two level games, and has some similarity to realist explanations and frameworks emphasizing public opinion. Model tests reveal relatively solid results: Comparisons with other forecasts generally favor this model, while both the cases of the Labor Party coming to power in Israel and a change in Jordanian behavior after the death of King Hussein lend further support to the model presented here. Finally, when the scholars who served as the expert group to produce these forecasts were asked to reflect back on the process, they exhibited the same rationalizations that have been found in other expert-based forecasts, even though the results of the forecasts were more favorable than many such forecasts.

Haftel, Yoram Z. 2004. From the Outside Looking in: The Effect of Trading Blocs on Trade Disputes in the GATT/WTO. International Studies Quarterly 48 (1): 121-142.

Abstract: The increasing number and expansion of trading blocs is an important dimension of the contemporary international economy. This study examines the effects of such trading blocs on third parties and on the multilateral trading system. It is argued that trading blocs have negative economic effects on economic sectors in non-members states. These sectors urge their governments to take political action vis-à-vis the trading bloc. Governments have several policy choices on their menu, and the attractiveness of these policies is determined by domestic and international incentives and constraints. I argue that filing a complaint in the GATT/WTO is an attractive and effective policy tool in the hands of third parties’ governments. Thus, I hypothesize that the existence, deepening, and widening of trading blocs result in an increase in the number of complaints filed against their members in the multilateral trading system. I examine these propositions in the context of three important trading blocs - namely the EU, NAFTA, and Mercosur - in the period 1948-2000. To test these hypotheses a time-series cross-section count model is performed. Controlling for conventional alternative explanations, the empirical analysis supports the theoretical framework.

Working Papers:

The Effect of U.S. Investment Treaties on FDI Inflows to Developing Countries: Signaling or Credible Commitment?

Abstract: Over the last three decades, the United States concluded more than fifty bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with developing countries. Many, but not all, of these BITs have entered into force. This study examines the effect of BITs on the inflow of American foreign direct investment (FDI) to the developing world. It argues that signed BITs operate as a costly signal of pro-investment climate and that BITs in force operate as a credible commitment to an irreversible protection of foreign investment. These putative relationships are tested with a data set of 132 developing countries from 1977 to 2004. Employing a variety of model specifications, the empirical analysis indicates that BITs in force increase FDI inflows. In contrast, signed BITs that are not mutually ratified have no effect on FDI inflows. These findings suggest that investors are more concerned with time-inconsistency problems than with the economic orientation of host governments (click here to download a copy).

Action Speaks Louder than Words: Variation in Regional Integration Arrangements and Violent Conflict

Abstract: Does institutional variation have implications for questions of conflict and peace? Realists expect no independent effect of international organizations on militarized interstate disputes and dismiss the importance of variation across such organizations. Liberals, on the other hand, offer several mechanisms by which international organizations may alleviate violent conflict. This paper evaluates these competing expectations in the context of regional integration arrangements (RIAs). These organizations display a great deal of variation in their level of institutionalization. Employing an event count model with a panel-data setup and controlling for several alternative explanations, the empirical analysis indicates that higher levels of institutionalization, when implemented, are associated with less conflict. This paper also builds on the statistical results to conduct a qualitative large-N analysis. This analysis provides additional support for my argument. At the same time, it points to some limitations of the liberal claim and to the conditions under which RIAs mitigate conflict (click here to download a copy).

Regional Integration Arrangements, Signaling, and Foreign Direct Investment: The Case of ASEAN

Abstract: Beginning in the 1950s, developing countries invested substantial resources in regional economic integration. Despite seemingly little prospects and meager results, these efforts continue and even intensify today. Considering the widespread skepticism regarding the benefits of regional integration arrangements (RIAs), this enthusiasm is puzzling. This paper offers an answer to this apparent discretion. In it, I argue that developing countries form RIAs not necessarily to boost intra-regional trade but rather to attract foreign capital from extra-regional private investors and public donors. In particular, governments of developing countries institutionalize their economic relations to signal that they are reliable and peaceful states. In doing so, they reduce the political risk associated with investment in their economies. This argument suggests that – by providing information under conditions of uncertainty – international institutions can promote cooperation not only among their members, but also between members and non-members. I demonstrate the empirical plausibility of my argument with the case the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). I first argue that conventional explanations for the formation of this organization in 1967 are unconvincing. I then make the case for the theoretical framework offered here. I show that Indonesia was a primary driving force behind ASEAN and that Indonesian policymakers believed that joining this RIA will reverse its aggressive and irresponsible image in the international community. A more positive and peaceful image, they believed, will result in increasing foreign capital and financial, which were indispensable for the development of the Indonesian economy. Evidence from other ASEAN countries and data on the inflow of foreign capital into the ASEAN region offers further support to my theoretical framework (click here to download a copy).