

Becoming Rivals: The Process of Rivalry Development

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The recent understanding that the path to peace can be found through the elimination of persistent historical animosity in the form of rivalry (Vasquez 1993, Diehl and Goertz 2000, Thompson 2001) is an important step for the conflict studies field. Rivalries are a fundamental aspect of all conflictual interactions. The context of events is important. Ignoring rivalry and history has been a central flaw of the field of international relations. By understanding the historic and diplomatic factors behind the emergence of rivalry, the strategies employed by states to deal with potential threats, and the issues critical to long-standing enemies, we can attempt to find solutions to the scourge of institutional violence.

This chapter will explain the process through which states develop into rivals so that in the future we can predict and prevent rivalries from occurring in the first place. Intervention can only occur once the causes to the problem are understood. The goal here is to scientifically explain the process of becoming rivals.

Rivalry is simply a situation of long-standing, historical animosity between two entities with a high probability of serious conflict or crisis (see Diehl and Goertz herein). During rivalry, relative positions matter and rivals will fight about anything and everything. A simple question needs to be answered about interstate rivalry: if states engaged in a rivalry can account for the majority of wars and disputes (Diehl and Goertz 2000; Thompson 2001) that have occurred since

1815, why have scholars failed to explain the beginnings of this important event? Research has uncovered little about why and how pairs of states become rivals.

The recent increase in the quantitative study of rivalry has largely identified who the rivals are (Diehl and Goertz 2000; Thompson 2001; Hewitt 2005), but not how they form and escalate. Questions about the development of rivalry are important if we are to understand the nature of conflictual interactions and seek to eliminate war from the system.

This chapter will proceed by briefly reviewing what a rivalry is and why the topic is so critical for studies of war and peace. I will then review findings in our discipline that seek to uncover how rivalries develop in the first place. The chapter will wrap up with a proposed theory to explain rivalry development and some empirical test of the theory.

What Is Rivalry?

The utilization of international rivalry as a concept has allowed the field of international politics to reconceptualize how the discipline studies conflict. In the past, the field concentrated on international war as the factor in need of explanation. If the rivalry situation accounts for over three fourths of wars in the first place, the study of conflict and international politics should be orientated toward preventing and managing the most severe forms of rivalry before escalation to war takes place.

Rivalries are typically identified as some form of repeated, long-standing crisis or protracted conflict. Rivalries involve competition and struggle between two or more actors over some stake or issue that may change and vary from incident to incident. Some states are actually

“addicted” to conflict with other states (Maoz 2004). The image of another state as an enemy endures in the relations between the states and in the minds of their elites and mass public.

Denying gains to a rival is a central theme in rivalry. Rivalry assumes a zero sum game where one side seeks to ensure their own security through the destruction or immobilization of another state. Zizzo and Oswald (2001) perform an experiment in which their subjects can reduce other players’ monetary payoffs, but only if they give up some of their money first. They find that despite the assumption of self interest, people put in this situation are willing to burn themselves rather than provide a gain for a rival. Two-thirds of the test subjects burned their opposing side even though it would be costly in terms of personal gains to do so. A similar dynamic works in rivalry situations. Rather than focusing on a narrow self interest, states engaged in a rivalry are much more willing to go out of their way to deny a benefit to an enemy even if that means they harm their own security or personal well being. Some rivals seek to wipe the other off the face of the Earth while most simply wish to deny any gains to that rival. Either way, rivalry produces a destructive relationship that only detracts the state from more pressing problems.

Rivalry simply means distrust with some expectation of future violence. As Colaresi et al. (2008: 12) note, during a rivalry, each side exaggerates hostile actions and downplays the sincerity of cooperative actions. As a concept rivalry, is simply meant to denote a perpetual hostile relationship. It captures relationships characterized by selfishness, relative positions, mistrust, hostility, and animosity. Empirically, Diehl and Goertz (2000) define and operationalize rivalries as repeated conflicts with a certain degree of competitiveness and connection of issues. Competitiveness suggests that there is a consistent and conflictual relationship between the two parties with some expectation of future conflict. For rivalries to be

observed there must be some degree of serious competition. A connection of issues is also important for Diehl and Goertz (2000) since rivalry for them is not an isolated incident of conflict, but should have linkages between disputes throughout the relationship.

In coding rivalries, a militarized interstate dispute (MID) is used to operationalize the competitiveness requirement.ⁱ Diehl and Goertz (2000, 44-46) operationalize an enduring rivalry as those pairs of states with six MIDs within a period of 20 years. Proto-rivalries are those dyads that have up to five MIDs but fail to reach the enduring rivalry requirement in a 20-year period. Isolated conflicts, on the other hand, are those conflicts between dyads that involve one or two disputes and do not escalate to the proto or enduring rivalry stage. The updated dataset (Klein, Goertz et al. 2006) covers the 1816 to 2001 period and does not consider isolated conflicts as rivals since these are not dyadic rivalries but short confrontations. Other changes include a more specific selection of who the rivals are. While the competitiveness rules have not changed drastically, now the Klein et al. (2006) dataset eliminates those dyads in which there was no clear contact between the disputing parties as well as those dyads that were coded as fighting but actually left or entered the dispute before the other party did. They also eliminated disputes if the conflict had nothing to do with the overall rivalry context. The final dataset includes 915 cases of isolated contact and 290 rivals. "Of the 290 cases of rivalry, 115 are enduring and 175 are proto-rivalries under the previous coding criteria." (Klein et al 2006: 340).

Defining rivalry by the number of MIDs within a dyad may limit the ability of the operational definition to capture the true meaning of rivalry and to account for all cases. For that reason, William Thompson and a group of other scholars have developed an alternative method of coding rivalries. Thompson and co-authors believe that for a rivalry to be active, each side must regard the other as competitors, be the source of actual or latent threats, and recognize each

other as enemies (Colaresi et al 2008: 25). Using historical research, Thompson (2001) identifies a population of dyads (173 rivals from 1816-1999) that are strategic rivalries. The two differing methods of coding rivalry should not be competition, but should reinforce the idea that rivalry is an important empirical concept and should allow scholars to test their theories according to the dataset that meets their needs.

What Do We Know About Rivalry Development?

The literature on interstate rivalry has only begun to identify factors leading a pair of states to initiate or develop into a rivalry. We therefore know little about how rivalries actually come about. Most factors that are said to account for the onset of rivalry either fall in the category of events to induce the situation right away or in the factors that accumulate to ultimately produce the outcome of rivalry.

Diehl and Goertz (2000) theorize that a political shock is a “virtual necessary” condition for the initiation and termination of a rivalry. A political shock is a traumatic event that occurs in the international system (e.g. world wars, changes in power distribution, and periods of territory shifts) or at the internal-domestic level of politics (e.g. regime change and civil war). In an empirical analysis, Diehl and Goertz (2000) find a political shock to be associated with rivalry initiation 95 percent of the time (60/63 cases) for enduring rivalries. They theorize that a political shock allows a “window of opportunity” for rivalry initiation.

Colaresi (2001) looks at global war as a political shock that might bring about rivalry using a population of Thompson’s strategic rivals. He finds that a war shock only leads to the

termination of rivalry, not the initiation. It does seem clear that most rivalries begin at state birth (Colaresi et al 2008: 84), which is a form of a political shock.

Rivalries typically evolve or experience a trend of increasing conflict throughout their life. Hensel's (1999) escalating evolutionary approach to rivalries holds that rivalries are likely to advance and become "enduring" if the outcome of the first dispute is not resolved to both states' mutual satisfaction. Leng (1983, 2000) makes a similar point through many case study examinations. The evolutionary approach also holds that high levels of severe conflict (war) early in the life of a rivalry make confrontations in the future less likely yet still pushes the states to lock into rivalry early. In essence, choosing not to respond to a militarized dispute with the use of force diminishes the probability of future disputes (Hensel and Diehl 1994) and rivalry.

Dissatisfaction is likely to play a large role in rivalry relationships. Maoz and Mor (2002) find that dissatisfaction with the status quo and equality of capabilities are factors that influence the continuation of a rivalry. Rivalries will endure as long as neither side has the ability to demonstrably change the relationship and both sides are dissatisfied with the outcome of past disputes. Hensel's (1996) notion of evolutionary learning during a rivalry likely explains much of why dissatisfaction tends to fester. Suspicion, hostility, and grievances only grow through time making it more likely that a rivalry will lock-in and endure. Dissatisfaction also plays a part in the analysis conducted by Goertz et al (2005) which finds that stalemate outcomes early during a rivalry push the dyads to endure as enemies (see also Hensel 1996). These facts might lead us to conclude that how disputes are handled early in the life of a rivalry matters the most.

One cannot forget the importance of domestic politics in the analysis of rivalry situations (Young and Levy 2010). Domestic factors such as leadership tenure (Colaresi 2001) and domestic instability (Mitchell and Prins 2004) can produce the outcome of rivalry. Leaders

sometimes need external enemies to galvanize the population in support of their policies and will only choose to deescalate a rivalry if they are in a secure power position internally (Colaresi 2005). The unfortunate consequence of this tactic is that it likely makes rivalries endure and lock-in. In fact, rivalries are almost impossible to terminate if both the public and leadership do not agree to end the hostile relationship. Leaders must play the ratification game on many levels (Putnam 1988) in order to achieve victory on policy initiatives. Domestic opinion can either force the continuation of a rivalry (Hensel 1998) or induce peace (Mor 1997).

Internal regime dynamics are also important factors in determining who might become rivals. Democracy reduces the likelihood of states entering into a rivalry in the first place (Hensel, Goertz et al. 2000). There have only been two serious cases of rivalries beginning between two democracies and only one of those cases (the United Kingdom versus the United States) contained two stable democracies for the entire duration of the conflict. Further research in the liberal paradigm looks at the impact of institutions on rivalries. Other scholars have found evidence that IGOs reduce the duration of rivalries (Cornwell and Colaresi 2002; Prins and Daxecker 2007) but these two studies have not looked at the origins of rivalry and the impact on external institutions.

Stinnett and Diehl (2001, 21) argue that rather than having one cause, “[rivalries] emerge from the conjunction of a large number of small, individually weak factors.” Stinnett and Diehl (2001) find that behavioral factors (linkages between disputes and dispute outcomes) and structural factors (political shocks and great power involvement) each have a small impact on rivalry initiation. Colaresi and Thompson (2002) take a similar line and suggest two rivalry paths, one for positional rivalries - those concerned with global/strategic issues - and one for spatial rivalries - those concerned with territorial questions. Contiguous rivals are likely to begin

over spatial/territorial questions (Colaresi et. al 2008: 169, 180). Non-democracy, militarization, and major power status increase the likelihood of positional rivals (Colaresi et. all 2008: 203), whose main source of disagreement seems to be based on geopolitical positioning rather than on specific locations and territories.

Colaresi et al (2008: Chapter 7) take a step back and ask if the factors that lead to war, as uncovered by Bremer (1992), lead to rivalry instead. Their analysis concludes by finding that dyads that are contiguous (being neighbors), are militarized, and contain a state that is either a regional or major power generally all contribute to the onset of rivalry.

Regarding war, there is a direct relationship between rivalry and war. This relationship may be a function of the number of disputes that rivalries engage in yet this cannot be a tautological fact. Most wars only occur because of rivalry, rivalry leads to war. In fact, most wars occur near the beginning of the rivalry (Klein et al. 2006: 342). This suggests that the road to war and the outcomes of said wars may play a pivotal role in rivalry development.

Overall, we know relatively little about the onset of rivalries. Knowledge of the behavioral processes predating the onset of rivalry is particularly lacking. Why and when do states make choices which ultimately lead them down the rivalry path? States that are newly independent, lack the characteristics of democracies, or fail to engage in relevant international organizations are likely to become rivals, but these factors are largely processes that are outside the domain of foreign policy action and behavior. How do we explain the behavioral development of the process? To explain the process of rivalry onset I develop a theory of power politics behavior on the road to conflict.

The Steps-to-Rivalry

The steps-to-rivalry model predicts that the development of rivalry will occur through a series of steps which combine to make a rivalry outcome probable. The model is not a deterministic process, but a process model whereby each action a state takes on the road to rivalry increases the probability of the event occurring. Events along the road to rivalry only make a rivalry outcome more probable, not automatic. The factors most likely to result in rivalry are power politics strategies such as the construction of alliances, participation in military buildups, and the use of escalating bargaining demands. When the application of these strategies is examined it is found that each factor actually leads to the onset of rivalry rather than deterrence and peace. Threatening actions rather than preventing further conflict actually make it more likely. This theory is counterintuitive to conventional wisdom in many ways since the practices I suggest bring about rivalry are typically seen as symptoms of rivalry, not causes.

The Model

This model considers the development of rivalry as a stepwise process. States that use realpolitik strategies in response to a potential enemy will increase the probability that the pair of states will eventually form an intense rivalry. Using these power politics strategies will make states lock into conflict that will escalate to the condition of dangerous rivalry and, quite likely, war.

The first step in the model is the existence of a contentious issue in dispute between two states. World politics is not about the distribution of influence in general, but about influence as it pertains to the decision making calculus surrounding issues of importance to external state

relationships. Early on, Diehl (1985) uncovered a connection between contiguity and major power rivalry. We now know that territorial issues are more critical than simple location dynamics (Senese 2005), yet early work on contiguity was important in highlighting the importance of territorial issues as steps towards rivalry (Huth 1996; Tir and Diehl 2002; Colaresi, Rasler et al. 2008).

Territorial issues produce greater commitment by states in that the nature of the conflict becomes symbolic rather than divisible (Vasquez and Valeriano 2009). Issues are more difficult to resolve when they contain transcendent properties because solutions must deal with the abstract qualities of the issue under consideration. Territorial issues tend to generate realpolitik responses (Hensel 2000) due to the symbolic and abstract qualities of the territory under question. Rarely is a territorial dispute fought over a tract of land with a sure value; instead territorial disputes tend to be fought over desolate or inaccessible locations. While territory is concrete and divisible, in practice the disputes over territorial questions are never very simple to solve because of their transcendent properties.

Realpolitik actions aim to increase the security of one state, but usually they end up creating a decrease in security of its potential rival. Perceiving a decrease in their own security, the opposing state employs their own realpolitik tactics in the context of pressing issues. The state seeks to “burn” or harm the enemy by denying them any sort of gain on pertinent issues. The situation develops into a conflict spiral and security dilemma, making the use of power politics tactics over salient issues the initial step on the road to rivalry.ⁱⁱ Ethnic disputes handled in a similar fashion will also produce rivalry. The mechanism in operation is the choice of power politics strategies.

Alliances are the second step to rivalry. Alliances are written formal agreements between at least a pair of states that commit a state to either intervene in a conflict, agree to remain neutral in conflict, or to consult the other state if conflict erupts (Gibler and Sarkees 2002). Traditionally alliances have been seen as factors that either adds to power or they can be ways to deter aggression by opposing states. These two views have been challenged by history that either suggests alliances actually detract from power by being restraining factors (Schroeder 1994) or extend deterrence commitments to third parties rendering direct deterrence irrelevant and illogical.

Alliances are the key trigger to the rivalry process. It seems that alliances are factors that lead to the onset of rivalry and also contribute to the onset of complex wars (Valeriano and Vasquez 2010). Alliances are meant to increase the security of one state but tend to decrease the security of both sides (Vasquez 1993). Instead of adding to the power of state, demonstrating resolve, or deterring an aggressor state, alliances seem to lock states into a rivalry relationship by encouraging the development of similar strategies in the opposing side—either to catch up and achieve a balance of power or due to the psychological need of the leadership to demonstrate activity in the face of threats.

Alliances signal intent to another potential rival. Alliances increase insecurity and provoke military buildups, as well as counter alliances rather than submission. The response to alliances formed by threats tends to be one of threat, reaction, and protection. There is a threat to a pressing issue at stake and the other side responds; it chooses to escalate and not back down. When this happens there are few options left to decision-makers short of war and one option is the formation and utilization of alliances to deter future escalation. Alliances do not deter future conflict but only encourage it.

The third step to rivalry is an arms race or mutual military buildup. These actions signify the rapid buildup and acceleration of two opposing state's military capabilities. Military buildups are a process by which two states compete to develop their capabilities to prevent attacks by another state. Two main elements comprise the arms race relationship, interaction and acceleration (Richardson 1960; Sample 1998). An arms race signifies a competition between one state and another. A single state can have a military buildup, but this process is not mutual unless another state also competes and races. The other element fundamental to the arms race process is acceleration. The buildup of military capabilities must be significantly higher than in previous years to constitute a real threat to the other side. Without a significant buildup, how would the other side know that there is a strategic danger posed by their enemy?

The arms race process is relatively simple in that one state builds up its arms for either internal (domestic industry, internal threats, leadership turnover) or external (threats, force modernization, weapons advancements) reasons. This buildup then compels a developing enemy to do the same, locking each side into rivalry. Counterintuitively, mutual military buildups decrease the security of both sides instead of providing further protection like most policy makers seem to believe. Building up an arsenal only increases the probability that the opposing side will build up its own arsenal in a similar manner. In this case, the security dilemma results whereby alliances and mutual military buildups create a context and provide the opportunity for the development of rivalry. A strategy of peace through strength sets in motion the security dilemma common in international politics (Herz 1950; Jervis 1978). Making an alliance or building up one's military may not always lead to war, but it will certainly be associated with rivalry relationships and development of the rivalry conflict spiral because of the psychological

and strategic impact of such processes. When conducted in a climate of fear, threats, and aggressive posturing, arms races or alliances will lead to the development of rivalries.

The fourth step to rivalry is escalating bargaining demands. One constant truth in international interactions is that threats beget threats when demands are made in the context of repeated disputes. Threatening other international actors with violence and extreme demands only brings about the onset of international rivalry, not the resolution of the issue concerns. Under certain contexts, threats and provocations can be ignored as frivolous. What cannot be ignored is when the threats take on an escalating nature of increasing demands as time goes on. As threats escalate in terms of consequences, the probability of rivalry then increases.

Leng's (1983) early studies are important to uncover this behavioral process critical to the onset of rivalry. The power politics style of international diplomacy focuses on utilizing power and resolve to spur concessions and achieve results. Unfortunately, demands escalate as successes are achieved in other arenas. Actors who participate in escalating threats are rejecting the prudential version of realism (Morgenthau 1948) in favor of a more offensive version of realist political theory (Mearsheimer 2001). Regrettably, the offensive version of realism fails to conform to reality and thus can lead a state to make bad decisions (Valeriano 2009). One such bad decision is the use of coercive bargaining tactics (Leng 1983) because they are assumed to be required responses when in fact they only setup the situation of rivalry.

Escalation is an unsuitable way to tackle a threat from an enemy. When an animal is threatened, cornered, and beaten it tends to lash out rather than submit. Even in the face of overwhelming defeat an opposing actor will lash out rather than be humiliated without responding. Vasquez and Valeriano (2010) demonstrate that escalating bargaining demands early in a rivalry are important correlates of some types of war. The remaining question is how

escalating bargaining demands impact the process of rivalry development. The prediction here is that when demands escalate early in a rivalry the states will likely lock in as permanent rivals.

The fifth step to rivalry is rivalry linkages.ⁱⁱⁱ Very few scholars have investigated the impact of linkages between disputes. By linkages I do not mean how issues within a rivalry are linked, but how two different dyadic rivalries are linked to another set of rivals or enemies. In short, how are rivalries connected and how does this impact the development of a rivalry? Of course rivalry does not occur in isolation. When India fights Pakistan, every other state in the region is a witness. What is unclear is what impact the observation of these behaviors will have on relationships between developing enemies.

The view presented in this work follows the overarching power politics theme outlined in my steps-to-rivalry theory. When states utilize power and threats to spur favorable action in the opposing side they are more likely to provoke an equal and escalatory reaction from the other side. The theory presented here suggests that movements to protect state security outside of a rivalry will escalate the rivalry of interest at the same time. Threats to another enemy only will provoke that enemy into responding and might also provoke other regional actors to join the developing fray.

The actions within one dyadic pairing will link up and impact the relationship of another pair of states. This type of interactive relationship is what I term a rivalry linkage.^{iv} Rivalries do not exist independent of other disputes between states. A dispute is linked to a rivalry if a party outside the dyad has a dispute with one member involved in a rivalry during the lifetime of that rivalry. The linkages between other disputes connect a rivalry to its ongoing threat environment in the region or international community.

Major power status should also be included as a factor that can help predict who will become rivals. Major power states fit the profile of the type of state likely to engage in rivalry. They have expansive issue concerns, making it more likely that they will conflict with any state in system over a foreign policy concern. Major power states have the economic ability to fund weapons purchases and increases, making military buildups more likely. Finally, major powers are typically sought after alliance partners because of their power projection capabilities. Considering these three facts leads one to theorize that major powers will be more likely to engage in rivalry than minor powers.

Hypotheses

The hypotheses tested here treat rivalry as the dependent variable and seek to explain the process of rivalry development. This study will be concerned with factors that distinguish isolated conflicts from proto and enduring rivalries.^v Handling crisis (or rivalries) with responses associated with power politics (alliance making and military buildups) will increase the probability that an isolated conflict between two states will become a proto-rivalry (3-5 disputes) or an enduring rivalry (6+ disputes over 20 years). The use of power politics strategies leads a state on the path to a rivalry conflict spiral. Each state identifies the other as an enemy and attempts to deny benefits to that enemy. During the life of a rivalry, states send signals to each other. The formation of alliances and arms races are negative signals that may increase hostility between a dyad. From this logic, hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2 would be expected to be true.

H1.1 Pairs of states that form politically relevant alliances against each other are more likely to become involved in proto-rivalries and enduring rivalries.

H1.2 Pairs of states that participate in mutual military buildups are more likely to become involved in proto-rivalries and enduring rivalries.

Hypothesis two presents the additive probability hypothesis. In combination, the factors of politically relevant alliances, mutual military buildups, and territorial disputes are more likely to lead to dangerous (enduring or proto rivals) rivalries.

H2: Pairs of states that form politically relevant alliances against each other, participate in mutual military buildups, and have a significant amount of territorial disputes are more likely to become involved in proto-rivalries and enduring rivalries.

In testing the additive models of rivalry development, this study will rely on multinomial logit modeling to determine the impact of each independent variable on the outcome. An independent variable in this paper is politically relevant alliances, which are taken from the work of Senese and Vasquez (2005). Alliances are relevant only if they include a major power or a minor power target state from the same region as the dyad. The alliance must be formed at least three months prior to the dispute, only outside alliances were counted here (either both sides or one side had an alliance). No distinction was made between types of alliances or the purpose of the alliance. In the future it might be useful to further investigate the types of alliances that lead to rivalry but first we must uncover the basic dynamics at work. Alliance information is taken from Correlates of War (COW) alliance version 3.0 (Gibler and Sarkees 2002). Mutual military buildups are taken from Sample's (2002) data that includes both major and minor power mutual military buildups. Sample codes a mutual military buildup if both states exhibit an overall increase in military spending in the ten years prior to a dispute. This is in comparison to the military spending of the state over its entire history. Over a ten year window, there must be a marked increase in expenditures during the five years of the time under scrutiny.

The main dependent variable in this analysis is taken from Diehl and Goertz's (2000) coding of rivalry. Diehl and Goertz distinguish which pairs of states are the most dangerous rivals, enduring rivals: those which have had at least six disputes over a twenty-year period and who do not have any long-standing enmity directed toward the other. The next category is proto rivalries, which includes pairs of states with three or more disputes within a twenty-year time period. Isolated conflicts represent the non-rivalry category because these dyads have between one or two militarized interstate disputes. While not examples of 'peaceful' dyads, the isolated conflicts do represent non-rivalry interactions in that the disputes do not repeat, and thus are therefore a suitable reference category.

The unit of analysis is the historical rivalry dyad. Territory is clearly an important factor in the onset of war and is another variable used in this study. Per Vasquez and Leskiw (2001), a dyadic observation is coded as positive if 25% of the MIDs in a dyad are over territorial revisionist issues. According to our working definition of rivalry, rival dyads can and will fight over any issue relevant to their interactions but territorial issues usually start the process. The control variables used in this study include contiguity and major powers. States that are contiguous are most likely to get into disputes (Bremer 1992). It is important to control for contiguity to ensure that findings on alliances are not spurious or driven by proximity, rather than other factors. I also include status as a predictive variable. Since major power states are more likely than any other type of state to become involved in conflict (Bremer 1992) and also rivalry (Colaesi et. all 2008).

Developing Rivalry Relationships

Here the dependent variable is rivalry type. Predicted probabilities were calculated to suggest the substantive interpretations of each coefficient. Preliminary analysis (see Valeriano 2003) demonstrates that according to the base probability of the event, 51.6 enduring rivalries were expected to have positive alliance observations during this stage. The fact that 60 enduring rivalries display a positive observation for alliance formation shows that the relationship is strongly positive. Similar dynamics are at work for the proto rivalry stage. For this category 195 rivalries exhibit alliance behavior (out of a possible 223). The expected count was 182.6. These results give us confidence to proceed with a statistical examination of the topic.

Insert Table 1 Here

Table 1 presents results for a multinomial logit test for hypothesis 1.1. The results support the proposition that states forming relevant alliances against each other are more likely to become involved in proto and enduring rivalries but are less likely to be observed in isolated conflicts (hypothesis 1.1). For the enduring rivalry category, relevant alliances generate a coefficient of 1.556 and are statistically significant. Major power dyads generate a coefficient of 1.502 and are also statistically significant. For the proto rivalry category, relevant alliances generate a coefficient of 0.511 and are statistically significant at 0.025. Major powers have a similar impact at 1.245 and the factor is statistically significant as well.

Predicted probabilities illustrate the statistics in a different way. If the values for relevant alliances and contiguity are set at one, the probabilities are 0.072 for enduring rivalry, 0.224 for proto rivalry, and 0.702 for isolated conflicts. If the values are set to zero, isolated conflict has a predicted probability of 0.860 having a negative difference of 0.158. While the highest predicted probability (0.860) is found during the isolated conflict stage, it is important to note that this

prediction is based on the absence of alliances and contiguity. When relevant alliances are observed, the probability decreases to 0.702. The direction of the relationship between isolated conflict and relevant alliances is negative or, simply, the lack of alliances during the isolated stage also corresponds to a lack in observed rivalries.

Proto rivalry has a probability of occurring at 0.126 and enduring rivalry has a probability of 0.012 when relevant alliances are present. The probability for proto rivalry almost doubles when the factors are present. The outcome increases close to six times for enduring rivalry (0.072). The relationship is even stronger when the values are set to one for a relevant alliance, contiguity, and a major power dyad. For enduring rivalry, a positive observation results in a probability of 0.168, and a zero observation results in a value of 0.012.

Insert Table 2 Here

A bivariate preliminary analysis (Valeriano 2003) once again demonstrates that there is relationship between military buildups and rivalry. According to the enduring rivalry category, there should be 6.23 observations during this stage. In reality, there were 25 observations. Mutual military buildups occur more frequently than would be expected by chance. For the proto rivalry category there are 29 dyads that engage in mutual military buildups while only 21 were expected.

Table 2 presents results for a multinomial logit test for hypothesis 1.2. The results support the proposition that states participating in mutual military buildups against each other are more likely to become involved in proto and enduring rivalries. For the enduring rivalry category, military buildups generate a coefficient of 2.154, and this factor is statistically significant at 0.003. Major power dyads generate a coefficient of 1.125 that is statistically significant at 0.000.

For the proto-rivalry category, military buildups generate a coefficient of 0.738 and are statistically significant at 0.003. Major power dyads have a similar impact at 1.08, and the factor is statistically significant at 0.000.

Predicted probabilities show that if the values for military buildup and contiguity are set at one, the probabilities are 0.242 for enduring rivalry, 0.288 for proto-rivalry, and 0.469 for isolated conflicts. If the values are set to zero, isolated conflict has a predicted probability of 0.765, creating a difference of 0.296. Proto-rivalry has a probability of 0.194 and 0.040 for enduring rivalry. While the probabilities for the proto-rivalries do not increase much with military buildups, enduring rivalry moves from a probability of 0.040 to 0.242, representing an increase by almost a factor of six.

The relationship is even stronger when the values are set to one for a military buildup, contiguity, and a major power dyad. For enduring rivalry, a positive observation results in a probability of 0.036 and a zero observation results in a value of 0.349. For proto-rivalry, if all values are set to zero, the probability is 0.176; if the values are set to one, the probability is 0.401.

Relevant alliances are the first and most important factor investigated. Those pairs of states that participate in relevant alliances (at least one outside alliance) are more likely to become involved in rivalry. This analysis shows that rivalry is more likely if states are involved in mutual military buildups. The probability of the occurrence of proto and enduring rivalry increases when mutual military buildups are present. Accordingly, the probability of isolated conflict decreases when mutual military buildups are present. While mutual military buildups are consistent with the hypotheses presented here as probabilistic sufficient conditions of rivalry,

they are not necessary conditions. Not all proto or enduring rivals have experienced mutual military buildups.

It is clear that alliances are important for the development of rivalry. Prior to or during the first two disputes, it is likely that a proto or enduring rivalry dyad used alliances to bolster their security. This usually results in the formation and development of rivalry itself rather than a decrease in tensions as policy makers typically hope. Any attempt to increase a state's security early in the process usually results in a perceived decrease in security for the opposing side. The power politics processes which these events trigger become the causal mechanism for the development of rivalry.

Extensive testing on the timing of events (Valeriano 2003) also reveals there is no consistent pattern like the one observed in the timing of mutual military buildups. In all likelihood, military buildups occur late in the life of a rivalry. There are 45 cases of mutual military buildups during the early rivalry stage, and twenty-four of these led directly to war, thus ending the rivalry. Twenty-one of these cases did not lead to war, and these cases should be selected out for further qualitative investigation. One cannot assume that arms races will occur only during a rivalry relationship; rather, a significant number of mutual military buildups occur outside of rivalries.

The Complete Additive Model

Table 3 presents results for a multinomial logit test of what we call the complete additive steps to rivalry model. This table directly tests hypothesis two. All the factors previously

investigated are added into one model. Here we consider the combined effects of military buildups, alliances, territory disputes, contiguity, and major powers.

Insert Table 3 Here

The results support the proposition that states who form politically relevant alliances, participate in military buildups, and fight territorial disputes are more likely to become involved in proto and enduring rivalries. For the enduring rivalry category, politically relevant alliances generate a coefficient of 1.389 and are statistically significant at 0.019. Military buildups produce a coefficient of 2.105 and are statistically significant at 0.000. The 25% territory variable produces a coefficient of 0.654 and is statistically significant at 0.018. Contiguity has a positive impact on the model but is not statistically significant at 0.218, much like the results in the other models. Major power dyads generate a coefficient of 1.15, and this coefficient is statistically significant.

For the proto rivalry category, military buildups generate a coefficient of 0.714 and are statistically significant. Politically relevant alliances produce a coefficient of 0.496 and are statistically significant. The twenty-five percent territory variable also produces a positive coefficient of 0.454 and is statistically significant at 0.004.

Insert Table 4 Here

Tables 4a and 4b present the predicted probability results for military buildups and alliances if the values are set to one or zero for each observation. It is important to note that the steps to rivalry theory predicts the onset of proto rivalry as well as or better than the onset of an enduring rivalry.

The relationship is even stronger when the values are set to one for politically relevant alliances, military buildup, and twenty-five percent territory. For enduring rivalry, a positive observation results in a probability of 0.2802, and a zero observation results in a value of 0.0092. For proto-rivalry, if all values are set to zero, the probability is 0.1143; if the values are set to one, the probability is 0.2939. The final additive model shows a high probability for the combined factors of alliances, military buildups, twenty-five percent territory, and major powers. For enduring rivalry, the probability of rivalry occurring is 0.389 if the values for the factors are set to one (Table 4d). For proto-rivalry, the probability is also close at 0.401 for a rivalry to occur if the values for the factors are set to one.

It is clear that dyads that have territorial disputes (specifically more than 25% of the disputes are territorial in nature) are more likely to become rivals. While not every dispute in which a dyad fights has to be territorial to make the dyad dangerous, those dyads having a significant number of territorial disputes are likely to become rivals. Politically relevant alliances and mutual military buildups are all important conditions for rivalry development. Each event makes the outcome of rivalry more likely to occur. This theory is additive in that the factors of territorial disputes, major power involvement, mutual military buildups, and politically relevant alliances all combine to increase the probability of proto and enduring rivalry occurrence.

From this study, a few typical paths to rivalry can be observed. The path with the highest probability of rivalry occurrence involves the use of politically relevant alliances, mutual military buildups, repeated territorial conflicts, and major power dyads.

Insert Table 5 Here

Table 5 presents the rank order probabilities of the occurrence of both enduring rivalry and proto-rivalry. There is a 0.013 probability of an enduring rivalry if the pair of states does not have an alliance. This probability increases to 0.389 if they have a politically relevant alliance, a mutual military buildup, territorial disputes, and are major powers. The base probability for proto-rivalry, if neither state has an outside alliance, is 0.137. This probability increases to 0.401 if the pair of states has an alliance, military buildup, territorial disputes, and is a major power.

Conclusion

The original query of this chapter was to determine what the field knows about the origins of rivalry. The use of traditional power politics is associated with severe manifestations of both *war and rivalry*. This analysis suggests that certain practices of power politics, namely alliances, are important conditions for setting in motion a pattern of recurring disputes that result in interstate rivalry, and then possibly, warfare.

In this paper, I have found that relevant alliances are key factors in development of both proto and enduring rivalry. The formation of alliances represents a significant step along the road to rivalry. When states use alliances in response to an initial dispute, they are likely to experience recurring conflict. I also find that mutual military buildups are probabilistic conditions for the development of rivalry. While mutual military buildups are not necessary conditions of rivalry, we do know that if a state participates in a mutual military buildup and it does not go to war during the first two disputes, the dyad is likely to become rivals.

It is also important to note that power politics foreign policy practices come into use early in the life of a rivalry. Dyads that are enduring or proto-rivals are likely to have formed politically relevant alliances early on. It remains for in-depth case studies to be undertaken to

show the causal path between initial disputes, alliance formation and escalation to the proto and enduring rival stages.

This work has presented rivalry as a process, and these stages of rivalry development need to be taken into account in any analysis of the formation of rivals. One cannot look at enduring rivals alone, but must also investigate the factors present in proto-rivals and isolated conflicts. The steps-to-rivalry are clear. Politically relevant alliances, mutual military buildups, territorial disputes, and major power dyads are more likely to become rivals if these factors are present. Added to previous findings regarding rivalry development (shocks, lack of democracy, born fighting, and escalating bargaining demands), we now have a start to the narrative story about rivalry origins.

I have argued that power politics strategies are dangerous precedents in international interactions. States that use power politics practices are likely to become dangerous rivals. While policy advice, up to this point, is premature, states should avoid threatening actions because it is likely those actions will lead to security dilemmas and rivalry. Those states involved in rivalry are the most likely dyads to become involved in war. To avoid war, one must avoid rivalry in the first place.

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Table 1

Relevant Alliances and Rivalry

Coefficient Estimates, Multinomial Logit Model for Rivalry Type

	Outcome					
	Proto Rivalry			Enduring Rivalry		
Independent Variables	Coefficient	S.E.	P> z	Coefficient	S.E.	P> z
R. Alliance	0.511	.228	0.025	1.556	.594	0.009
Contiguity	0.262	.167	0.116	0.395	.273	0.149
Major Powers	1.245	.222	0.000	1.502	.321	0.000
Constant	-2.039	.227	0.000	-4.36	.579	0.000

Isolated Conflict is reference category

N = 1166

Prob > chi2 = 0.000

Log likelihood = -769.631

Predicted Probabilities for Rivalry Type

	<u>Isolated Conflict</u>	<u>Proto Rivalry</u>	<u>Enduring Rivalry</u>
A) No Alliance + No Cont.	0.860	0.126	0.012
Alliance + Cont.	0.702	0.224	0.072
Difference	-0.158	0.098	0.060
B) No Alliance + No Cont. + No Major	0.875	0.113	0.011
Alliance + Cont. + Major Power	0.419	0.411	0.168
Difference	-0.456	0.298	0.157

Table 2

Mutual Military Buildups and Rivalry Type

Coefficient Estimates, Multinomial Logit Model for Rivalry Type

	Outcome					
	Proto Rivalry			Enduring Rivalry		
Independent Variables	Coefficient	S.E.	P> z	Coefficient	S.E.	P> z
Military Buildups	0.738	.252	0.003	2.154	.304	0.003
Contiguity	0.145	.167	0.387	0.119	.283	0.387
Major Power	1.08	.224	0.000	1.125	.336	0.000
Constant	-1.49	.108	0.000	-3.709	.210	0.000

Isolated Conflict is reference category

N = 1001

Prob > chi2 = 0.000

Log likelihood = -695.924

Predicted Probabilities for Rivalry Type

	<u>Isolated Conflict</u>	<u>Proto Rivalry</u>	<u>Enduring Rivalry</u>
A) No Buildup + No Cont.	0.765	0.194	0.04
Buildup + Cont.	0.469	0.288	0.242
Difference	-0.296	0.094	0.158
B) No Buildup + No Cont. + No Major	0.786	0.176	0.036
Buildup + Cont. + Major Power	0.249	0.401	0.349
Difference	-0.537	0.225	0.313

Table 3
Complete Rivalry Model
Coefficient Estimates, Multinomial Logit Model for Rivalry Type

	Outcome					
	Proto Rivalry			Enduring Rivalry		
Independent Variables	Coefficient	S.E.	P> z	Coefficient	S.E.	P> z
Military Buildup	0.714	.258	0.006	2.105	.304	0.000
Alliance	0.496	.229	0.031	1.389	.591	0.019
25% Terr	0.454	.159	0.004	0.654	.274	0.018
Contiguity	0.223	.169	0.186	0.345	.280	0.218
Major Power	1.13	.220	0.000	1.15	.339	0.001
Constant	-2.22	.235	0.000	-4.789	.586	0.000

Isolated Conflict is reference category

Robust Standard Errors

N = 1166

Prob > chi2 = 0.000

Log likelihood = -739.569

Table 4
Predicted Probabilities for Complete Rivalry Model

	<u>Isolated</u> <u>Conflict</u>	<u>Proto</u> <u>Rivalry</u>	<u>Enduring</u> <u>Rivalry</u>
A) No			
Military			
Buildup	0.788	0.179	0.032
Military			
Buildup	0.555	0.259	0.185
Difference	-0.233	0.08	0.153
B) No			
Alliance	0.8495	0.137	0.013
Alliance	0.7531	0.199	0.047
Difference	-0.096	0.062	0.034
C) Alliance, Mutual Military Buildup, 25% Territory			
No	0.8765	0.1143	0.0092
Yes	0.4259	0.2939	0.2802
Difference	-0.451	0.179	0.271
D) Alliance, M-Military Buildup, 25% Territory, Major Power			
No	0.888	0.103	0.008
Yes	0.209	0.401	0.389
Difference	-0.679	0.298	0.381

Table 5

Paths to Rivalry: Rank Order of Predicted Probabilities

Enduring Rivalry:

.389	Alliance, Military Buildup, Territory, and Major Powers
.280	Alliance, Military Buildup, and Territory
.239	Military Buildup and Territory
.185	Military Buildup
.066	Alliance and Territory
.047	Alliance
.013	No Alliance

Proto-Rivalry

.401	Alliance, Military Buildup, Territory, and Major Powers
.294	Military Buildup and Territory
.294	Alliance, Military Buildup, and Territory
.259	Military Buildup
.247	Alliance and Territory
.199	Alliance
.137	No Alliance

ⁱ A militarized interstate dispute is a threat, display, or use of force (Ghosn, Palmer et al. 2004) condoned by government actors. Past efforts to code and categorize MIDs (Gochman and Maoz 1984; Jones, Bremer et al. 1996) have had a large impact on the study of rivalry as a field. Without the existence of the MID dataset scholars would be hard pressed to identify who fights so often in the system.

ⁱⁱ Multiple issues are likely to make rivalries endure and persist (Dyer 2010), but it is unclear if the number of issues at stake has an impact on the development of a rivalry.

ⁱⁱⁱ Unfortunately due to space limitations data analysis for the hypotheses regarding escalatory tactics and rivalry linkages remain unexplored in this volume. Consult Valeriano (2003) for a full analysis.

^{iv} Diehl and Goertz (2000) also investigate rivalry linkages but they study how rivals are linked to other parties through alliances or mutual engagement in the same dispute. Not how some disputes will influence new disputes.

^v A key reason the Diehl and Goertz (2000) data was used since it contains variance on the dependent variable utilized here.