the warrior (entropic and supportive), as well as Morten Ender's empirical examination and discussion of communicational connections between soldiers and families.

From a heuristic perspective, this volume offers a number of starting points. In connecting the military with the larger society, Fabian Virchow discusses the integration of German military with the German sports association to suggest the fertility of examining the military in connection with other societal components, while Obraztov reflects on the historical importance of civil–military relations in the military sociology of the former Soviet Union and contemporary Russia. In an intriguing article, Anne Irwin, using an ethnomethodological approach, facilitates an understanding of the difficulties and complexities between realism and reality in training Canadian forces. Ulrich vom Hagen offers a thesis of integration between the German military forces and the Protestant church, using the theoretical perspectives of Weber's sociology of religion and Pierre Bourdieu's concept of habitus. Claude Weber examines the evolvement of concerns following the elimination of conscription in France. The volume concludes with a small-scale study by Paul Higate that examines a correlation between the skills encountered in military training and survivorship as a homeless person.

From a critical perspective, the diversity of the contributing authors and the subjects examined create difficulty in placing this effort in a category with other works. From this reviewer's point of view, the title promises much more than the volume delivers. While some different paradigms are introduced, most are but a different angle of those we have previously used. For example, the classical theory offered by Max Weber, Georg Simmel, and Karl Marx served as the foundation for some of the chapters. Furthermore, and as is generally the case with an edited volume, the quality of the presentations is uneven in intellectual depth and thoroughness. In this light, it is unfortunate that the work, as a whole, loses some credibility.

Ultimately, sufficient stimuli are provided to encourage military sociologists to reflect and think of some new directions for their future theoretical and empirical efforts. To this degree, Ouellet realizes his aim.

Jay Stanley
Towson University, Professor Emeritus

Feaver, P. D., and Gelpi, C. (2003). *Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

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The civil-military gap regarding public-opinion preferences has long been debated but hardly analyzed with extensive empirical data and techniques. The civil-military gap refers to the difference in opinion between the American general public at large

and the military population. A gap in perceptions could have implications for civil-military relations, cooperation, decisions to use force, and military effectiveness. At no time in our history is the question more important than in the post-9/11 world in which the use of force as an instrument of policy has gained increased traction. Another key factor is the willingness of the enemy to use asymmetric tactics to strike the military and population to extract casualties aimed at winning the battle for public opinion.

Virtually no one with military experience supported or advocated the war in Iraq before the March 2003 invasion. Most were against the military option to deal with the possibility of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and democracy. All those who supported the war as well as perhaps additional options against Iran and Syria had never served time in the military. The hawks and doves clearly illustrate the current debate as to the means and ends of American foreign policy. Yet, it is the military that acts as the doves and the public elite that acts as the (chicken) hawks.

Entering into this debate, Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi of Duke University attempt to settle the question of the civil-military gap empirically. Their fascinating book, *Choosing Your Battles,* is the result of a series of public surveys attempting to get at the heart of the civil-military debate in America. They find that Americans are not as casualty sensitive as previously thought. If the public feels a mission is worthwhile, it is willing to support potentially massive losses of human life. These perceptions as to the willingness to lose lives in military efforts are stable and rational perspectives as well as statistically significant. They also find that those in the military or connected to the military are likely to support “realpolitik” missions such as the defense of South Korea, but not interventionist missions such as the stabilization of democracy in the Congo. However, the general public is willing to support interventionist missions with high losses of life in situations in which human rights are a concern. The military would like to reserve the use of force to only missions that are in the “national interest,” whereas the public has a different view regarding the utility of military force.

Public opinion in America seems to be sharply divided between the Madeleine Albrights (hawks) and Colin Powells (doves) of the world. The Albrights are public elites who have not served in the military and tend to see the usefulness of force as unlimited. The Powells of the world are those who have served or are serving in the military and see the potential of military force as limited and to be used only in the last resort, with maximum effort. Fever and Gelpi have found empirical evidence to support the current trend of public elites who have no military experience yet advocate the use of force against threats when the military and veteran establishment resists this impulse.

An interesting trend the authors empirically identify is clearly the tendency for the Albrights of the world to want to use force for “interventionist” missions such as human-rights abuses or democratic stabilization. The Powells of the world would reserve the use of force for only those missions that are relevant to America’s

geostrategic position or in defense of an ally. In response to an interventionist issue's arising, the military and veteran groups' likely advice would be to do nothing. In response to a "realpolitik" issue's arising, the general public would rather use minimal force. The authors also report that as the proportion of veterans in government increases, it is less likely that the United States will initiate conflict against other states. Yet, if conflict is initiated, it also is likely that a massive amount of force will be used if there are significant numbers of veterans in government. Overall, the military feels that if force is used, it should be used decisively, in line with the Powell doctrine. This finding holds regardless of rank or branch of service.

The authors assert that the notion that the American public is casualty phobic is a myth. The general public is willing to accept the loss of life if it views the mission as important. The authors note, "on a range of missions, sizable majorities of the public are willing to tolerate substantial casualties" (p. 133). The key factor is how the mission is framed by the administration. If framed as an interventionist mission in support of basic rights, the general public is even much more willing than the military to accept the loss of life. Even for national-interest missions, the public is willing to accept casualties. High levels of approval for the president by the public also affect the willingness of the public to support combat operations. The only caveat in line with prior empirical research is that events matter. A significant loss of life in such battles as Mogadishu and Korea can erode public support, but this is a result of the negative flow of battles rather than the general perceptions of the public.

These overall patterns hold across political parties and age. Women and minorities are generally more interventionist but less willing to accept casualties. There seems to be no self-preservation instinct in the military in that it is willing to accept fatalities. In general, the question must be asked if it is ever acceptable to tolerate fatalities in the conduct of military operations. The reality of the use-of-force option in international politics is that some people will die, and the public seems willing to accept this reality if the missions are framed well and seem to be for a necessary purpose.

Empirically, this book is an impressive use of both qualitative survey methodology and advanced statistical techniques. An impressive number of procedures are executed, and all produce sound methodological justifications. Each regression model has important control variables accounted for, and the authors even test for selection bias and use simultaneous equations to model their hypothesis tests. The overall results are strong and robust. There can be no doubt that there is a civil-military gap in public opinion regarding the use of force.

As important and groundbreaking as this book is, it does have one critical flaw. For a book published in 2003, it is incomprehensible to use survey data to come to conclusions about the current direction of American Foreign Policy without reference to 9/11 and the Iraq war. The survey data used in *Choosing Your Battles* was collected before 9/11. I understand it might have been cost prohibitive to redo the entire survey, yet a limited survey with a few questions was at least warranted. The authors are seriously in danger of dating their results in that the use of force in the 9/11 world

may be an entirely different entity than the use of force before 9/11. As of yet, we do not know the answers to these questions, and this book could have been the definitive source in this debate.

At this point, the work is an important effort that leaves many questions unanswered as to the use of force and public opinion during the post-9/11 world order. It is still an important and groundbreaking book in the realm of public opinion and the use of force. It is a must read for anyone in government or the military who wishes to understand the important differences of opinion between the military and civilian groups. It is also important for those who wish to investigate how many casualties the public might accept and how the missions should be framed. The general conclusion is that the public will support combat operations (with high casualties) if the missions are framed in a way that is acceptable to the public at large.

Brandon Valeriano
University of Illinois at Chicago

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The extent to which far-reaching, cross-national trends are reconfiguring Western militaries has been a central feature of the armed forces and society debate since the end of the Cold War. Broadly termed the “postmodern” military thesis, the discussion has centered on the common technological, social, economic, and operational forces that appear to be reshaping civil-military relationships and the broader nature of Western military affairs. Within these areas, a disparate yet interrelated set of themes has emerged, including the increasingly joint-service and multinational character of military forces, the expansion of nontraditional military missions, the erosion of martial values in military culture, and the diminishing distinctions between military and civilian identities and roles. Underpinning much of this scholarship has been a shared, albeit often implicit, assumption that these trends would eventually affect all Western militaries in more or less the same way. That is, while admittedly uneven, the change patterns themselves have been viewed as largely universal. The present volume takes up many of these issues and diverges from much of the existing literature precisely on this latter point of homogeneous change.

In *Armed Forces and Society in Europe*, Anthony Forster offers an ambitious and comprehensive look at what are often divergent patterns of armed forces and society relations among European states. Rather than monolithic, Forster describes how different socially, historically, culturally, and politically contingent state contexts shape both the nature of armed forces and society pressures, and the manner of dealing