My Research:

Published

"The Dual Track theory of Moral Decision-Making: A Critique of the Neuroimaging Evidence" (2011) Neuroethics Vol. 4, pp 143-162.
Published Version | Final Draft | abstract Greene et al. claim that certain kinds of moral dilemmas activated brain regions specific to emotional responses, while others activated areas specific to cognition. This appears to indicate a dissociation between different types of moral reasoning. I re-evaluate these claims of specificity in light of subsequent empirical work. I argue that none of the cortical areas identified by Greene et al. are functionally specific: each is active in a wide variety of both cognitive and emotional tasks. I further argue that distinct activation across conditions is not strong evidence for dissociation. This undermines support for the dual-track hypothesis. I further argue that moral decision-making appears to activate a common network that underlies self-projection: the ability to imagine oneself from a variety of viewpoints in a variety of situations. I argue that the utilization of self-projection indicates a continuity between moral decision-making and other kinds of complex social deliberation. This may have normative consequences, but teasing them out will require careful attention to both empirical and philosophical concerns.

"Response to Tumulty on Pain and Imperatives" (2010) The Journal of Philosophy Vol. CVII, No. 10, pp 554-557.
Final Draft | abstract Maura Tumulty recently raised two good objections to my imperative account of pain. I respond.

“Critical Notice: Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind by Robert Rupert” (2010)
The Journal of Mind and Behavior Vol 34 No 3&4.
Published Version | Penultimate Draft | abstract A review of Robert Rupert's recent book.

“Redeployed Functions Versus Spreading Activation: A Potential Confound” (2010)
Commentary on “Neural reuse: A fundamental organizational principle of the brain”
by Michael L. Anderson. Behavioral and Brain Sciences Vol. 33, pp. 280-281
Final Draft | abstract Anderson's meta-analysis of fMRI data is subject to a potential confound. Areas identified as active may make no functional contribution to the task being studied, or may indicate regions involved in the coordination of functional networks rather than information processing per se. I suggest a way in which fMRI adaptation studies might provide a useful test between these alternatives.

"Images are not the Evidence of Neuroimaging"
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (2010) Vol. 61, pp. 265-278.
Published Version | Penultimate Draft | abstractI argue that various skeptical arguments about neuroimages reduce to (justified) skepticism about the use of null hypothesis significance testing to establish functional hypotheses about the brain. This skepticism is properly restricted neuroimages, though, and cannot be extended to all evidence from fMRI. Neuroimages play an supporting role for this other, better evidence.

"Confirmation, Refutation and The Evidence of fMRI"
Chris Mole and Colin Klein
In Foundational Issues in Human Brain Mapping (2010), pp99-112.
MIT press | abstract We argue that fMRI results must test hypotheses in a strong sense. Mere 'consistency' with a theory under consideration, although a common test, is too weak a standard for neuroscientific evidence.

"Philosophical Issues in Neuroimaging"
Philosophy Compass (2010) Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 186-198.
Published Version | abstract Functional neuroimaging (NI) technologies like Positron Emission Tomography and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) have revolutionized neuroscience, and provide crucial tools to link cognitive psychology and traditional neuroscientific models. A growing discipline of 'neurophilosophy' brings fMRI evidence to bear on traditional philosophical issues such as weakness of will, moral psychology, rational choice, social interaction, free will, and consciousness. NI has also attracted critical attention from psychologists and from philosophers of science. I review debates over the evidential status of fMRI, including the differences between brain scans and ordinary images, the legitimacy of forward inference and reverse inference, and deductive versus probabilistic accounts of NI evidence. I conclude with a discussion of fMRI as exploratory rather than confirmatory evidence, linking this debate to the growing literature on cognitive ontology.

"Reduction without Reductionism: A Defence of Nagel on Connectability"
Philosophical Quarterly (2009) Vol. 59, No. 234, pp. 39-53.
Philosophical Quarterly version | abstract Nagel's overall account of reduction has been rightly abandoned, but Nagel's theory of inter-theoretic connection has more life in it than many suppose. Unlike its metaphysical successors, it aptly handles cases where reduction requires complex representations of a target domain. Taking Nagel's condition of connectability seriously gives a powerful view of reduction, but one that requires us to index explanatory power to sciences as they are formulated at particular times.

"Dispositional Implementation Solves the Superfluous Structure Problem"
Synthese (2008) Vol. 165, No. 2, pp. 141-153
Penultimate Draft | abstract Some argue that consciousness supervenes on activity while computation supervenes on structure, and so conscious states cannot supervene on computational ones. I argue that the computationalist can avoid the Superfluous Structure Problem by moving to a dispositional theory of implementation. Dispositional computationalism thus permits episodes of computational activity that correspond to potential episodes of conscious awareness. The Superfluous Structure Problem cannot be motivated against this account, and so computationalism may be preserved.

"An Ideal Solution to Disputes about Multiply Realized Kinds,"
Philosophical Studies (2008) Vol. 140, No. 2, pp. 161-177.
Penultimate Draft | abstract Some terms are thought to pick out Multiply Realizable properties. I argue that MR properties are ontologically problematic, and that these terms actually pick out idealizing models. Idealizing explanation has many of the features normally associated with explanation by MR kinds. As idealized models are usually mere possibilia,though, such explanations do not run into metaphysical problems.

"An Imperative Theory of Pain,"
The Journal of Philosophy (2007) Vol. CIV, No. 10, pp 517–532.
Penultimate Draft | abstractI argue that the phenomenal contents of pains supervenes on their intentional contents, but that the intentional content is imperative rather than representational. Pains are negative imperatives that proscribe against using one's body in particular ways. This view allows for a unified account of many types of pain, including pains that do not involve tissue damage. It also allows for integration with a biologically plausible story about the functional role of pain. It also allows pains to be inherently motivating while accommodating the phenomenology of traditionally problematic cases like morphine pain.

"Kicking the Kohler Habit,"
Philosophical Psychology (2007) Vol. 20, No. 5, pp. 609–619.
Penultimate Draft | abstractContrary to the familiar story about Kohler, recent research shows that subjects adapted to inverting goggles do not have their vision re-invert upon re-mastery of motor skills. I argue that this is problematic for the strong forms of enactivism that have relied on Kohler's supposed result

"Events as Changes in the Layout of Affordances."
Chemero A, Klein C, and Cordeiro, W Ecological Psychology (2003). 15(1), 19-28.
Chemero's Pre-publication Draft | abstractThomas Stoffregen 2000 questions the possibility of ecological event perception research. This paper describes experiments performed to examine the perception of the disappearance of gap-crossing affordances, a variety of event as defined by Chemero 2000. We found that subjects reliably perceive both gap-crossing affordances and the disappearance of gap-crossing affordances. Our findings provide empirical evidence in favor of understanding events as changes in the layout of affordances, shoring up event perception research in ecological psychology.

Forthcoming

"Imperatives, Phantom Pains, and Hallucination by Presupposition"
Forthcoming in Philosophical Psychology
Online First | Final Draft | abstract Phantom limb pains are imperatives with false presuppositions. This explains several apparently conflicting intuitions about phantom pains, and sheds some light on the psychological harm done by chronic pain.

"Multiple Realizability and the Semantic View of Theories" Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.
Online First | Penultimate Draft | abstractI argue that most theories of multiple realizability presuppose an axiomatic view of theories, and cannot be motivated on a semantic view (Updated 3/10).

Work in Progress

"What Pain Asymbolia Really Shows"
Current Draft | abstractIn a recent book, Nikolai Grahek argues that Pain Asymbolia is evidence against a motivationalist view of pain. I disagree, and argue that he has mischaracterized asymbolia as a sensory deficit. Instead, it is a form of depersonalization syndrome. Properly understood, asymbolia is compatible with a modest motivationalism about pains.