Research

Links

My Research:

My research interests center on philosophy of mind and philosophy of science, particularly where they intersect in philosophy of psychology. My dissertation "Idealizing the Mind", written under the direction of Karen Bennett, developed a general theory of idealizing explanation and argues that many uses of mental terms actually refer to idealized, non-actual models of human psychology.

Other current research projects include examining the methodology and import of neural imaging techniques, developing theories of explanation and understanding in neuroscience, and thinking hard about the metaphysical and scientific aspects of reduction.

Click here for a reasonably recent CV. See below for published and in-progress papers. Comments are always welcome (though please do not circulate, cite, or archive anything in progress without permission)

Published/Forthcoming

"Images are not the Evidence of Neuroimaging"
Forthcoming in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Penultimate Draft | abstractI argue that various skeptical arguments about neuroimages reduce to (justified) skepticism about the use of null hypothesis significance testing to establish functional hypotheses about the brain. This skepticism is properly restricted neuroimages, though, and cannot be extended to all evidence from fMRI. Neuroimages play an supporting role for this other, better evidence.

"Confirmation, Refutation and The Evidence of fMRI"
Chris Mole and Colin Klein
Forthcoming in Foundational Issues of Human Brain Mapping, MIT press | abstract We argue that fMRI results must test hypotheses in a strong sense. Mere 'consistency' with a theory under consideration, although a common test, is too weak a standard for neuroscientific evidence.

"Reduction without Reductionism: A Defence of Nagel on Connectability"
Philosophical Quarterly (2009) Vol. 59, No. 234, pp. 39-53.
Philosophical Quarterly version | abstract Nagel's overall account of reduction has been rightly abandoned, but Nagel's theory of inter-theoretic connection has more life in it than many suppose. Unlike its metaphysical successors, it aptly handles cases where reduction requires complex representations of a target domain. Taking Nagel's condition of connectability seriously gives a powerful view of reduction, but one that requires us to index explanatory power to sciences as they are formulated at particular times.

"Dispositional Implementation Solves the Superfluous Structure Problem"
Synthese (2008) Vol. 165, No. 2, pp. 141-153
Penultimate Draft | abstract Some argue that consciousness supervenes on activity while computation supervenes on structure, and so conscious states cannot supervene on computational ones. I argue that the computationalist can avoid the Superfluous Structure Problem by moving to a dispositional theory of implementation. Dispositional computationalism thus permits episodes of computational activity that correspond to potential episodes of conscious awareness. The Superfluous Structure Problem cannot be motivated against this account, and so computationalism may be preserved.

"An Ideal Solution to Disputes about Multiply Realized Kinds,"
Philosophical Studies (2008) Vol. 140, No. 2, pp. 161-177.
Penultimate Draft | abstract Some terms are thought to pick out Multiply Realizable properties. I argue that MR properties are ontologically problematic, and that these terms actually pick out idealizing models. Idealizing explanation has many of the features normally associated with explanation by MR kinds. As idealized models are usually mere possibilia,though, such explanations do not run into metaphysical problems.

"An Imperative Theory of Pain,"
The Journal of Philosophy (2007) Vol. CIV, No. 10, pp 517–532.
Penultimate Draft | abstractI argue that the phenomenal contents of pains supervenes on their intentional contents, but that the intentional content is imperative rather than representational. Pains are negative imperatives that proscribe against using one's body in particular ways. This view allows for a unified account of many types of pain, including pains that do not involve tissue damage. It also allows for integration with a biologically plausible story about the functional role of pain. It also allows pains to be inherently motivating while accommodating the phenomenology of traditionally problematic cases like morphine pain.

"Kicking the Kohler Habit,"
Philosophical Psychology (2007) Vol. 20, No. 5, pp. 609–619.
Penultimate Draft | abstractContrary to the familiar story about Kohler, recent research shows that subjects adapted to inverting goggles do not have their vision re-invert upon re-mastery of motor skills. I argue that this is problematic for the strong forms of enactivism that have relied on Kohler's supposed result

"Events as Changes in the Layout of Affordances."
Chemero A, Klein C, and Cordeiro, W Ecological Psychology (2003). 15(1), 19-28.
Chemero's Pre-publication Draft | abstractThomas Stoffregen 2000 questions the possibility of ecological event perception research. This paper describes experiments performed to examine the perception of the disappearance of gap-crossing affordances, a variety of event as defined by Chemero 2000. We found that subjects reliably perceive both gap-crossing affordances and the disappearance of gap-crossing affordances. Our findings provide empirical evidence in favor of understanding events as changes in the layout of affordances, shoring up event perception research in ecological psychology.

Work in Progress

"Response to Tumulty on Pain and Imperatives"
Current Draft | abstract Maura Tumulty recently raised two good objections to my imperative account of pain. I respond.

"Imperatives, Phantom Pains, and Hallucination by Presupposition"
Current Draft | abstract Phantom limb pains are imperatives with false presuppositions. This explains several apparently conflicting intuitions about phantom pains, and sheds some light on the psychological harm done by chronic pain.