Individual and Civic Notions of Forgiveness
by
Sharon Lamb, Ed.D.
Copyright © 1997, Sharon Lamb
Public musing about the value of apology, forgiveness, and reparation, these softer aspects of how to deal with harm and evil doers, have been, of late, buried beneath louder calls for hard-line punishment. But recently such concepts have surfaced to be applied not only to individual relationships but to broader wrongs and more public evils such as the South African "truth trials", or the expectation of an apology from the pope to all Jews for not intervening during the holocaust, or, in our own country, Clinton’s consideration of an apology to all blacks for slavery. These calls for apology and forgiveness that are being applied more publicly clearly derive from Christian teachings. But they also come out of a more modern psychological interest in self-help, self-reflection, personal growth, and the idea that the pursuit of personal happiness is a meaningful guide for how we choose to live our lives. Thus our thinking about forgiveness stems not only from humility (the idea that we are all sinners and would want to be forgiven ourselves) but also from the idea that it "feels good" to forgive and is "healthier" to let go of anger.
In order to discuss the possibilities and uses of "forgiveness" in civic life it would seem important to define "forgiveness" in as precise a way as possible. But such precision is difficult to achieve for several reasons. Dictionary definitions are inadequate in that they stress "pardoning" or "absolving" a wrongdoer from his bad deeds. As we will learn, there are some recent scholars of forgiveness who claim that to forgive does not mean "to pardon". Others emphasize an emotional aspect to the definition – to cease to feel resentment – and yet this definition in and of itself begs the question: can one not cease to feel resentment through other means besides forgiveness? And can’t one forgive while still holding onto some amount of resentment? In this latter definition, only the individual psyche is at stake and not of the interpersonal relationship. Here forgiveness is a change of heart requiring no verbal pronouncement or consequent acts. Finally, a psychologist offers the definition that forgiveness is simply "one mechanism for righting wrongs" (p. 2, Flanigan, 1992). Yet many would argue that wrong is never "righted" or "forgotten" through forgiveness (see multiple essays on this topic in Simon Wiesenthal’s The Sunflower).Thus the chapter to follow begins with a discussion of current concepts of forgiveness while at the same time asking, is forgiveness a virtue? I take on as a specific challenge to the notion of forgiveness as a virtue, the case of women and the problems in advocating the virtue of "forgiveness" for women. Finally, I examine the requirements necessary to make "forgiveness" a useful concept in civic life.
First, let us examine the definitions of some psychologists, quite different from the dictionary authors, reject the concept of "pardon". Robert Enright and the "Human Development Group" he works with, have written extensively on forgiveness, and they distinguish it from reconciliation. They define it as giving up resentment, hatred, or anger and taking up a stance of love and compassion (1991; 1994) even when the forgiver understands that the offender has "no right to such benevolence." Beverly Flanigan who advocates forgiveness as a moral virtue and a path to mental health in her book Forgiving the Unforgivable argues that forgiving is not pardoning. It is also not forgetting. It is more than a pronouncement. It is, in the end, a transaction in which a wounded person "reopens his heart to take in and reaccept his offender." Both of these psychological writers see forgiveness as a virtue and few authors have written about forgiveness without coming to the conclusion that forgiveness is good. This a priori notion of the value of forgiveness has perhaps biased what authors define as aspects that belong to the notion of forgiveness. I am not sure forgiveness is a virtue, nor that it aids in the mental health of wounded parties, whether it plays a rehabilitative role for offenders, nor whether it serves to right wrongs. Nor am I sure that forgiveness necessarily involves being released from anger or necessarily involves re-opening one’s heart. When we explore these particular ideas associated with forgiveness in hopes of coming to a definition, such a journey may only end with what forgiveness is not. We will see, however, that the concept of forgiveness is so hopelessly bound up with individual psychology in our current atmosphere of self-involvement and reflection, that when we want to turn our gaze to the community at large, civic apologies, not civic forgiveness, may become the more important notion to develop.
IS FORGIVENESS A VIRTUE?
As mentioned above, there is little disagreement among psychologists regarding whether "forgiveness", even person-to-person forgiveness, is a good thing. Popularized in the film and book Dead Man Walking (Prejean, 1993), the nobler characters (Sister Prejean and the father of the teenage girl who was murdered) attempted to forgive the murderer (although it is true that those who tried but were unable to forgive were still treated sympathetically).
Psychologists and other counselors who advocate forgiveness as a virtue seem to think that forgiveness is something that primarily serves the forgiver, something that will eventually be necessary for her or his mental health. It isn’t necessary for the perpetrator to acknowledge his wrongdoing although such a confession usually makes it easier for a victim to forgive. In the film Dead Man Walking, the father of the murdered girl seems particularly to need such an admission in order to forgive the perpetrator.
ARE APOLOGIES NECESSARY FOR FORGIVENESS?
If we want to move beyond recent psychological versions of forgiveness as something that primarily serves the forgiver, then we can consider forgiveness as more of an interaction and, if we take this part of our definition to be true, it would seem that something is required from the wrongdoer. But in current conceptions, a victim’s act of forgiveness appears to be separate from the independent path or decision a perpetrator must make towards admitting his culpability. We do not require that there be an apology before somebody forgives. It is important to acknowledge that if an offender doesn’t apologize, we think that the forgiveness offered is an even nobler act. (It is possible that this is an example of premature forgiveness and I will deal with that problem later in the chapter).
Apologies, social psychologists, have shown us, are scripted events like so much else among people (Goffman, 1959; 1971). The important aspect of the scriptedness of apologies is that there is pressure to forgive once someone has apologized if the apology is sincere. Apologies make the wounded beholden to or hostage to the perpetrator in a way that does not fit with the idea of forgiveness as some psychological movement in a person.
Because of the scripted nature of apologies, they can also serve to manipulate the wounded, to turn the tables. The scriptedness of the apology/forgiveness interaction is not only about social expectations but about power relations. When the victim is wounded (and her wounds are documented, believed, acknowledged, and validated) she is in a powerful position vis a vis the offender. Her wounds not only mark her as a victim but also give her a certain power because of our associations with the position of victimhood – in particular the innocence but also the protection one affords and special considerations.
Victimhood affords one a sort on instant purity and sympathy, if not martyrdom. And all too often the public has trouble with victims when they do not live up to this idealized standard. The victim-offender dyad is set as a dichotomy -– that one is evil, the other pure in exaggerated form. So when a perpetrator apologizes and does an excellent sincere job at such, our natural inclinations are to expect and require forgiveness from a victim. Apologies can thus be power plays used to pull at victims’ notions of themselves as good. To maintain their role in the dichotomy as the "good one" the victim will need to apologize, or to prove in some way that their wounds are just too immense and they have suffered too long. Rarely is anger considered an appropriate response to a sincere apology. (We will return to this later.)
The power relations between the offended and the offender are always important to keep in mind, for an apology offered by an offender who ultimately has power over the injured party brings with it even more pressure for forgiveness.
FORGIVENESS AS A SIGN OF MENTAL HEALTH
To many, when a victim forgives her perpetrator it is not only a moral good but also a sign that she has mastered her trauma and moved beyond it. To the extent that she remains angry she is perceived as being "not over it" or not having obtained enough distance from her wounds. One researcher of forgiveness claims that all of her subjects experienced a great sense of release once they were able to forgive their injurers (Enright and the Human Development Study Group, 1991; Flanigan, 1992). Psychological research indeed shows that letting go of anger improves one’s physical well-being as well as one’s relationships (Tavris, 1982). And therapists use words like "letting go", "working through", and "accepting" in relation to old wounds and injuries, in an attempt to have their patients "move beyond" the issue (Hope, 1987).
Nonetheless, we confuse the fact that something psychologically "feels good" with the idea that an action IS good, is indeed a moral virtue. Because "letting go" does feel good, if one is able to do it, then why not do it? In the words of one incest survivor who has gone through a seventeen step forgiveness therapy, "forgiveness is a proud, powerful feeling" (Freedman, 1997, p. 4).
But there are two circumstances in which forgiveness is not "good". The first, on an individual basis, would be when a person forgives in order to TRY to feel better about what happened even though this good feeling from "release" may not come or may only be there temporarily. This would be the case in which a person is trying to "let go of anger" that she still has and doesn’t quite have conscious choice about. (The whole idea that a person can "choose" her emotions is also an interesting idea that could be discussed further.) The second case in which this wouldn’t work out is when there is something so wrong about an act and so unrepentant about the perpetrator that it seems positively evil to forgive such a person.
Currently, building on previous work on the virtue of forgiveness, Enright and colleagues have begun to argue that self-forgiveness is also an important psychological step. Self-forgiveness is a "willingness to abandon self-resentment in the face of one’s own acknowledged wrongdoing while fostering compassion, generosity, and love towards oneself" (Rique and Enright, 1997). Done in the context of sincerely begging forgiveness from the one who was wronged, the harm-doer must "unconditionally" forgive him or herself.
When forgiveness becomes an individual psychological emotion to experience, where individual feelings become "figure" to the "ground" (or, background) of the relationship, the offender is on his own. From a communitarian perspective (Etzioni, 1992), forgiveness as therapy is problematic because it focuses too heavily on the individual. And, as in much 12-step mythology which claims that one can only change oneself and not attempt to change others, there is no response necessary from the broader community. All that is repaired when a victim forgives is the victim’s individual psyche, not the relationship between victim and offender nor offender and community, who has been offended by the "bad" act. Individual bad acts do indeed affect the community at large and not just the injured party.
IS RELEASE FROM ANGER A NECESSARY PART OF FORGIVENESS?
Returning to the individual again for just a moment, why do psychologists make the "release from anger" so central to the notion of forgiveness? Are the two really synonymous? Can’t release from anger come from other things besides forgiveness? For example, a victim can be released from her anger through embracing it. Some therapeutic modalities suggest that the deep experiencing of emotion rather than the resistance to it can bring release and relief. This may be particularly true for women whose expression of anger is often hindered by attempts to suppress it, guilt, and bad feelings about the self for not being "good" or "nice" enough. A victim can also be released from her anger by getting distance from it – through time passing, through many other life experiences that occlude the first unforgivable one, through "acceptance". Not everyone who has been wronged and can’t or won’t forgive the wrongdoer harbors intense negative feelings indefinitely for their wounds.
And even if a person can’t "let go" of a harm done, even if a person is obsessed with the harm done to them, does it make sense that that person seeks release through forgiveness? I think that the feeling that one OUGHT to forgive when one can’t is as damaging and can keep a victim "hooked" into her pain as much as the pain itself.
There is another kind of distancing from emotion that comes from maturing. In this way the victim moves "beyond" the wounds and not just "away from" the wounds. Maturity is a tricky concept involving not only the passage of time but the acknowledgment that one becomes a different person who has grown through her experiences. Maturing doesn’t have to mean getting "better" but just moving beyond, becoming a different "I".
While many have written of forgiveness as a choice one makes for oneself – that one can actually choose to forgive – it seems important to also consider forgiveness as something that simply "happens" over time. Anger lessens, grudges disappear, and the offender seems different, less capable of having done that prior act, connected to the community again now that the bad act is in the distance. It is not that the bad act loses its significance, but is crowded out by good deeds, warmer feelings, and the sense of a different actor.
So the idea that forgiveness is the primary way to bring about mental health is questionable for there are so many other ways that relief or release can be achieved and the notion that one MUST forgive can even have the opposite effect of not bringing relief.
CHRISTIAN NOTIONS OF FORGIVENESS:
The idea that one can indeed forgive someone else without any apology or remorse on the part of the perpetrator is a generous notion of forgiveness deriving from the Christian tradition which values the ability to forgive. Christian doctrine claims that anger and vengeance need to be tempered with mercy and this mercy should come about from the realization that we are all sinners. The religion thus connects the wrongdoer to a community of sinners as shown by the biblical quote, "He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone." The Christian who forgives the offender who is not even remorseful is considered particularly virtuous.
Christian tradition also holds that forgiveness not only helps the victim but also has the capacity to transform the wrongdoer. To forgive another individual is to present a gift of renewal and acceptance; it shows faith in the character of the forgiven person to reform. This idea can be taken so far that victims of heinous crimes torture themselves with the expectation that they should be able to forgive when they cannot (see Simon Wiesenthal’s The Sunflower re-released in 1997). In this way, the tables get turned and victims begin to see themselves as the worse sinners for not having virtue enough to forgive the evil-doer.
WOMEN AND FORGIVENESS: A SPECIAL DANGER
Nietzsche referred to forgiveness as "sublimated resentment" and we as a community need to beware of those who forgive too easily. Women in particular are in danger of forgiving prematurely or overlooking offenses (Forward, 1989). Socialization practices teach young girls to prioritize the resolution of conflict, healing wounds, and repairing relationships. Gilligan has pointed out women’s tendency to preserve the relationship even at the expense of their own individual rights citing this as a different moral virtue, one of "care" (1982). The demands on individual victims to forgive are bound up with traditional notions of what it means to be a "good girl" or "good woman" in which anger and resentment are suppressed (Becker, 1997), and the needs of others are put before the needs of the self. Krestan and Bepko (1992?) have argued that wives of alcoholics, recently under criticism for being "enablers" of their husbands’ alcoholism, are simply doing what they were brought up all of their lives to do: take care of their husbands, protect them, and try to meet their needs.
Women’s forgiving can also be a way of avoiding confrontation, confrontation with the injurer but also with their own anger. This kind of forgiving has been called "pseudo-forgiveness" (Enright, Eastin, Golden, Sarinopoulos, & Freedman, 1992) and while forgiving may protect a valued relationship it may damage it also by not requiring accountability from the injurer and not acknowledging remaining anger which may emerge in subtler ways later on (Forward, 1989). Women who do forgive their husbands their battering are often abused again and remain unprotective of themselves and their children. This is part of the "Battered Women’s Syndrome" (Walker, 1984). Moreover, women who forgive too easily don’t show self respect – the philosopher Philip Strawson argues that if we do not resent the violation of our rights, then we do not take our rights very seriously (1974). And Bonnie Burstow (1992), writing about sexual abuse survivors, says that "by treating forgiveness as necessary, therapists effectively pathologize anger, close down the survivor’s own process, and reinforce social messages" (1992). Karen Olio, also writing about sex abuse survivors, identifies the myth advocated by some therapists that "forgiveness makes you a better person". She adds that this myth reflects a fear and misunderstanding of anger as something damaging to the victim without distinguishing anger itself from various options for expressing it.
Arguments for forgiveness that aim at a release from anger are aimed also at a kind of CONFORMITY to what "mental health" in women has been defined as. Psychological research has long showed us that women who are angry and resentful are viewed by the mental health profession as unhealthy (Becker, 1997; Burstow, 1992). Gender conformity then is "met", when a woman forgives her wrongdoer and lets go of resentment, even at the cost of self respect.
FORGIVENESS AS A TRANSACTION, AS A WAY
TO RESTORE RELATIONSHIPS
The psychological view of forgiveness has its limitations. There is, indeed, a beauty in the idea that forgiveness is something an individual does for herself, to ennoble the spirit, and to reach a certain level of peace. And there is a practical aspect to the psychological view to the extent that we give up on the idea that forgiving a person will actually change him. Still, there are problems with so absolute an individualistic view. As noted earlier, forgiving in this way requires no change from the perpetrator; it requires no apology; and it requires no response from the broader community. It only repairs the victim’s individual psyche.
But if we reach toward a transactional definition of forgiveness, as Flanigan suggests, we can begin to speak of the possible uses of forgiveness in civic life. The idea that forgiveness restores relationship is a strong one and one that communitarians could find fruitful. If an offender is forgiven too easily, without need of his remorse or his repentance, the relationship that continues after would seem to be on shaky ground. If forgiveness has been used to avoid blaming the individual who has offended, then how can we expect the perpetrator to assume responsibility for his acts? Forgiveness without blame, and without acceptance of the blame is truly an individual psychological (intrapsychic) act of the forgiver.
Some have argued we need to distinguish between forgiving and pardoning a person (Enright & the Human Development Study Group, 1991; Freedman, 1997). A forgiver might say I will always remember what he did and there is no excuse for it, but I’ve forgiven him. What does this mean? It means that the relationship continues and no grudge is harbored. But what does it mean to the person forgiven? Is it that he is pardoned anyway, absolved of all sin? He suffers from no more recriminations except those he makes to himself. He is, in effect, allowed, if he can, to forget.
When an offender begs for forgiveness what exactly is he asking of the victim? Isn’t the act of "begging for forgiveness" really a plea for pardon? It is a plea that the victim not be angry any longer; that he or she show hope in his promise to change or to do better; and that the injured believe in the existence of a good inner character, separated from the offender’s bad acts. Any of these expectations seems to be asking too much from a person and too much of a lone verbal act – "I forgive you."
It would seem that it is entirely possible to have compassion for an offender, even your own offender if you have been abused, and not be willing to forgive. Whatever happened to the older psychoanalytic notions of ambivalence? While it may be difficult to live with ambivalent feelings, this is the human condition. Relationships can be, in part, restored, and yet there can be problems with trust and an injured party can love and resent simultaneously someone close to her who has injured her.
There are other ways to restore relationship besides forgiveness, something more than or different from a verbal act. But before considering these we might also want to ask whether we as a society want to forgive offenders? Should we forgive? Does it seem to be the right time to reintroduce the idea of civic forgiveness as a community virtue? Although to introduce the idea of civic forgiveness might demonstrate our hope for a criminal’s reformation, from a realistic standpoint, our society is not at present in a stage in which that hope is alive. We see that the act of forgiveness needs to be connected, in civic life, to a hope in a person’s rehabilitation. And what better way to exhibit one’s potential for rehabilitation except through apology? A renewed interest in apologies, civic apologies accompanied by reparation, would seem to be the first priority, rather than a renewed idea of civic forgiveness. But for a moment, let’s reconsider the impact such a focus would have on women. Recently a journalist asked me to comment on why women apologize so much? She was looking, I believe, for some statements about women’s low self-esteem or the like. But turning the question on its head, I asked, why don’t men apologize more? And, what is "too much" for apologizing? These apologies could be signs of caretaking and benevolence. What is so problematic about these apologies? We turn to a discussion of apologies and leave our discussion of forgiveness with the acknowledgment that while forgiveness has the potential to restore relationship, apology and reparation seem to serve the purpose better. Forgiveness, now merely an intrapsychic act, a cognitive restructuring, to use a more modern therapeutic term, is an exercies in self-esteem. To make it a true transaction, something bigger and broader, the wrongdoer must claim personal responsibility, and attempt to right the wrong. These acts, accepting personal responsibility and efforts to make reparation, are acts that develop and take place over time.
REVISITING APOLOGIES
Researchers differentiate between excuse-making, justification, and apology (Bennett & Dewberry, 19xx; Itoi, Ohbuchi, & Fukuno, 19xx). While the first two separate act from person, the latter, apology, does not need to make this separation. This is an important point because, in general, we want to hold perpetrators responsible for their acts in as full a way as possible. Goffman (1971) has argued that the act of apologizing splits the self into a good self, who recognizes the wrong, and a bad self who did the wrong.
Interestingly enough, collectivists (see Markus & Kitayama, 1994 or Triandis, 1989), who see the self as less separated from the community or role a person plays in the community, (and as more integrated in general) show a preference for apology as a form of mitigating social conflicts (Ohbuchi & Takahashi, 1994). In one study, Japanese preferred apologies to justifications whereas Americans preferred justifications for a wrong done.
Apologies, like forgiveness, can be false, a kind of "remedial self-presentation" (Goffman, 1971). Research shows that making an apology will minimize the negative attributions made about one’s character and restore one’s social identity (Kermer & Stephens, 1983). Apologies can also be manipulative for they reduce social sanctions (Darby & Schlenker, 1989; McLaughlin, Cody, & French, 1990; Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989). There are, of course, sincere and insincere apologies, meaningful and perfunctory.
Good apologies show remorse and empathy for the one hurt. One significant sign of a sincere apology, often neglected by researchers and theorists, is that the person making the apology has difficulty doing so. The discomfort arises from the fact that the person has claimed this bad act as his own, and, in doing so, must be rightfully ashamed that he could do such a thing. The difficulty in coming forth with an apology also is present when the perpetrator cares about the other person’s view of him or herself. He is shameful and this shame is healthy and important because it shows the recipient of the apology that his or her opinion really counts – it shows the connection of wrongdoer to community.
But apologies make a demand on victims, perhaps, an unfair demand. Victims who do not accept an apology are viewed less positively than those who do and there is a strong sense of constraint to accept an apology even when viewers deem the apology to be illegitimate or insincere (Bennett & Dewberry, 19xx).
In recent politics in the United States it has become increasingly common for officials to publicly apologize on behalf of the government for bad acts and crimes against humanity. For example, President Clinton recently apologized for the Tuskegee experiments in which African-American men with syphilis were denied treatment so that researchers could study the long-term progression of the illness. While this kind of public apology (and acknowledgment of wrongdoing) is good for the community, (in that we are forced to face aspects of our nation’s history that are immoral and unpleasant), it was not a difficult apology to make. Having not personally carried out the experiments, Clinton could not express personal shame, nor did these acts reflect on his character. The gift of research to the college in Tuskegee was an appropriate act of reparation, but once again, not difficult to make. At this moment in history citizens are in moral agreement that these acts were bad and did unnecessary harm to individuals. We are already in a "changed" place with regard to these acts and so don’t feel ashamed of ourselves as we might. We perceive ourselves (rightly or wrongly) as changed and as having already made a number of reparations to the African-American community in general. Such an easy apology, perhaps, does not carry much weight – unburdened by personal guilt or remorse.
This is not to say that apologies are generally useless or ineffective as tools for resolution of interpersonal and social conflicts. But depending on the harm done, they seem like "not enough", when they are not accompanied by remorse, and shame, and reparative acts. Michael Moore (1987) asks himself what he would feel like were he to have killed another human being and answers, "I would feel guilty unto death" and adds that anything less would be too little. In such circumstances apologies are necessary but never enough.
Apologies can seem like excuses as when an offender claims, "I can’t believe I did something so cruel" – the implication being it is unlike him. This focuses attention on the act itself but not on the character of the individual. Apologies that come about through shameful self-examination sound more like, "I can’t believe who I am – or who I have become." But the ironic part of the latter kind of apology, which Amelie Rorty has nicely labeled "character" or "agent regret", is that, paradoxically, the person who feels shame so forcefully and has concomitantly arranged his life so as to make reparations on a long-term basis to the injured parties, is probably no longer the same person as the person who committed the original crime.
REPENTANCE IN PRACTICE
I am currently concerned with society’s practices toward sex offenders who are given less and less reason to show remorse, confess, and make reparation. Public outrage against sex offenders is so high that all kinds are grouped together as monsters who are incurable, There is also mistrust in the penal system’s ability to rehabilitate these criminals. While we advocate forgiveness in victims, we advocate publicly an undying resentment towards perpetrators.
Do we want the public to forgive perpetrators their crimes? If not, why expect of a victim more than what a society can do? If we advocate for civic forgiveness we can still warn against individual forgiveness and the problems within. Such a civic act can depend on, can indeed be held out to offenders as a motivation for apology, reform, and making reparation.
Victims can leave relationships with offenders, but communities can not. Thus civic forgiveness – the notion that we must restore the relationship between offender and community --is even more urgent. We must not forget that the initial anger and resentment towards an offender conveys high expectations by the community that a person act "right". The knowledge that community anger and resentment towards a person who committed an act can lessen, should be a powerful force for reform and reparation.
Prisons as "time-outs" (to use a nursery school term) could and should revolve around changing and rebuilding the character of the prisoner. Self-reflection and guidance rather than isolation and shunning, lead to changed character. The opportunity to make reparations that reconnect offenders to the community in meaningful ways also serves to open the way to civic forgiveness.
RESOLUTION
What is interesting in the notion of civic forgiveness and offender apologies is that individuals do find relief from offenders who apologize, even without forgiving them themselves. Isn’t it an interesting thought that such phenomenal effort be put into victim forgiveness as a means of relief rather than perpetrator apology, the first reinforcing the individual’s own responsibility to herself, the second promoting forgiveness and remorse as an interaction?
The word "resolution" (clinical or managerial sounding though it is) has been offered as a substitute for "forgiveness"; however, forgiveness can happen without resolution and resolution can occur without "forgiveness".
Another idea that has been offered is a different Christian notion than the one discussed earlier. This is a simultaneous forgiving and not forgiving, a way to give up the individualized pressure to forgive and yield to a God who "takes over". One can get relief and freedom from resentment by making it not one’s own problem anymore, but God’s problem. The offended can wish and hope for the offender’s path towards remorse and repentence, but also believe that forgiveness is only something God can do.
If one substitutes the community for God, it is possible to get a sense of how civic forgiveness can relieve the individual of her burden and yet hold the perpetrator to a standard of repentance. We need public and communal ways to witness rituals of repentance (as demonstrated by the tremendous growth of twelve-step meetings in which admissions of weak character and moral wrongdoings are integral). And if these new rituals of repentance need to be accompanied by offering wrongdoers ways to make reparations, ways tied closely to the acts they committed, the people who they have offended, over time, reparation may serve as the gateway to reintegration of offenders to communities and families, which is, in a way, a kind of forgiveness.
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Public musing about the value of apology, forgiveness, and reparation,
these softer aspects of how to deal with harm and evil doers, have been,
of late, buried beneath louder calls for hard-line punishment. But recently
such concepts have surfaced to be applied not only to individual
relationships but to broader wrongs and more public evils such as the South
African “truth trials”, or the expectation of an apology from the pope to
all Jews for not intervening during the holocaust, or, in our own country,
Clinton’s consideration of an apology to all blacks for slavery. These
calls for apology and forgiveness that are being applied more publicly
clearly derive from Christian teachings. But they also come out of a more
modern psychological interest in self-help, self-reflection, personal
growth, and the idea that the pursuit of personal happiness is a meaningful
guide for how we choose to live our lives. Thus our thinking about
forgiveness stems not only from humility (the idea that we are all sinners
and would want to be forgiven ourselves) but also from the idea that it “feels good” to forgive and is “healthier” to let go of anger.
In order to discuss the possibilities and uses of
“forgiveness” in civic life it would seem important to
define
“forgiveness” in as precise a way as possible. But such
precision is difficult to achieve for several reasons.
Dictionary definitions are inadequate in that they stress
“pardoning” or “absolving” a wrongdoer from
his bad deeds. As we
will learn, there are some recent scholars of forgiveness who
claim that to forgive does not mean “to pardon”. Others
emphasize an emotional aspect to the definition – to cease
to
feel resentment – and yet this definition in and of itself
begs
the question: can one not cease to feel resentment through other
means besides forgiveness? And can’t one forgive while still
holding onto some amount of resentment? In this latter
definition, only the individual psyche is at stake and not of the
interpersonal relationship. Here forgiveness is a change of
heart requiring no verbal pronouncement or consequent acts.
Finally, a psychologist offers the definition that forgiveness is
simply “one mechanism for righting wrongs” (p. 2,
Flanigan,
1992). Yet many would argue that wrong is never
“righted” or
“forgotten” through forgiveness (see multiple essays on
this
topic in Simon Wiesenthal’s The Sunflower).
Thus the chapter to follow begins with a discussion of
current concepts of forgiveness while at the same time asking, is
forgiveness a virtue? I take on as a specific challenge to the
notion of forgiveness as a virtue, the case of women and the
problems in advocating the virtue of “forgiveness” for
women.
Finally, I examine the requirements necessary to make
“forgiveness” a useful concept in civic life.
First, let us examine the definitions of some psychologists,
quite different from the dictionary authors, reject the concept
of “pardon”. Robert Enright and the “Human
Development Group” he
works with, have written extensively on forgiveness, and they
distinguish it from reconciliation. They define it as giving up
resentment, hatred, or anger and taking up a stance of love and
compassion (1991; 1994) even when the forgiver understands that
the offender has “no right to such benevolence.”
Beverly
Flanigan who advocates forgiveness as a moral virtue and a path
to mental health in her book Forgiving the Unforgivable argues
that forgiving is not pardoning. It is also not forgetting. It
is more than a pronouncement. It is, in the end, a transaction
in which a wounded person “reopens his heart to take in and
reaccept his offender.”
Both of these psychological writers see forgiveness as a
virtue and few authors have written about forgiveness without
coming to the conclusion that forgiveness is good. This a priori
notion of the value of forgiveness has perhaps biased what
authors define as aspects that belong to the notion of
forgiveness.
I am not sure forgiveness is a virtue, nor that it aids in
the mental health of wounded parties, whether it plays a
rehabilitative role for offenders, nor whether it serves to right
wrongs. Nor am I sure that forgiveness necessarily involves
being released from anger or necessarily involves re-opening
one’s heart. When we explore these particular ideas
associated
with forgiveness in hopes of coming to a definition, such a
journey may only end with what forgiveness is not. We will see,
however, that the concept of forgiveness is so hopelessly bound
up with individual psychology in our current atmosphere of self-
involvement and reflection, that when we want to turn our gaze to
the community at large, civic apologies, not civic forgiveness,
may become the more important notion to develop.
IS FORGIVENESS A VIRTUE? As mentioned above, there is little disagreement among psychologists regarding whether “forgiveness”, even person-to- person forgiveness, is a good thing. Popularized in the film and book Dead Man Walking (Prejean, 1993), the nobler characters (Sister Prejean and the father of the teenage girl who was murdered) attempted to forgive the murderer (although it is true that those who tried but were unable to forgive were still treated sympathetically). Psychologists and other counselors who advocate forgiveness as a virtue seem to think that forgiveness is something that primarily serves the forgiver, something that will eventually be necessary for her or his mental health. It isn’t necessary for the perpetrator to acknowledge his wrongdoing although such a confession usually makes it easier for a victim to forgive. In the film Dead Man Walking, the father of the murdered girl seems particularly to need such an admission in order to forgive the perpetrator.
ARE APOLOGIES NECESSARY FOR FORGIVENESS? If we want to move beyond recent psychological versions of forgiveness as something that primarily serves the forgiver, then we can consider forgiveness as more of an interaction and, if we take this part of our definition to be true, it would seem that something is required from the wrongdoer. But in current conceptions, a victim’s act of forgiveness appears to be separate from the independent path or decision a perpetrator must make towards admitting his culpability. We do not require that there be an apology before somebody forgives. It is important to acknowledge that if an offender doesn’t apologize, we think that the forgiveness offered is an even nobler act. (It is possible that this is an example of premature forgiveness and I will deal with that problem later in the chapter). Apologies, social psychologists, have shown us, are scripted events like so much else among people (Goffman, 1959; 1971). The important aspect of the scriptedness of apologies is that there is pressure to forgive once someone has apologized if the apology is sincere. Apologies make the wounded beholden to or hostage to the perpetrator in a way that does not fit with the idea of forgiveness as some psychological movement in a person. Because of the scripted nature of apologies, they can also serve to manipulate the wounded, to turn the tables. The scriptedness of the apology/forgiveness interaction is not only about social expectations but about power relations. When the victim is wounded (and her wounds are documented, believed, acknowledged, and validated) she is in a powerful position vis a vis the offender. Her wounds not only mark her as a victim but also give her a certain power because of our associations with the position of victimhood – in particular the innocence but also the protection one affords and special considerations. Victimhood affords one a sort on instant purity and sympathy, if not martyrdom. And all too often the public has trouble with victims when they do not live up to this idealized standard. The victim-offender dyad is set as a dichotomy -– that one is evil, the other pure in exaggerated form. So when a perpetrator apologizes and does an excellent sincere job at such, our natural inclinations are to expect and require forgiveness from a victim. Apologies can thus be power plays used to pull at victims’ notions of themselves as good. To maintain their role in the dichotomy as the “good one” the victim will need to apologize, or to prove in some way that their wounds are just too immense and they have suffered too long. Rarely is anger considered an appropriate response to a sincere apology. (We will return to this later.) The power relations between the offended and the offender are always important to keep in mind, for an apology offered by an offender who ultimately has power over the injured party brings with it even more pressure for forgiveness.
FORGIVENESS AS A SIGN OF MENTAL HEALTH To many, when a victim forgives her perpetrator it is not only a moral good but also a sign that she has mastered her trauma and moved beyond it. To the extent that she remains angry she is perceived as being “not over it” or not having obtained enough distance from her wounds. One researcher of forgiveness claims that all of her subjects experienced a great sense of release once they were able to forgive their injurers (Enright and the Human Development Study Group, 1991; Flanigan, 1992). Psychological research indeed shows that letting go of anger improves one’s physical well-being as well as one’s relationships (Tavris, 1982). And therapists use words like “letting go”, “working through”, and “accepting” in relation to old wounds and injuries, in an attempt to have their patients “move beyond” the issue (Hope, 1987). Nonetheless, we confuse the fact that something psychologically “feels good” with the idea that an action IS good, is indeed a moral virtue. Because “letting go” does feel good, if one is able to do it, then why not do it? In the words of one incest survivor who has gone through a seventeen step forgiveness therapy, “forgiveness is a proud, powerful feeling” (Freedman, 1997, p. 4). But there are two circumstances in which forgiveness is not “good”. The first, on an individual basis, would be when a person forgives in order to TRY to feel better about what happened even though this good feeling from “release” may not come or may only be there temporarily. This would be the case in which a person is trying to “let go of anger” that she still has and doesn’t quite have conscious choice about. (The whole idea that a person can “choose” her emotions is also an interesting idea that could be discussed further.) The second case in which this wouldn’t work out is when there is something so wrong about an act and so unrepentant about the perpetrator that it seems positively evil to forgive such a person. Currently, building on previous work on the virtue of forgiveness, Enright and colleagues have begun to argue that self-forgiveness is also an important psychological step. Self- forgiveness is a “willingness to abandon self-resentment in the face of one’s own acknowledged wrongdoing while fostering compassion, generosity, and love towards oneself” (Rique and Enright, 1997). Done in the context of sincerely begging forgiveness from the one who was wronged, the harm-doer must “unconditionally” forgive him or herself. When forgiveness becomes an individual psychological emotion to experience, where individual feelings become “figure” to the “ground” (or, background) of the relationship, the offender is on his own. From a communitarian perspective (Etzioni, 1992), forgiveness as therapy is problematic because it focuses too heavily on the individual. And, as in much 12-step mythology which claims that one can only change oneself and not attempt to change others, there is no response necessary from the broader community. All that is repaired when a victim forgives is the victim’s individual psyche, not the relationship between victim and offender nor offender and community, who has been offended by the “bad” act. Individual bad acts do indeed affect the community at large and not just the injured party.
IS RELEASE FROM ANGER A NECESSARY PART OF FORGIVENESS? Returning to the individual again for just a moment, why do psychologists make the “release from anger” so central to the notion of forgiveness? Are the two really synonymous? Can’t release from anger come from other things besides forgiveness? For example, a victim can be released from her anger through embracing it. Some therapeutic modalities suggest that the deep experiencing of emotion rather than the resistance to it can bring release and relief. This may be particularly true for women whose expression of anger is often hindered by attempts to suppress it, guilt, and bad feelings about the self for not being “good” or “nice” enough. A victim can also be released from her anger by getting distance from it – through time passing, through many other life experiences that occlude the first unforgivable one, through “acceptance”. Not everyone who has been wronged and can’t or won’t forgive the wrongdoer harbors intense negative feelings indefinitely for their wounds. And even if a person can’t “let go” of a harm done, even if a person is obsessed with the harm done to them, does it make sense that that person seeks release through forgiveness? I think that the feeling that one OUGHT to forgive when one can’t is as damaging and can keep a victim “hooked” into her pain as much as the pain itself. There is another kind of distancing from emotion that comes from maturing. In this way the victim moves “beyond” the wounds and not just “away from” the wounds. Maturity is a tricky concept involving not only the passage of time but the acknowledgment that one becomes a different person who has grown through her experiences. Maturing doesn’t have to mean getting ”better” but just moving beyond, becoming a different “I”. While many have written of forgiveness as a choice one makes for oneself – that one can actually choose to forgive – it seems important to also consider forgiveness as something that simply “happens” over time. Anger lessens, grudges disappear, and the offender seems different, less capable of having done that prior act, connected to the community again now that the bad act is in the distance. It is not that the bad act loses its significance, but is crowded out by good deeds, warmer feelings, and the sense of a different actor. So the idea that forgiveness is the primary way to bring about mental health is questionable for there are so many other ways that relief or release can be achieved and the notion that one MUST forgive can even have the opposite effect of not bringing relief.
CHRISTIAN NOTIONS OF FORGIVENESS: The idea that one can indeed forgive someone else without any apology or remorse on the part of the perpetrator is a generous notion of forgiveness deriving from the Christian tradition which values the ability to forgive. Christian doctrine claims that anger and vengeance need to be tempered with mercy and this mercy should come about from the realization that we are all sinners. The religion thus connects the wrongdoer to a community of sinners as shown by the biblical quote, “He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone.” The Christian who forgives the offender who is not even remorseful is considered particularly virtuous. Christian tradition also holds that forgiveness not only helps the victim but also has the capacity to transform the wrongdoer. To forgive another individual is to present a gift of renewal and acceptance; it shows faith in the character of the forgiven person to reform. This idea can be taken so far that victims of heinous crimes torture themselves with the expectation that they should be able to forgive when they cannot (see Simon Wiesenthal’s The Sunflower re-released in 1997). In this way, the tables get turned and victims begin to see themselves as the worse sinners for not having virtue enough to forgive the evil- doer.
WOMEN AND FORGIVENESS: A SPECIAL DANGER Nietzsche referred to forgiveness as “sublimated resentment” and we as a community need to beware of those who forgive too easily. Women in particular are in danger of forgiving prematurely or overlooking offenses (Forward, 1989). Socialization practices teach young girls to prioritize the resolution of conflict, healing wounds, and repairing relationships. Gilligan has pointed out women’s tendency to preserve the relationship even at the expense of their own individual rights citing this as a different moral virtue, one of “care” (1982). The demands on individual victims to forgive are bound up with traditional notions of what it means to be a “good girl” or “good woman” in which anger and resentment are suppressed (Becker, 1997), and the needs of others are put before the needs of the self. Krestan and Bepko (1992?) have argued that wives of alcoholics, recently under criticism for being “enablers” of their husbands’ alcoholism, are simply doing what they were brought up all of their lives to do: take care of their husbands, protect them, and try to meet their needs. Women’s forgiving can also be a way of avoiding confrontation, confrontation with the injurer but also with their own anger. This kind of forgiving has been called “pseudo- forgiveness” (Enright, Eastin, Golden, Sarinopoulos, & Freedman, 1992) and while forgiving may protect a valued relationship it may damage it also by not requiring accountability from the injurer and not acknowledging remaining anger which may emerge in subtler ways later on (Forward, 1989). Women who do forgive their husbands their battering are often abused again and remain unprotective of themselves and their children. This is part of the “Battered Women’s Syndrome” (Walker, 1984). Moreover, women who forgive too easily don’t show self respect – the philosopher Philip Strawson argues that if we do not resent the violation of our rights, then we do not take our rights very seriously (1974). And Bonnie Burstow (1992), writing about sexual abuse survivors, says that “by treating forgiveness as necessary, therapists effectively pathologize anger, close down the survivor’s own process, and reinforce social messages” (1992). Karen Olio, also writing about sex abuse survivors, identifies the myth advocated by some therapists that “forgiveness makes you a better person”. She adds that this myth reflects a fear and misunderstanding of anger as something damaging to the victim without distinguishing anger itself from various options for expressing it. Arguments for forgiveness that aim at a release from anger are aimed also at a kind of CONFORMITY to what “mental health” in women has been defined as. Psychological research has long showed us that women who are angry and resentful are viewed by the mental health profession as unhealthy (Becker, 1997; Burstow, 1992). Gender conformity then is “met”, when a woman forgives her wrongdoer and lets go of resentment, even at the cost of self respect.
FORGIVENESS AS A TRANSACTION, AS A WAY TO RESTORE RELATIONSHIPS The psychological view of forgiveness has its limitations. There is, indeed, a beauty in the idea that forgiveness is something an individual does for herself, to ennoble the spirit, and to reach a certain level of peace. And there is a practical aspect to the psychological view to the extent that we give up on the idea that forgiving a person will actually change him. Still, there are problems with so absolute an individualistic view. As noted earlier, forgiving in this way requires no change from the perpetrator; it requires no apology; and it requires no response from the broader community. It only repairs the victim’s individual psyche. But if we reach toward a transactional definition of forgiveness, as Flanigan suggests, we can begin to speak of the possible uses of forgiveness in civic life. The idea that forgiveness restores relationship is a strong one and one that communitarians could find fruitful. If an offender is forgiven too easily, without need of his remorse or his repentance, the relationship that continues after would seem to be on shaky ground. If forgiveness has been used to avoid blaming the individual who has offended, then how can we expect the perpetrator to assume responsibility for his acts? Forgiveness without blame, and without acceptance of the blame is truly an individual psychological (intrapsychic) act of the forgiver. Some have argued we need to distinguish between forgiving and pardoning a person (Enright & the Human Development Study Group, 1991; Freedman, 1997). A forgiver might say I will always remember what he did and there is no excuse for it, but I’ve forgiven him. What does this mean? It means that the relationship continues and no grudge is harbored. But what does it mean to the person forgiven? Is it that he is pardoned anyway, absolved of all sin? He suffers from no more recriminations except those he makes to himself. He is, in effect, allowed, if he can, to forget. When an offender begs for forgiveness what exactly is he asking of the victim? Isn’t the act of “begging for forgiveness” really a plea for pardon? It is a plea that the victim not be angry any longer; that he or she show hope in his promise to change or to do better; and that the injured believe in the existence of a good inner character, separated from the offender’s bad acts. Any of these expectations seems to be asking too much from a person and too much of a lone verbal act – “I forgive you.” It would seem that it is entirely possible to have compassion for an offender, even your own offender if you have been abused, and not be willing to forgive. Whatever happened to the older psychoanalytic notions of ambivalence? While it may be difficult to live with ambivalent feelings, this is the human condition. Relationships can be, in part, restored, and yet there can be problems with trust and an injured party can love and resent simultaneously someone close to her who has injured her. There are other ways to restore relationship besides forgiveness, something more than or different from a verbal act. But before considering these we might also want to ask whether we as a society want to forgive offenders? Should we forgive? Does it seem to be the right time to reintroduce the idea of civic forgiveness as a community virtue? Although to introduce the idea of civic forgiveness might demonstrate our hope for a criminal’s reformation, from a realistic standpoint, our society is not at present in a stage in which that hope is alive. We see that the act of forgiveness needs to be connected, in civic life, to a hope in a person’s rehabilitation. And what better way to exhibit one’s potential for rehabilitation except through apology? A renewed interest in apologies, civic apologies accompanied by reparation, would seem to be the first priority, rather than a renewed idea of civic forgiveness. But for a moment, let’s reconsider the impact such a focus would have on women. Recently a journalist asked me to comment on why women apologize so much? She was looking, I believe, for some statements about women’s low self-esteem or the like. But turning the question on its head, I asked, why don’t men apologize more? And, what is “too much” for apologizing? These apologies could be signs of caretaking and benevolence. What is so problematic about these apologies? We turn to a discussion of apologies and leave our discussion of forgiveness with the acknowledgment that while forgiveness has the potential to restore relationship, apology and reparation seem to serve the purpose better. Forgiveness, now merely an intrapsychic act, a cognitive restructuring, to use a more modern therapeutic term, is an exercies in self-esteem. To make it a true transaction, something bigger and broader, the wrongdoer must claim personal responsibility, and attempt to right the wrong. These acts, accepting personal responsibility and efforts to make reparation, are acts that develop and take place over time.
REVISITING APOLOGIES Researchers differentiate between excuse-making, justification, and apology (Bennett & Dewberry, 19xx; Itoi, Ohbuchi, & Fukuno, 19xx). While the first two separate act from person, the latter, apology, does not need to make this separation. This is an important point because, in general, we want to hold perpetrators responsible for their acts in as full a way as possible. Goffman (1971) has argued that the act of apologizing splits the self into a good self, who recognizes the wrong, and a bad self who did the wrong. Interestingly enough, collectivists (see Markus & Kitayama, 1994 or Triandis, 1989), who see the self as less separated from the community or role a person plays in the community, (and as more integrated in general) show a preference for apology as a form of mitigating social conflicts (Ohbuchi & Takahashi, 1994). In one study, Japanese preferred apologies to justifications whereas Americans preferred justifications for a wrong done. Apologies, like forgiveness, can be false, a kind of “remedial self-presentation” (Goffman, 1971). Research shows that making an apology will minimize the negative attributions made about one’s character and restore one’s social identity (Kermer & Stephens, 1983). Apologies can also be manipulative for they reduce social sanctions (Darby & Schlenker, 1989; McLaughlin, Cody, & French, 1990; Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989). There are, of course, sincere and insincere apologies, meaningful and perfunctory. Good apologies show remorse and empathy for the one hurt. One significant sign of a sincere apology, often neglected by researchers and theorists, is that the person making the apology has difficulty doing so. The discomfort arises from the fact that the person has claimed this bad act as his own, and, in doing so, must be rightfully ashamed that he could do such a thing. The difficulty in coming forth with an apology also is present when the perpetrator cares about the other person’s view of him or herself. He is shameful and this shame is healthy and important because it shows the recipient of the apology that his or her opinion really counts – it shows the connection of wrongdoer to community. But apologies make a demand on victims, perhaps, an unfair demand. Victims who do not accept an apology are viewed less positively than those who do and there is a strong sense of constraint to accept an apology even when viewers deem the apology to be illegitimate or insincere (Bennett & Dewberry, 19xx). In recent politics in the United States it has become increasingly common for officials to publicly apologize on behalf of the government for bad acts and crimes against humanity. For example, President Clinton recently apologized for the Tuskegee experiments in which African-American men with syphilis were denied treatment so that researchers could study the long-term progression of the illness. While this kind of public apology (and acknowledgment of wrongdoing) is good for the community, (in that we are forced to face aspects of our nation’s history that are immoral and unpleasant), it was not a difficult apology to make. Having not personally carried out the experiments, Clinton could not express personal shame, nor did these acts reflect on his character. The gift of research to the college in Tuskegee was an appropriate act of reparation, but once again, not difficult to make. At this moment in history citizens are in moral agreement that these acts were bad and did unnecessary harm to individuals. We are already in a “changed” place with regard to these acts and so don’t feel ashamed of ourselves as we might. We perceive ourselves (rightly or wrongly) as changed and as having already made a number of reparations to the African- American community in general. Such an easy apology, perhaps, does not carry much weight – unburdened by personal guilt or remorse. This is not to say that apologies are generally useless or ineffective as tools for resolution of interpersonal and social conflicts. But depending on the harm done, they seem like “not enough”, when they are not accompanied by remorse, and shame, and reparative acts. Michael Moore (1987) asks himself what he would feel like were he to have killed another human being and answers, “I would feel guilty unto death” and adds that anything less would be too little. In such circumstances apologies are necessary but never enough. Apologies can seem like excuses as when an offender claims, “I can’t believe I did something so cruel” – the implication being it is unlike him. This focuses attention on the act itself but not on the character of the individual. Apologies that come about through shameful self-examination sound more like, “I can’t believe who I am – or who I have become.” But the ironic part of the latter kind of apology, which Amelie Rorty has nicely labeled “character” or “agent regret”, is that, paradoxically, the person who feels shame so forcefully and has concomitantly arranged his life so as to make reparations on a long-term basis to the injured parties, is probably no longer the same person as the person who committed the original crime.
REPENTANCE IN PRACTICE I am currently concerned with society’s practices toward sex offenders who are given less and less reason to show remorse, confess, and make reparation. Public outrage against sex offenders is so high that all kinds are grouped together as monsters who are incurable, There is also mistrust in the penal system’s ability to rehabilitate these criminals. While we advocate forgiveness in victims, we advocate publicly an undying resentment towards perpetrators. Do we want the public to forgive perpetrators their crimes? If not, why expect of a victim more than what a society can do? If we advocate for civic forgiveness we can still warn against individual forgiveness and the problems within. Such a civic act can depend on, can indeed be held out to offenders as a motivation for apology, reform, and making reparation. Victims can leave relationships with offenders, but communities can not. Thus civic forgiveness – the notion that we must restore the relationship between offender and community --is even more urgent. We must not forget that the initial anger and resentment towards an offender conveys high expectations by the community that a person act “right”. The knowledge that community anger and resentment towards a person who committed an act can lessen, should be a powerful force for reform and reparation. Prisons as “time-outs” (to use a nursery school term) could and should revolve around changing and rebuilding the character of the prisoner. Self-reflection and guidance rather than isolation and shunning, lead to changed character. The opportunity to make reparations that reconnect offenders to the community in meaningful ways also serves to open the way to civic forgiveness.
RESOLUTION What is interesting in the notion of civic forgiveness and offender apologies is that individuals do find relief from offenders who apologize, even without forgiving them themselves. Isn’t it an interesting thought that such phenomenal effort be put into victim forgiveness as a means of relief rather than perpetrator apology, the first reinforcing the individual’s own responsibility to herself, the second promoting forgiveness and remorse as an interaction? The word “resolution” (clinical or managerial sounding though it is) has been offered as a substitute for “forgiveness”; however, forgiveness can happen without resolution and resolution can occur without “forgiveness”. Another idea that has been offered is a different Christian notion than the one discussed earlier. This is a simultaneous forgiving and not forgiving, a way to give up the individualized pressure to forgive and yield to a God who “takes over”. One can get relief and freedom from resentment by making it not one’s own problem anymore, but God’s problem. The offended can wish and hope for the offender’s path towards remorse and repentence, but also believe that forgiveness is only something God can do. If one substitutes the community for God, it is possible to get a sense of how civic forgiveness can relieve the individual of her burden and yet hold the perpetrator to a standard of repentance. We need public and communal ways to witness rituals of repentance (as demonstrated by the tremendous growth of twelve-step meetings in which admissions of weak character and moral wrongdoings are integral). And if these new rituals of repentance need to be accompanied by offering wrongdoers ways to make reparations, ways tied closely to the acts they committed, the people who they have offended, over time, reparation may serve as the gateway to reintegration of offenders to communities and families, which is, in a way, a kind of forgiveness.
References
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