RECENT JUSTICE PROJECTS

My theory and research on questions relevant to how and why people care about justice can be classified in two broad categories: (1) research on the "moral mandate effect," that demonstrates that when people have strong moral convictions about preferred outcomes (e.g., that abortion be legal or illegal) that they care little about the fairness of the procedures used to make policy or other decisions in this domain. Instead, people judge whether outcomes, decisions, and policies are fair as a function of whether they match their pre-existing moral point-of-view. Most recently this program of research has expanded consideration to explore how moral convictions relate to perceptions of and willingness to comply with authorities. (2) My other recent work on justice has been developing an integrative and contingent theory that can account for existing research on the fair process effect as well as the moral mandate effect, and that can make predictions about when different factors (e.g., procedures, outcomes) and needs or concerns (e.g., material, social, and moral) are likely to dominate people's fairness reasoning.

Moral Mandates and Justice Reasoning

Skitka, L. J., Bauman, C. W., & Lytle, B. L. (in press). The limits of legitimacy: Moral and religious convictions as a constraints on deference to authority. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.

Various versions of legitimacy theory predict that a duty and obligation to obey legitimate authorities generally trumps people's personal moral and religious values. However, most research has assumed rather than measured the degree to which people have a moral or religious stake in the situations studied. This study tested compliance with and reactions to legitimate authorities in the context of a natural experiment that tracked public opinion before and after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in a case that challenged state's rights to legalize physician-assisted suicide. Results indicated that citizens' degree of moral conviction about the issue of physician-assisted suicide predicted post-ruling perceptions of outcome fairness, decision acceptance, and changes in perceptions of the Court's legitimacy from pre- to post-ruling. Other results revealed that the effects of religious conviction independently predicted outcome fairness and decision acceptance but not perceptions of post-ruling legitimacy.

Wisneski, D. C., Lytle, B. L. & Skitka, L. J. (in press). Gut reactions: Moral conviction, religiosity, and trust in authority. Psychological Science

Theory and research point to different ways moral conviction and religiosity connect to trust in political authorities to decide controversial issues of the day. Specifically, we predicted that stronger moral convictions would be associated with greater distrust, and stronger religiosity would be associated with greater trust in authorities such as the U.S. Supreme Court to get controversial issues "right." We tested these hypotheses using a survey of a nationally representative sample of Americans (N = 727) that assessed the degree to which people trusted the U.S. Supreme Court to rule on the legal status of physician-assisted suicide (PAS). Results indicated that religiosity was associated with greater trust, and moral convictions about PAS were associated with greater distrust in the U.S. Supreme Court to decide this issue. Also, the processes underlying religious trust and morally convicted distrust were both more visceral than considered.

Bauman, C. W., & Skitka, L. J. (2009). Moral disagreement and procedural justice: Moral mandates as constraints to voice effects Australian Journal of Psychology, 61, 40 - 49.

Procedural voice is a widely used and effective means to reduce or eliminate conflict. Moral disagreements, however, are particularly inflammatory, divisive, and difficult to manage. The current article reports two studies that demonstrated the unique challenge that moral disagreements pose. Specifically, the studies tested the extent that procedural voice affected justice judgments, group climate, and decision acceptance when people perceived decisions to have moral implications. Study 1 tested hypotheses by having students work on a group task via computer, for which they earned a bonus that they could distribute to the charity of the group's choice. Participants either did or did not have voice in deciding whether the bonus went to a charity that served a pro-life cause. Study 2 tested hypotheses with a nationally representative sample and a web survey. Participants in the high voice condition of this study were told that their survey responses would be shared with legislators, and were provided an open-ended opportunity to voice their opinion in addition to providing responses to close-ended items. Participants in the low voice condition were not told anything about sharing results with legislators, and were not provided an open-ended opportunity to share their views. Participants then provided reactions to potential Supreme Court decisions that either validated or overturned the Roe v. Wade decision in support of legalized abortion, and we asked questions about fairness and decision acceptance. Manipulation checks validated that voice was successfully manipulated in both studies. Results indicated that when people's outcome preferences reflected strong moral convictions, outcomes were the primary determinant of perceived fairness and related judgments, irrespective of whether people had voice in the decision making process. Replicating previous research on procedural fairness, however, voice did influence perceptions of fairness and related variables when people did not have moral convictions about abortion even when the Supreme Court ruled against their preferences. These results were consistent with other research that has indicated that procedural fairness is less important in shaping people's fairness reasoning, decision acceptance, and other related concerns when people have moral convictions about outcomes (e.g., Mullen & Skitka, 2006; Skitka & Houston, 2001; Skitka, 2002; Skitka & Mullen, 2002).

Skitka, L. J., Bauman, C. W., & Mullen, E. (2008). Morality and justice: An expanded theoretical perspective and review. In K. A. Hedgvedt & J. Clay- Warner (Eds.),Advances in Group Processes, Vol. 25, (pp. 1 - 27). Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.

This chapter reviews theory and research that investigates how moral convictions about various outcomes (e.g., whether abortion should be legal) affect fairness judgments about both outcomes and the procedures and authorities that yield them. More specifically, this chapter presents an integrated theory of moral conviction provides a more complete theoretical account for why people's moral and non-moral outcome preferences differ, and explicitly posits a particularly important role for emotion in these processes. This chapter also reviews research that supports two core predictions of the theoretical model, specifically, the authority independence and litmus test hypotheses. The authority independence hypothesis predicts that when people have a moral stake in decision outcomes, their reasoning about outcome fairness and decision acceptance will be based more strongly on internal conceptions of personal right and wrong than on their pre- decision perceptions of authorities' fairness or legitimacy. The litmus test hypothesis predicts that people use their sense of morality as a benchmark to assess whether leaders, authorities, and procedures are valid or invalid.. People often do not know the "right" answer to the kinds of decisions or conflicts authorities and institutions are asked to resolve (e.g., whether a defendant is really guilty or innocent), and therefore rely on cues that procedures are even-handed and fair as evidence that they yield good decisions. However, when people have moral certainty about what outcome authorities and institutions should deliver, they do not need to rely on procedural propriety as proxy information to judge whether the system works-in these cases, they can simply evaluate whether procedures get it "right." "Correct" decisions indicate that leaders, authorities, and decision making procedures are appropriate and work as they should. "Wrong" answers signal that the system is somehow broken and is not working as it should. The chapter reviews research in support of these hypotheses, and also reviews research that suggests that the effects of moral conviction on people's justice reasoning is based largely on emotion.

Skitka, L. J., & Mullen, E. (2008). Moral convictions often override concerns about procedural fairness: A reply to Napier and Tyler. Social Justice Research, 21, 529-546.

Napier and Tyler (this issue) question whether moral convictions about outcomes really override the influence of procedural fairness (PF) on fairness judgments and decision acceptance. The empirical answer to this question is "yes." When people have strong moral convictions about outcomes, perceptions of outcome fairness and decision acceptance are primarily shaped by whether the morally "correct" outcomes are achieved. Pre-decision perceptions of PF have surprisingly little or no effect on these judgments. That said, pre-outcome perceptions of PF sometimes predict post-outcome perceptions of PF, even when people have morally vested outcome preferences. We provide further details supporting the validity and superiority of our data analytic approach and argue that our original conclusions were justified.

Skitka, L. J., & Bauman, C. W. (2008). Is morality always an organizational good? A review of morality in the context of organizational justice theory and research. In S. W. Gilliland, D. D. Steiner, & D. P. Skarlicki (Eds.) Justice, morality, and social responsibility: Research in social issues in management, Vol. 6(pp. 1 - 28). Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing..

Recent justice theory and research has variously proposed morality as a motive, an aspect of identity, and as a characteristic of attitudes. The current chapter provides a critical review of each of these approaches, and concludes that (a) morality plays an important role in fairness reasoning, (b) morality has ties to both pro-social and anti-social reactions and behavior, (c) it may be more useful to take an idiographic than nomothetic approach to studying morality, and (d) managing moral diversity may present greater organizational challenges than managing other kinds of diversity.

INTEGRATIVE THEORIZING

Skitka, L. J., Aramovich, N., Lytle, B. L., & Sargis, E. (in press). Knitting together an elephant: an integrative approach to understanding the psychology of justice reasoning. In D. R. Bobocel, A. C. Kay, M. P. Zanna, & J. M. Olson (Eds.), The psychology of justice and legitimacy: The Ontario symposium (Vol. 11). Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.

Why do people care about justice? How do people reason about what is fair or unfair? To answer these questions, justice researchers have developed theories of justice reasoning based on their assumptions about people's needs, desires, and motivations. For example, theories of social exchange assume people are rationally self-interested and will evaluate fairness through the lens of maximizing rewards. Alternatively, theories of procedural fairness assume people fundamentally need to belong to groups and will focus on the fairness of procedures as an indication of their social worth. Moral theories of justice reasoning assume people have fundamental beliefs about right and wrong and that people evaluate fairness in accordance with these beliefs. This chapter reviews these three different theoretical perspectives and integrates them into a contingency theory of justice. The contingency theory of justice posits that how people define fairness depends on the current perspective or goals of the perceiver (i.e., whether the perceiver is primarily focused on material, social, or moral needs or goals). Specifically, we propose that the perspective and motivations of the perceiver impact the factors people use to decide whether something is fair or unfair. The contingency theory of justice can account for the complexity and flexibility of people's justice reasoning, and how justice judgments vary both between and within persons over time. Additionally, the theory suggests that an important area of future research inquiry is exploring how people cope with differences in their fairness judgments, and how they resolve conflicts and arrive at consensus that everyone can agree is fair.

Skitka, L. J. (2009). Exploring the "lost and found" of justice theory and research Social Justice Research, 22, 98-116.

Scientific interest in the nature of how people think about justice and fairness began approximately 70 years ago with Stouffer's classic study on the American soldier. Since then there have been numerous theoretical frameworks and thousands of research studies conducted on what people perceive as fair and the consequences of making a fairness judgment. The goal of this article is to dig through the "lost and found" box of justice research in an attempt to re- examine where we have been, issues and ideas we may have forgotten, and to gain insight on directions we may want to go in the future. The key rediscovery of this review is that perspective matters. Specifically, how people interpret fairness depends critically upon whether they viewing a situation in terms of their material, social, or moral needs and goals. The implications of adopting a contingent theory of how people reason about fairness are discussed. .

Skitka, L. J. (2003). Of different minds: An accessible identity model of justice reasoning. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 7, 286-287.

An accessible identity model (AIM) of justice reasoning is introduced to explain when people become concerned about justice and how they define what is fair or unfair once justice concerns are activated. This model has two core propositions: (a) people are most likely to think about justice and fairness when self-relevant values and goals are highly accessible or activated, (b) how people define fairness depends on which aspect of the self (i.e., material, social, or personal/moral) dominates the working self-concept. A review of the literature indicates that this general model provides an integrative account for when and how people become concerned about both procedural and distributive justice, and provides a cogent explanation for known effects and results previously thought to be anomalies. Finally, the model generates novel hypotheses about how identity threat may lead to motivated perceptions of fairness or unfairness.