We have looked at Libertarianism, which holds that (1) In order for it to be legitimate to for us to hold people morally responsible for what they do, determinism must be false, and (2) Determinism is false.

David Hume denies both (1) and (2).  He argues first that determinism is true, and that the voluntary actions of human beings are every bit as necessary and determined as the motions of inanimate objects, and second that this is not in any way a problem for our practices of holding people morally responsible for what they do.  This position, which has been called "compatibilism" we will call "soft determinism."  It is the view that our actions are determined, but we can still be held responsible for our voluntary actions.  In making his case, Hume directs us to ordinary life.  This is very characteristic of Hume.  His idea is always to look to our ordinary practices, and to seek the practical implications of his views.

Let's look first at his discussion under Part I.

He begins by telling us that where there is a longstanding disagreement on something of common interest (rather than something abstract and complex, like the origins of the universe or something), it is probably because we are not clear on our terms, and so talking past one another.  The argument, he says, is between "liberty and necessity," so we should consider what these two terms mean.  He begins with necessity:

(1) He starts with the material world, where he says that we all agree that there is necessity (determinism).  What this means is basically that when we know how things stand we typically know what will happen next--we observe consistent connections between states of affairs.  What we really mean when we find necessity in the material world (or say that there is determinism or universal causation there) is to note "the constant conjunction of similar objects, and the consequent inference from one to the other."(427)  This is all we can mean by necessity, there is nothing deeper.

(2) But we have the same sort of necessity in the world of our voluntary actions, he says.  There, too, we note constant conjunction of similar objects and make such inferences.  For the first point, he suggests that we find many universals of human nature.  Not to say that there are no differences between people from different places or times, or no individual differences, but there is as much uniformity in the end as there is in the natural world.  (Make sure you understand this discussion).

(3) Sometimes it seems that there is more contingency in human affairs than in the natural world, and that we see less regularity there.  However, if we think carefully we see that this is not really the case.  Where there seems to be unpredictability in either case, we assume that there is some causal agent that we have not yet discovered. (429)  Human behavior is hard to predict like the weather is, but we do not really suppose that in either case there is a lack of necessity.(430)  The same thing is true with inferences.  We make these inferences all of the time, and count on them as surely as we count on inferences about the material world.

(4) He argues that in face we need this kind of necessity to make sense of moral responsibility.  An action must have connection with a person's character, and follow from what he is like, if we are to hold him responsible for it.  Liberty has to include this kind of necessity.  (432)
 
 

The theme of (4) is continued in Part II.

(1) First Hume argues that we could not have laws without the kind of uniformity (433) and that we would need to forgive people for their actions and forgo vengeance if we did not have necessity of this sort (433-4).  (Make sure you understand the argument there).

(2) Then he considers the problem that is raised by Campbell in his paper (although, of course, Hume wrote long before Campbell.  I mean only that the content of the problem is the same).  The problem that if our choices are necessitated by our character there will be a "chain of necessity" which ultimately goes outside of us--in the version he describes, back to God.(435)  This seems to imply either that there is no evil, or that it is attributable to God.  The answer, he says, is usually in the form of the assertion that evil is local.  God necessitated that the world be as it is, and that is good, but locally we will see pain or evil, as this is necessary to have the best possible whole.  (It's important to know that Hume is describing a traditional argument and response here.  He is not a big believer himself, but he is interested in the themes).  The important point here, from Hume's perspective, is that while this may be so, it does not stop us from complaining about the local evils--that is part of the whole.  Again he uses an analogy with physical causation.  Someone with an illness may be made to understand the physical determinants of his illness, and might even be made to see that the best general design for the body leaves it open to such illness, but none of this is going to make that person like the illness any better.  Similarly, he concludes, when we bring ourselves back from abstract speculations which are beyond our intellectual capacities, and focus on our own lives, we will see that the possible fact of grand chains of causation which go back beyond our origins do not matter to our practice of holding one another responsible.  (Do you understand this argument?  Do you accept it?)