Military History of the American Revolution
Study Questions
- The northern and southern colonies (or states, as they were called after 1776), made for very different theatres of war, because of geographical conditions (terrain, ports, rivers, weather), and settlement patterns and economic activities. They also differed in terms of population (the proportions of patriots and loyalists; freemen and slaves). Show how the military campaigns in the North differed from those in the South?
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In a long complex war, supplies, financing and the logistics of getting supplies to the soldiers can be critical. Overland transportation was slow and expensive--and imports from Europe were even slower and more costly. Explain how both the Americans and the British faced major logistics problems. How did each side try to solve their problems, and how successful were they? How important was French help to the Americans?
were they?
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How valid is the claim, "Without the help of the
French, American victory in the Revolution would not have been possible."
- Who were the Loyalists who fought for the King?
- Two decisive American victories came at Saratoga and Yorktown. A major British victory came at Camden. Select one and analyze how victory was secured.
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Discuss the social effects of the Revolution. In what areas was the
revolutionary promise or spirit of independence and equality most or least fulfilled? How did military service support and change the spirit?
- Weak revolutionary movements sometimes rely on guerrilla warfare to frustrate an occupying power. To what extent did the Americans use this approach, and to what extent did they rely on conventional warfare.
- Identify some of the misperceptions and false assumptions about Americans that hindered the British war effort.
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Describe the basic British strategy during the Revolution. What mistakes could they have avoided? Could they have defeated the Americans?
- Both sides had trouble raising enough soldiers. Explain the problems--and the motivations of the soldiers who did enlist.
1. In Search of Independence
The British were not willing to give up their great north American colonies without a fight. No colony anywhere had ever broken away from the Empire (and none would again until India broke loose in 1946). The British had a powerful professional army, the world's best navy, and a highly efficient financial and political system to back them up. The Americans had politicians aplenty, but almost no experienced soldiers, no warships, few cannon, and little gunpowder. Although the patriots easily seized control of the colonial and local governments in each of the 13 colonies in 1775, they had no real national government, and no money or credit. Thus the most difficult and
most important mission ever given the American military came in
1775: throw out the British army, repel the Royal Navy, and preserve
American liberties. In July 1776 the charge was expanded--to
wrest total independence for the new nation, the United States of
America. The challenge seemed impossible. Britain had a large
professional army, the greatest navy afloat, three times the
population, and a comprehensive administrative system that raised
and spent money efficiently. Add to that her allies: fierce
Indian tribes to the rear, Canada to the north, the Floridas to
the South, and untold numbers of Loyalists right in the middle.
The Americans had weak state governments which collected few
taxes, a new, even weaker national government that lacked any
taxing power at all. None of the states had standing armies or
navies. Fortifications and harbor defenses were decrepit. Only
in New England was the militia system anything more than an
archaic joke. No one in America yet knew how to make gunpowder or
cast cannon. George Washington, the new commander in chief, had
never led as many as a thousand soldiers, and the other generals
were even less experienced. A more subtle problem was that the
Americans sought independence in large part because they feared a
standing army--a force that would negate the republican
government they sought--yet they needed a standing army to fight
the Crown.
Britain threatens the colonies
The revolution occurred in the hearts and minds of Americans
in 1774-1776 as they realized that continued subservience to the
British Empire was impossible. After the Seven Years War London
wanted stifling controls on the colonial economy and on westward
expansion. They insisted that the colonists pay a share of the
cost of empire through new taxes, but refused to allow
representation in Parliament. Ominously London sent thousands of
regular army troops--was this to protect the colonists from
nonexistent threats, or to protect the Royal officials from the
anger of the people? Nothing seemed more dangerous to the
precious political liberties of the Americans than the sort of
standing army Britain was forcing upon them. The colonists
responded by setting up their own shadow government, including
local committees and (beginning in 1774) a Continental Congress.
The Empire thought it knew how to suppress rebellions--in 1715 and
1745 it had ruthlessly crushed the Highlanders in Scotland; in the
17th century it had taken control of Ireland in campaigns that
killed thousands of Catholic rebels and left the Protestants in
total domination. King George III was a hard-liner unwilling to yield to
the rebels, and he was loyally supported by his Prime Minister Lord North and the entire London bureaucracy.
Crisis in Massachusetts
Tensions came to a head in Massachusetts. In late 1773 the
Boston radicals disguised as Indians dumped a shipment of tea
into the harbor in protest. Next spring Parliament passed the
Coercive Acts that imposed near martial law and suspended
traditional civil liberties and economic freedom. Congress
denounced the Acts, called for boycotts of British goods, and
recommended that the militias ready their weapons. Georgia became
the 13th colony represented in the Congress; however, Canada and
16 smaller British colonies in North America remained loyal. The
French Catholics in Canada much preferred the tolerance of London
to the anti-Catholic Yankees; they stayed loyal, as did the
wealthy sugar planters who controlled the numerous West Indian
colonies. East Florida, West Florida and Newfoundland were so
small, so new, and so dominated by the British army and navy that
they stayed loyal. Nova Scotia (just north of Maine) was the
curious case. It had been settled largely by New Englanders, who
favored Congress. Yet it was an isolated island, easily
controlled by the Royal Navy from its powerful base in Halifax.
Protests were put down, and the people stayed neutral, pouring
their emotions into religious revival rather than revolution.
The 13 revolting colonies were the largest, richest, and most
developed in the Empire. London had no intention of letting them
go free. General Thomas Gage fortified Boston and raided nearby
towns where rebels had stored munitions. The people of
Massachusetts responded by setting up a provisional government,
training militia units, and detecting and suppressing Loyalists
and spies. A system of "minute men" was established, so that any
alarm would be answered immediately.
click here for maps from West Point Atlas
The Americans had sympathizers in Britain, but not enough.
Parliament rejected conciliation by a 3 to 1 margin, and Gage was
ordered to aggressively enforce the Coercion laws. More troops
arrived, along with the generals who would later replace Gage
and command the main British armies during the war, Sir William
Howe (fall 1775 to spring 1778), Sir Henry Clinton (1778 to 1782)
and John Burgoyne. All of them failed at their mission--perhaps
because London political considerations made it impossible to
remove careless generals who repeatedly lost tactical
opportunities, quarreled or failed to coordinate with one
another, and muffled the strategic designs that London drew up.
On April 18, 1775, Gage sent 700 elite troops to Concord, 21
miles from Boston, to seize illegal munitions stored there.
Major John Pitcairn, second in command of the unit, a month before had written that "one active
campaign, a smart action, and burning two or three of their
towns, will set everything to rights." As the British moved out just before midnight, Paul Revere and other patriots spread the alarm alerting the "Minutemen" militia in twons along the route.
The minute men of
Lexington tried to stop the British; someone unknown fired the first shot;
the Redcoats pushed on to Concord. As the British commander reported afterwards:
I marched on the evening of the 18th inst. with the corps of grenadiers and light infantry for Concord, to execute your Excellency's orders with respect to destroying all ammunition, artillery, tents, &c., collected there, which was effected, having knocked off the trunnions of three pieces of iron ordnance, some new gun carriages, a great number of carriage wheels burnt, a considerable quantity of flour, some gunpowder and musket balls, with other small articles thrown into the river. Notwithstanding we marched with the utmost expedition and secrecy, we found the country had intelligence or strong suspicion of our coming, and fired many signal guns, and rung the alarm bells repeatedly; and were informed, when at Concord, that some cannon had been taken out of the town that day, that others, with some stores, had been carried three days before....
Turning back to Boston, the British professionals were stunned to see
the American amateurs were fighting back. Three thousand militia lined
the route, firing muskets from behind stone fences. ("The
Americans," noted General Israel Putnam, "are not at all afraid
of their heads, though very much afraid of their legs; if you
cover these they will fight forever.") The Yankee assault was
well-planned and well-carried out. Only the timely arrival of a
rescue party saved the redcoats, who suffered 270 casualties
(versus 93 American casualties).**
Note on terminology. "Casualty" includes dead, wounded,
captured, deserted and missing. It represents the number of men
permanently or temporarily lost to the command. The missing were
usually captures or deserters, and most did not return to the
war. Many of the wounded soon died. "Regular" means full-time,
long-term soldiers, either British or American (the latter known
as Continentals.) Contrast with "militia", who were temporary
citizen-soldiers, commanded by state officers. The U.S. side is
variously called American, patriot, Congress, rebel, Yankee, Continental,
allied or Whig. The King's side is called British, redcoat,
Tory, Hessian or Loyalist.
The Loyalists were Americans who supported the King. "Rank and file" refers to privates and
corporals.
Patriots aroused after Lexington
Fast riders sped word of the British aggression and American
resistance up and down the coast. The news reached General
Putnam, age 67, as he was plowing his Connecticut farm. He
instantly unhitched a horse, left word for his militia to follow,
and galloped the 100 miles in 18 hours. Within days Boston was
surrounded by 10,000 patriots, enlisted for the year, armed with
muskets and ready to fight. Their opportunity came in June, at
the Battle of Bunker Hill,
when 2,400 redcoats attacked 1,600
patriots dug in on Breed's Hill (in front of Bunker Hill).
Crouching low behind their breastworks, the Yankees were told to
wait--"Don't fire until you see the whites of their eyes!" The
first two waves were mowed down; finally a bayonet charge took
the hill. The redcoats won, at a stunning cost of 1,054
casualties, including a high proportion of officers. The
Americans lost 400 casualties, and shattered the illusion that
they would not or could not stand up to well-trained regulars.
Over the winter of 1775-76, the Americans sent expeditions to
conquer Canada. With no support forthcoming from the French
Catholics in Canada, the American invasion was hopeless. Short
of supplies, outnumbered, and too reckless, the Americans were
whipped and Canada would continue to fly the Union Jack. The
Americans could not assault Boston itself without artillery. Led
by Henry Knox, a brilliant clerk who had read military treatises
and knew how to seize the moment, the patriots obtained 60 heavy
guns from the capture of Ft. Ticonderoga, in upstate New York.
Water traffic was controlled by the Royal Navy, so Knox organized
ox teams that hauled the heavy guns across the snows and ice in
winter 1775-76. When the guns finally arrived in Boston in March,
1776, the British in Boston were defenseless; they withdrew to
the great British naval base in Halifax, Canada. The rebellion
faced by their old enemy pleased the French, who began secret
shipments of gunpowder, muskets and other vitally needed
munitions, and allowed American privateers to use ports in France
and the French West Indies. Independence Declared
In full control of nearly all parts of the 13 states, and
realizing they had to break from London once and for all if they
ever were to receive French aid, the new United States of America
declared its independence in July, 1776. This was a proclamation
of a state of affairs that had taken effect at least a year
earlier, when the Continental Congress took over the forces
around Boston and formally established a Continental Army. The
army's mission thus was to preserve the status quo of a
new nation that had seized control of its fate. The British had
to crush that symbol, and reassert the supremacy of the Crown.
The Royal Navy blockaded the American coastline. Washington and
his armies had to trudge overland, while the British forces could
be moved rapidly by water from point to point. Although they had
the naval power to seize any one point, Britain never had the
manpower to occupy all the rebellious colonies simultaneously.
At least 200,000 soldiers would have been needed for that, and
probably more. London did expand its army, but service was
unpopular and it could not raise enough troops. Efforts to hire
mercenary armies around Europe turned up only 30,000 men rented
out by the rulers of Hesse-Cassel and other tiny countries. (The
rulers were paid so much per soldier, with a bonus for those
killed.) The 3,000-mile-long supply line drastically limited the
number of troops that could be maintained in America. The supply
line furthermore had to be constantly protected from American
privateers (privately operated armed merchant ships with a
license to attack British merchantmen.) London assumed that a
small number of radicals, wholly unrepresentative of American
opinion, had seized control. The solution was not to negotiate
but to overthrow them. The reasonable Americans would see their
duty as British citizens, and renew their allegiance to the Crown
once they saw the invincible British army had arrived.
British map of Theatre of War, 1776
2. Two Armies Contest North America
General in chief George Washington
When
Congress took charge of the unorganized army at Boston in June,
1775, its consensus choice for commander in chief was George
Washington, age 45. His military experience totaled five years
in the French and Indian War, when he became colonel in charge of
all Virginia forces at age 23. Now a wealthy tobacco planter,
slaveholder, and political leader of Virginia, he had the
stature, the energy, and the bearing of leadership the Americans
needed. Washington had three roles during the war. In 1775-77,
and again in 1781 he led his men against the main British forces.
He lost many of his battles--save the last one--but always
survived to fight another day. Second he was charged with
organizing and training the army. He recruited regulars and
assigned a German professional named von Steuben to train them.
Steuben's open homosexuality annoyed the straight Americans, but they
needed all the help they could get. Washington had the major
voice in selecting generals for command, and in planning their
basic strategy. The quality of these choices was mixed, as some of his
favorites (like John Sullivan) never mastered the art of command.
Eventually he found men who got the job done, like Nathaniel
Greene. The American officers never equalled their opponents in
tactics and maneuver, and consequently they lost most of the
pitched battles. Washington himself was defeated repeatedly near
Boston ("Bunker Hill"), New York City ("Long Island") and Philadelphia ("Germantown").
The great American successes, at Saratoga and Yorktown,
came from trapping the British far from base with much larger
numbers of troops. Third, and most important, Washington was the
embodiment of armed resistance to the Crown--the representative
man of the Revolution. American Republicanism was the opposite of British
aristocracy, and Washington proved a much better national symbol for his
nation than King George III did for Britain. The Virginian's enormous stature and political skills
kept Congress, the army, the French, the militias, and the states
all pointed toward a common goal. By voluntarily stepping down
and disbanding his army when the war was won, he permanently
established the principle of civilian supremacy in military
affairs. And yet his constant reiteration of the point that
well-disciplined professional soldiers counted for twice as much
as erratic amateurs helped overcome the ideological distrust of a
standing army. There was unanimous sentiment that he had to be
the first president when the first election took place in 1788.
The American "Continental Army"
The Continental army was organized along British lines.
Washington was General (three stars) and Commander in Chief,
reporting directly to Congress. He personally commanded the Main
Army, which varied in strength from 6,000 to 18,000, and directed
army wide staff commands. Washington supervised major generals
(two stars) who commanded geographical divisions: Eastern (New
England), Northern (New York), Highlands (West Point area of New
York), Middle (New Jersey to Delaware), Southern (Virginia--the
largest state--plus the Carolinas and Georgia), Western and
Canadian. When the Main Army moved into a division, Washington
assumed overall command there; most of the time it was based
within a radius of 40 or 50 miles outside New York City. The
divisional armies fluctuated in size, but usually comprised one
to five brigades. Brigades comprised about 2,500 men commanded by
a brigadier (one star) general. Congress approved 73 generals,
16 of whom had been officers in the British army (usually
captains or majors), 36 in the colonial militias, and 21 with
zero previous military experience. All that Nathanael Greene and
Henry Knox knew about warfare came from reading manuals and
military history, yet Greene was one of the two or three best
fighters (after Benedict Arnold), and young Knox (born 1750)
brilliantly handled Washington's artillery.
The brigades
were the main fighting units of the army. They were made up of
five to ten regiments, which were called battalions when in
battle. Some regiments were "Continental," that is, organized
and controlled by Congress, with long terms of service. Other
regiments were "militia," organized and controlled by the states,
with short terms of service (usually one year). In addition to
these standard regiments, when the Americans were doing well
local militia companies suddenly showed up; they would depart
whenever they pleased. Washington was infuriated at his lack of
control over them. "They come in you cannot tell how, go, you
cannot tell when; and act, you cannot tell where; consume your
provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at last in a
critical moment." He insisted that only a regular army with long
terms of service could be properly trained, officered, moved from
place to place, and counted upon to be around for a long
campaign. But Washington was too awed by the professionalism of
the British Army, and anyway the new American political and
financial systems were much too weak to support a large standing
army. Furthermore, most patriots deeply distrusted one. To this
day historians debate whether in actual battle the militia fought
as well as the Continentals. The Maryland Line and Delaware Line
(militia) were outstanding, performing almost as well as the
British regulars in executing tactical moves on the battlefield.
In any case, a large standing army would have been a tempting
target for the main British force. The basic British strategy in
1775-1778 was to track down and destroy Washington's main army.
Its destruction would likely have led to an American loss of
independence.
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A colonel commanded an American regiment,
assisted by a lieutenant colonel and a major.* They usually were
the organizers
* The colonelcy of a British regiment was honorific; the lieutenant
colonel was in actual command.
who recruited the regiment in the first place. The regulars had
volunteered for different lengths of time (one year, three, the
duration of the war), and regiments whose term had expired wanted
to march home. Half the veteran officers and sergeants, and
perhaps a third of the privates reenlisted; the rest called it a
war and went home. It grew harder and harder to raise troops.
Cash bounties were offered, a draft was imposed. A draftee could
escape by paying a fine or finding a substitute; older men sent
sons or younger brothers. The more established young men
volunteered for war first; by 1777 it was the poor, the
unemployed, immigrants, blacks, and drifters who entered the army.
To organize the regiment a colonel's staff included a surgeon,
quartermaster (supply officer), chaplain, paymaster, and an
adjutant to quill the paperwork. The fighting power of the
regiment comprised seven to ten companies, each commanded by a
captain, assisted by a lieutenant or two, an ensign (the lowest
ranking officer), four sergeants (who ran things), four corporals,
and a drummer and fifer (to issue commands in battle). The
privates, 30 to 70 per company, carried muskets, pitched their
tents, cooked whatever food was available, and did what the
corporals and sergeants ordered. The weakness of the American
army was that the sergeants and officers had little or no
experience in warfare, and the generals displayed more genius for
back-room politics than for battlefield action. The Americans had
great difficulty carrying off complex, coordinated maneuvers.
When Washington tried a four-pronged attack at Germantown in 1777,
everything collapsed in confusion. At least Washington learned
his lesson: he did not have an army that could maneuver as well
or fight on equal terms, so he never again tried. |
Most regiments were strictly infantry, armed just with
muskets and bayonets. Sometimes elite troops were assigned to a
light infantry company, which was always kept up to full strength.
Brigade commanders would assemble all their light infantry
companies into a special battalion for special missions. The
British used light infantry more often and more effectively than
the Americans, because their command and control structure worked
better. A brigade might have one artillery company, with perhaps
an artillery regiment assigned to department headquarters.
Cavalry units (which fought on horseback) were rarely used.
Dragoons were infantry who rode horses, but dismounted to fight.
They appeared in southern campaigns, but were not used more often
because few Americans owned suitable mounts, and the British could
not handle the logistics of sending horses and fodder across the
Atlantic. Furthermore Washington never learned to appreciate the
strong advantages of mounted forces in covering great distances.
On paper a regiment numbered 500 to 1,000 men. But it probably
was not at full strength in the first place. At any one time,
some soldiers were sick, some assigned elsewhere, some captured or
dead or deserted, or just vanished. Having 350 men fit for duty
was usual. When new recruits arrived they usually came in new
regiments, but sometimes they filled out understrength old ones.
Every year or two old regiments might be merged, reorganized or
even disbanded as their one or three year enlistment terms
expired.
Associated with each regiment were civilian sutlers (who sold
food and clothes in a sort of post exchange, or PX), wagoners, and
often their wives. These women washed, cooked, sewed, nursed, and
maintained morale, and were entitled to half rations. (Very few
were prostitutes.) British and German regiments typically had far
more camp followers; apparently American women disliked that kind
of life. The Americans, "not being used to doing things of this
sort, choose rather to let their linen, etc., rot upon their backs
than to be at the trouble of cleaning 'em themselves." The lack
of women had more dangerous consequences: "Many of the Americans
have sickened and died of the dysentery brought upon them in great
measure through an inattention to cleanliness. When at home their
female relations put them washing their hands and faces and
keeping themselves neat and clean, but being absent from such
monitors, through an indolent needless turn of mind, they have
neglected the means of health, have grown filthy, and poisoned
their constitution by nastiness." Everyone scratched away at the
parasitic mites that burrowed into the seams of dirty clothing.
Those itching from scurvy were in fact seriously ill, and were
sent to the regimental field hospital. It was a rude hut where
the surgeon, surgeon's mate, and nurses (camp followers) did would
little they could.
Disease
Disease killed far more soldiers than did combat. Of the
100,000 to 150,000 men who served in U.S. forces at one time or
another, about 6,800 died in battle, while disease carried away
10,000 in camp and 8,500 in British prisons. Putting thousands
of men in close quarters, with bad sanitation and poor hygiene,
was the prescription for epidemics. The care of the wounded was
rudimentary; neither side had an ambulance service or corps of
medics to apply first aid and rush the wounded back to field
hospitals. A delay of several hours before any medical attention
often meant bleeding to death, or the onset of fatal gangrene.
Punctures made by bayonets were usually clean wounds with deep
gashes; bayonets either killed immediately or offered a good
chance for survival in an otherwise healthy soldier. The main
function of bayonet charges, however, was not to stab the enemy
but to frighten him into running away. Iron shrapnel from
artillery and the lead musket balls produced torn, jagged wounds.
Unlike the steel-jacketed high-velocity bullets of the late
nineteenth century, the low-velocity one-ounce musket balls
flattened on impact, ripped up flesh, traumatized tissue, and
splintered bones. Chest, stomach and groin wounds were hopeless.
Wounds of the face, neck and legs demanded immediate attention for
there was still hope if the man did not go into shock. Blood
transfusion was unknown so the surgeon stopped the bleeding with a
tourniquet, calmed the wide-eyed patient with a slug of rum,
opened the wound with a scalpel, and removed the fragments with
forceps (or dirty fingers). The wound was cleaned with lint
soaked in oil, bandaged, and changed daily. A serious leg or arm
wound required immediate amputation to forestall gangrene; the
operation took a half hour. Since the incision was made through
healthy tissue, there was a better chance for survival if not much
blood had been lost. Unfortunately, if the surgical patients were
kept in the hospital more than a few days, they would probably
catch, and perhaps die from an infectious disease--dysentery,
typhoid, smallpox, or malaria. The surgeons were poorly trained
(many not even doctors), and supplies were always short. Scarcely
any effective drugs were available, though many remedies
were tried, especially emetics and laxatives.
Supplies
When a regiment was on the march, it would send out foragers
to buy (or steal) whatever food, fodder and fuel the local farmers
had not hidden away. British, French and German supply officers
paid real money. Americans could pay only with depreciating
Continental paper, or in near-worthless certificates. The job of
forager was as unpopular as it was essential, and often was
assigned to black troops. In the lightly populated interior South, food supplies were scarce and marching armies often suffered. The officers were responsible for
their own food and clothing, using their pay or, more often, their
private wealth. The pay, when it occasionally arrived, seldom was
enough to buy much. Their relatives sent along boots and
blankets. The privates, however, depended on the quartermaster
corps for shoes, clothes, blankets, and everything else, and
routinely were disappointed. They mutinied from time to time--the
only effective way they could signal Congress and the people that
the system was not working. The mutinies were not refusals to
fight, nor attacks on officers, and the men calmed down quickly
enough when their generals and colonels promised them relief.
As for the officers, they demanded, and finally got, a Congressional
promise of eventual pensions (half-pay for life) and land grants in the west.
Why Fight?
The British officers were convinced the Americans would not
and could not fight. Hilarious anecdotes circulated about their
inept soldiering in the French and Indian War and the impossibility of disciplining them according to European standards. "They are raw,
undisciplined, cowardly men," insisted the First Lord of the
Admiralty. The British misperceptions of the American character
typified the widening gap between London and the fast maturing
colonies. The rank and file British soldiers were recruited from
very low social ranks, were treated shabbily by their sergeants
and officers, and held in contempt by everyone. The British
private was a cog in the machine, not an individual. His duty was
to obey his superiors immediately, without flinching or thinking.
The main tactic of the infantry was to march as close as possible
to the enemy, form ranks, then fire volleys of muskets regardless
of enemy fire. Severe flogging was the punishment for any
disrespect; the European ideal was that the soldier should fear
his officers more than the enemy. British privates enlisted for
life, attracted by the free food and clothing. Patriotism was
scarcely a factor. American militiamen were part-time soldiers and
full-time citizens and voters. They were individualistic, with
their own needs and priorities, so they evaluated military service
on their own terms. The instructions for recruiters in Maryland
required "great Regard to moral Character; Sobriety in
particular." "You are to inlist no Man who is not able bodied,
healthy and a good marcher, nor such whose attachment to the
liberties of America you have cause to suspect. Young hearty
robust men who are tied by Birth or Family Connections to this
County; and are well practiced in the use of firearms are by much
to be preferred." Recruits thus were integrated into their
community, and reflected its values, aspirations and fears. The
militia elected its own junior officers, and judged their
performance with a critical eye. When their enlistments expired,
they went home. (Deserters went home too, and the community
protected them. The American desertion rate was a very high 20 to
25 per 100 men per year.)
Did Patriots lack discipline?
The Americans were notoriously sloppy, dirty and careless;
formations were ragged, and routine discipline was at best
erratic. To the martinets in red coats this proved that the
rebels did not know how to make war. American officers had to
learn how to elicit self discipline among their men. Parades and
smart uniforms enhanced pride in the unit, which gradually became
the community the long-terms regulars identified with. As drill
master von Steuben later explained to a Prussian visitor, "You say
to your soldier, 'Do this' and he doeth it; but I am obliged to
say 'This is the reason why you ought to do that,' and then he
does it." The redcoat was easy to order around. The Americans
only followed orders they felt were correct; if the scene were too
dangerous they would run away. If the generals were doing poorly
they would go home. Conversely, if the officers could motivate
them they would fight well, and if the enemy seemed in trouble
they would suddenly show up by the thousands, as they did at
Boston (1775), Saratoga (1777) and Yorktown (1781). The American
militiaman, contrasted with a redcoat regular, was better
educated, more easily trained, more accustomed to wilderness more
acclimated to the disease environment, and more familiar with
firearms. He was a full participant in the war because this was a
struggle his home community was waging for its own independence
and freedom.
British soldiers
The British army of 1775 had a fearsome reputation that was
not fully deserved. Britain normally fought its wars by
subsidizing allies, like Prussia, that did the real fighting. The
army was therefore quite small for a global empire. In 1775 it had
worldwide only 49,000 men: 39,000 infantry, 2,500 artillery, and
6,900 cavalry. The average soldier, aged 30, had been nine years
in the ranks, but that did not mean he was well trained. Since
there had been no warfare for a dozen years, only the older men
had battlefield experience. In peacetime the British army was
scattered about in small units, the men often boarded in private
homes. In America the men lived in barracks and were drilled six
hours a day, with calisthenics, goose-step marching, and musket
loading. However, there were no field exercises that would give
the officers a feel for maneuvering thousands of men. Parliament
expanded the forces quickly after Lexington, authorizing 40,000
more soldiers. Enlistment meant lifetime service, however, and
only the most destitute men looked upon it is an attractive deal.
They were not quick studies, and had narrow perspectives. Never
were they permitted to take any initiative or question their
orders. did not know what they were fighting for, except to avoid
the iron discipline of their sergeants and lieutenants. The
Hessians were
German soldiers hired from their princes by the British.
Americans appealed to them to desert and join the American
cause. Most Hessians looked at Americans as ferocious savages,
but some changed their opinions. Hessian prisoners were held in
German-speaking areas of
Pennsylvania, and hired out to local farmers. Only 60 percent of
the mercenaries returned to Germany; 23 percent died; 17 percent
deserted and became Americans.
British Officers
Europeans measured the qualities of officers not in terms of
initiative, ingenuity or community ties, but in terms of honor and
elevated social status. British officers were gentlemen, or even
titled aristocrats who had purchased their commissions for huge
sums of money. They had not attended a military academy;
aristocrats thought their status alone made them deserving of
command. Warfare was a way of enhancing the honor of their
family; military hierarchies reflected social hierarchies, with a
vast gap between top and bottom. The American armies had an
amazingly small social differential between officer and private--
typified by the story of the captain-barber cutting his men's
hair, or the colonels who cobbled boots for prisoners. According
to the "Republican" or "Whig" ideology that had seized the
American mind, it was the duty of every citizen to work for the
good of the community. Sacrifice, especially the risk of life in
battle, was the highest form of virtue. The bravest soldiers, the
ones most dedicated to the cause, were therefore the ones with the
highest virtue, and thus deserved to be officers. Their men ought
to follow their orders not because of aristocratic status, or
obedience to the King, but because the officers most nearly
embodied the spirit of liberty and community. The officers had to
uplift the men, help them reach their full potential as true
Americans. Conversely, the most horrible status was that of
traitor: the person who put alien allegiance ahead of civic virtue
and loyalty to community. The Loyalists were traitors, and worst
of all was Benedict Arnold, the hero who became a turncoat. King
George, by the Coercion Acts and the imposition of martial law,
was challenging the very existence of an autonomous American
community. To give in would be slavery; to resist, the highest
form of virtue. "Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be
purchased at the price of chains and slavery?" called out Patrick
Henry of Virginia. "I know not what course others may take, but
for me give me liberty or give me death!"
Discusses the anomaly of slave-owning Americans demanding freedom.
3. The New York City Disaster
The glorious spring of 1776 gave way to disasters in the
summer and fall for the fledgling Continental army and its
inexperienced commander. The British Royal Navy had complete
control of the seas (since the French were still neutral). They
could move large forces anywhere on the coastline much faster than
the Americans could build defenses or march in reinforcements. As
Washington discovered, "The amazing advantage the Enemy derive
from their Ships and the Command of the Water, keeps us in a state
of constant perplexity and the most anxious conjecture."
Throughout the war the British strategy focused on cities. They
realized that the colonies did not have a true center like
London, but the cities were all accessible by sea, and they all
contained large Loyalist contingents who wined and dined the
British officers, leaving the mistaken impression that most
Americans "really" favored the King. New York City was a prime
target--it had the best port in the colonies, and could be used
to isolate the New England region. Congress demanded that
Washington defend Manhattan island (population 22,000) and nearby
Long Island. But any defense was hopeless in the face of 30
British warships with 1,200 guns, and 10,000 sailors, not to
mention the hundreds of transports that carried nearly half of
the British army--32,000 trained regulars. This powerful force--
45% of the Royal Navy and by far the most formidable fighting
unit on the globe--was assembled only because King George III
himself demanded action, and his minister for American affairs
Lord George Germain brilliantly solved the logistic challenge. It
was commanded by Major General William Howe and his older brother
Admiral Earl Howe. Fortunately for the American cause, the
Howes were trying to be conciliatory; a massive show of force on
land and a tight blockade at sea would show the Yankees how
insane their rebellion was, inducing them to accept the generous
pardons which Howe was prepared to offer. Conciliation would be a
better route to reunion, Howe felt, than annihilation of the
rebel armies. But annihilation it nearly was. Washington
foolishly divided his 28,000 men between Long Island and
Manhattan, and neglected to defend his flanks. Instead of
charging head-on, as they did in Boston, the Redcoats used their
mobility to land troops in the rear, A surprise amphibious
landing trapped Washington at the Battle of Long Island (Aug
1776). Miraculously he evaded the fleet and escaped to
Manhattan. But another amphibious landing trapped him again. A
second miraculous escape took Washington north of the city.
click here for map from West Point Atlas
Aftermath of defeat
Washington had been whipped. Any remaining American
taste for offensive warfare like the siege of Boston or the
invasion of Canada dissolved in the face of British superiority
in numbers and assault capability. Disorganization, shortages of
supplies, fatigue, sickness, and above all, lack of confidence in
the American leadership resulted in a melting away of untrained
regulars and frightened militia. As Washington grumbled, "The
honor of making a brave defence does not seem to be sufficient
stimulus, when the success is very doubtful, and the falling into
the Enemy's hands probable." The Connecticut contingent shrank
from 8,000 to 2,000 in a matter of days. At White Plains. north
of New York City, Washington again lost, and had to retreat to
the hills of New Jersey. Meanwhile two major American forts, Lee
and Washington, were surrounded and captured with 2,800 prisoners
and the loss of sorely needed artillery and supplies. Manhattan
and Long Island would fly the Union Jack until 1783. In
December, 1776, the British seized control of New Jersey. The
defeats were humiliating, but indecisive because the Howes
neglected their opportunities to crush the insurgents. After all
the casualties, captures, departures and desertions, Washington
had only 16,000 men left--half the force he started with. He
would never again battle the main British army, but would try to
pick away at detachments and outposts. He knew the Redcoats
could seize any city or other point they chose, but the new
nation was so decentralized that it had no nerve center to be
immobilized. Above all, Washington's goal was to keep his army
alive as proof that the Revolution persisted.
Washington Strikes Back
Washington, however, was not finished. On Christmas Day, 1776, he crossed the ice-filled Delaware River
and surprised the
Hessian winter encampment at Trenton, New Jersey. Over 900 of
the 1,400 Germans were captured, and 22 killed; only 4 Americans
were dead. Washington followed up this brilliant stroke with a
lightning attack on Princeton, New Jersey, on January 2. The
overcautious General Howe decided to retreat to New York,
abandoning New Jersey and thousands of Loyalist supporters. Only
a small part of the great British army had been defeated, and yet
New Jersey was lost. Washington broke all the rules. Well-
behaved armies spent six "winter" months (December through May or
June) in camp, not in the field. It was rude indeed to interrupt
Hessians sleeping off their Christmas parties. And it was
audacious to challenge a much larger, much better equipped enemy
with a ragged, hungry little force. But battles are won by
audacity, and Washington's bold moves revived patriot spirits and
demonstrated to the British that conciliatory tactics would never
bring the Americans to heel.
4. Counter-Revolutionary Warfare
If this was a revolution, the British needed a counter-
revolutionary policy. Assuming the ringleaders were few and
easily suppressed was a cardinal mistake, delaying any effective
policy until after 1776. By then it was too late. To control an
area the insurgents had to accomplish three goals: win the
allegiance of more people, in terms of both active support and
passive acquiescence. Then the rebels had to construct a viable
organization. The organization needed identity (badges, flags),
recruiting capability, weapons, training, leadership, ties to the
national movement, and a secure sanctuary in case in case of
attack. Finally the insurgents had to crush the opposition's will
to exist through techniques that ranged from ostracism to seizure
of property, imprisonment, and execution. In the 1770s the
patriots were younger, more committed, more vigorous, less
attached to the old order, more confident and better organized
than the Loyalists. They would surely win unless the British
successfully competed for the allegiance of the apathetics and
neutrals, throttled the rebel organization, and revitalized the
old government, especially as it touched people's lives.
In Queens County New York, Loyalism was strong; about 12% of
the people were patriots and 27% Loyalists. (The remainder were
neutral, but some could be coerced one way or the other.) In
addition to their rare numerical advantage, the Loyalists had the
secure refuge, for New York City was only a few miles away.
Furthermore the British commissary agents were paying farmers real
gold for food, horses and fuel, while the rebels only had dubious
paper money. In most of the country, the rebels early on seized
control of local governments, and enlisted the militia on their
side, but in Queens, the Loyalists won control of most of the
towns. In most of the country, the religious configuration
favored the rebels. The New England Congregationalists and the
southern Anglicans, for example, supported the revolution. In
Queens, one fifth of the people were Quakers. Ostensibly neutral,
the Quakers in fact were comfortable with the royal regime that
had protected them for so long. Queens had a large Anglican and
Dutch Reformed population (both 4 to 1 Tory), and many
Presbyterians (5 to 1 patriot). Most newspapers in the colonies
favored the revolution, as did most orators. In Queens the
propaganda seemed to favor the Crown. The atrocities and
oppression the patriots talked about endlessly were not local
matters; no one was afraid of Indians any longer. When the
patriots failed to win control of the spirit of Queens in 1775,
they bluntly arrested and attacked supporters of the Crown. This
gave the Loyalists the image of reasonable moderates defending the
community against terrorists.
British lose popular support
When the redcoats occupied Queens from 1776 to 1783 the
inhabitants discovered what the American Revolution was all
about. Civilians were treated with contempt--attacked, raped,
arrested, plundered, cheated, cut off from decisions. The
British instituted a harsh martial law just to make sure there
would be no unrest. Loyalism faded in Queens; the men
increasingly refused to volunteer for Loyalist militia units, or
spy on the patriots. Only one fifth of the original Tories went
into exile after 1783; the remainder seemed pleased that the new
government had restored peace. Not even under ideal conditions
could the aristocratic British win the hearts and minds of the
equalitarian Americans. But even if the British had figured out
a counter-revolutionary strategy, after Saratoga it was too late.
5. Burgoyne's Plan: Split the Colonies, 1777
Early in the war one of the more dashing and imaginative
British generals, John Burgoyne, had a plan to divide and
conquer:
A large army of such foreign troops as might be hired to
begin their operations up the Hudson River; another army
composed partly of old, disciplined troops and partly of
Canadians, to act from Canada; a large levy of Indians, and a
supply of arms for the blacks, to awe the southern provinces,
conjointly with detachments of regulars; and a numerous fleet
to sweep the whole coast, might possibly do the business in one
campaign.
Burgoyne won London's approval for most of his plan, and command
of the army that was to march down from Canada and seize the
Hudson River. Lieutenant Colonel Barry St. Leger would lead a
second army across New York from west to east, meeting up with
Burgoyne in Albany. Finally, redcoats in New York City might (or
might not) march north and join the other two armies. Burgoyne's
basic idea was that New England was the hotbed of revolution.
Cut it off and the nine central and southern colonies would lack
leadership and determination. Canada was used as the main base
partly because there were 10,000 regulars there who could come
down the long Montreal-Hudson River corridor. By 1777, however,
a hundred thousand patriotic New Englanders lived within marching
range of Burgoyne's route. A campaign north from New York City
would have been much shorter, safer and more effective. But Howe
was the senior officer, and would command such an attack. If
Burgoyne was to lead the decisive blow he would have to start
from Canada. He moved deep into enemy territory, far from the
Royal Navy's guns, far from his base of supplies, and out of
touch with supporting troops.
click here for map from West Point Atlas
Early success of invasion
Everything went smoothly for Burgoyne, at first. In June,
1777, he easily captured the important American fort at
Ticonderoga. St. Leger, with 1,800 Loyalists and Indians, besieged
750 Americans at Ft. Stanwix in central New York. Indians and
Loyalists led by Mohawk Chief Joseph Brant ambushed one relief
party. But then luck turned. General Benedict Arnold (still on
the U.S. side) sent a half-wit into St. Leger's camp with
exaggerated tales of vast American armies on the march. The
Indians bought the story and deserted, forcing St. Leger to
withdraw. He would not be at the Albany rendezvous. Burgoyne
meanwhile slowly hacked his way through dense forest south of
Ticonderoga. The Loyalists he expected to rally to the Union
Jack were disappointingly few. The Indians proved very difficult
to coordinate; Burgoyne complained they were too bloodthirsty and
too eager for plunder to be effective soldiers. "My effort,"
Burgoyne explained, "has been to keep up their terror and avoid
their cruelty." The French Canadians, though willing to defend
their homes from the Yankees, refused to march south with
Burgoyne's invading army. Howe, aware of Burgoyne's efforts,
decided nonetheless to capture Philadelphia; he moved most of his
army there by sea. Howe would not rendezvous in Albany either.
Washington perhaps should have moved north to cut the
Hudson River between Albany and New York. Instead he tried to
defend Philadelphia, the national capital. Howe whipped him in
set battles at Brandywine Creek in September, and at Germantown a
month later. Rather than pursuing his elusive tormentor, Howe
settled down to winter quarters in affluent Philadelphia, where
the wealthy Loyalists entertained his troops lavishly. The
British, with plenty of gold coin, never wanted for food or fuel.
Washington's barefoot men shivered and starved all winter long at
nearby Valley Forge. The commissary and quartermaster
departments, which reported directly to Congress, had failed
their mission. The main reason was a lack of transportation to
move supplies to where they were needed, and a lack of long-term
planning. Since the Royal Navy blockaded the ports and
controlled the seas and major rivers, supplies had to be
tediously moved overland by wagon; with the British in control of
New York City and Philadelphia, circuitous routes were necessary.
Poor British Intelligence
The British lacked good intelligence about what was
happening. In Europe the armies were so large, the space so
small, and the population so numerous, that everyone knew where
everyone else was. Vast, open, underpopulated America was a
different world. In the first few years of the war, the British
commander occasionally received reports, often garbled or
contradictory or, worst of all, overoptimistic, but never handled
them in systematic fashion. Howe in Philadelphia did not know
whether Washington was camped 5 miles away or 105. Finally after
four years of warfare, in May 1779, Clinton appointed his aide
Captain John Andre as intelligence officer. The energetic young
spymaster set up underground networks and systematically analyzed
the inflow of data from spies, Loyalist informers, captured
hostiles, and escaped British prisoners. Andre's most brilliant
stroke was the purchase of the plans for the defense of West
Point in 1780--in the process of which he was captured in
disguise and hung. His successor perfected the British
intelligence network. When the Pennsylvania regulars mutinied in
January 1781, Clinton learned about it the same day as
Washington. His emissaries offered to pay in cash the mutineers'
back wages if they would defect, but the mutineers hanged them.
When the New Jersey regulars mutinied three weeks later, Clinton
learned about it before Washington did, but did not try anything.
The royal spies were getting better--soon they reported that the French
naval base at Newport, Rhode Island, was poorly guarded. Clinton
decided on a surprise attack, but both Admiral Graves and General
Cornwallis refused to follow his orders, and the opportunity
passed. Spies correctly reported the secret moves of Washington
and Rochambeau toward Virginia in 1781. This time Clinton
misinterpreted the data, for it contradicted his firm belief that
their attack would be against him in New York rather than against
Cornwallis in Virginia. The best intelligence in the world
proved useless when the command structure could not deal with it.
6. Decisive Victory: Saratoga, 1777
click here for maps and a detailed history of the battle of Saratoga
After taking patriot strongholds at Crown Point and Ft.
Ticonderoga, Burgoyne marched his redcoats south toward Albany,
New York. He was far behind schedule because the Americans
systematically blocked his way; his long train of unnecessary
artillery prevented fast movement. Supplies of food and fodder
were running short; his foragers found the countryside had been
stripped. A cautious commander might have declared victory
(because of the capture of Ft. Ticonderoga) and hurried back to
Canada, as General Guy Carleton had done in nearly the same
location a year earlier. But "Gentleman Johnny" was the proudest
of the British generals--an amateur playwright with a flair for
the dramatic. His sharp criticism of Carleton's retreat had
given him this command in the first place. Success would end the
war and make him the toast of London. By early August, Burgoyne
was still far from Albany, and was running short of food. He
sent 700 Hessians to Bennington, Vermont, to capture supplies,
but only a handful returned. This was the his first indication
of trouble--desperate trouble. The American militias had
mobilized by the hundreds, by the thousands, and had whipped the
Hessians at Bennington. Burgoyne was stunned to discover that
Loyalists were refusing to join his army or supply provisions.
"The great bulk of the country [upstate New York] is undoubtedly
with the Congress in principle and in zeal.... Wherever the
King's forces point, militia to the amount of three or four
thousand assemble within twenty-four hours; they bring their own
subsistence, and the alarm over they return to their farms."
Burgoyne finally called for help, and in late September Clinton
led 3,000 men--an inadequate force--to capture American forts
around West Point. They never came closer than 100 miles to
Burgoyne. His invading army, with 2000 British regulars, 500
Loyalists and 2500 Hessians, was outnumbered 2-1 and was trapped.
On September 14 he crossed his Rubicon, to the west bank of the
Hudson River, and headed inland. On September 19 he led an
assault at Freeman's Farm in an attempt to move west of Bemis
Heights. 4,200 redcoats encountered MG Benedict Arnold with
2,000 Americans. Colonel Daniel Morgan' riflemen and Major Henry
Dearborn's light infantry were forced to withdraw after a Hessian
envelopment of their right flank. The American commander, MG
Horatio "Granny" Gates had only committed these troops at
Arnold's insistence, and refused to give them artillery or
reinforcements. At nightfall Gates conceded the field. He
understood the futility of direct assaults, and by limiting his
casualties to only 65 dead he had encouraged more militia to join
his army. Furthermore, the British victory proved costly, since
they lost 600 irreplaceable men.
Crisis for British
For the next three weeks Burgoyne stood paralyzed. An attack
on September 20 or 21 might have sent the Americans running.
Instead he waited for reinforcements from Clinton coming up the
Hudson--waited, waited, waited. By October 3 the redcoats were
hungry; quartermasters reduced rations by one-third. Casualties,
desertions of Loyalists and Canadians, and sickness reduced the
effectives to 5,000. Gates held all the trumps. New England
militia companies, sensing the kill, were pouring into camp. The
Americans now held a decisive 3:1 advantage. Gates carefully
buttressed Bemis Heights with earthworks and breastworks; his
army was being resupplied; and he knew the whereabouts and
strengths of the British. Burgoyne realized it was impossible to
retreat to Canada; he had to attack. On October 7 he again tried
to move west of Bemis Heights. Gates sent Morgan and Dearborn to
the British right, and BG Enoch Poor's 800 man brigade to its
left. Riflemen high in the trees took deadly aim at redcoat
officers. Soon, both British flanks were exposed and BG Ebenezer
Learned's brigade in the center engaged two German battalions.
Arnold, who had been relieved of command by Gates, suddenly
jumped into the action and led Learned's brigade in a brilliant
attack. The Germans retreated behind Balcarres Redoubt. Arnold
then took command of all the troops and led an assault around
Burgoyne's right which captured the critical Breymann's Redoubt.
Arnold's horse was shot and his leg broken; Morgan and Dearborn
continued the charge. (Today there is a monument at Saratoga to
Arnold's patriotic leg.) The British retreated, but had nowhere
to go. As Burgoyne noted, the American militias were clumsy in
method and movement (because of inexperienced field officers),
but they were disciplined, and showed the "sobriety,
subordination, regularity and courage" needed to win battles.
Burgoyne had lost another 600 men, including two generals. American
casualties were only 200. Burgoyne put off his formal surrender
at Saratoga until October 17. Since there was still a danger of
Clinton's arrival, Gates gave very generous terms. The redcoats
would disarm, march to Boston, sail for home, and promise never
to return. The officers did go home, but Congress reneged and
kept the others prisoner for the rest of the war.
Overconfidence, poor strategy, amazingly confused
coordination among Burgoyne, Howe and Clinton (which can be
blamed on Lord Germain, in overall charge in London), and
inadequate logistics destroyed a proud British army. Gates
followed a simple, clear-cut strategy of blocking a force that was
too small and too far from base. Sooner or later it had to
surrender.
7. The Meaning of Saratoga
The original British strategy had failed totally. Clearly there
was no way to defeat the Americans in classical battles--
Washington would either disengage, or, when the odds were highly
favorable, capture another British army. Unless Britain did
something radically innovative, the American colonies were lost.
The strategy of sending Burgoyne overland from Canada to seize
the Hudson was a fundamental strategic blunder. It played to the
Americans' strength and failed to use the British fleet
effectively at a time it controlled the seas. Instead the British
should have seized West Point 50 miles north of New York City by
overland attack, then sailed small, well-armed frigates up and
down the Hudson River. This would have prevented movements of
supplies or soldiers between New England and New York.
Washington was more alert to the geography than his enemies were,
and by 1778 he had West Point well defended. Saratoga was a
shattering blow. The British lost 8,000 men (plus supplies and
artillery) that would be hard to replace. The Americans kept
control of a strategic waterway and prevented the enemy from
splitting the new nation. Americans were excited to discover
that they could indeed defeat the best soldiers of a supposedly
invincible superpower
British status threatened
Even more decisively, the American victory undercut the entire world
geopolitical position of
Britain. France had long been eager to enter the war, and while
Britain allowed its navy to rot, the French had built a powerful
fleet and knit alliances across the continent. Paris stepped up essential munitions shipments and in February, 1778, signed a formal treaty
with the U.S., becoming a fighting ally. Some aristocratic young officers joined the American army to serve under Washington, most notably the Marquis de Lafayette. France sent in regular troops, who were stationed in or near Rhode Island for most of the war, but who marched to Yorktown in 1781 and played a major role in the vioctory there. Even more important, the large French navy was now at war with the British navy. In 1779 Paris brought
the Spanish Empire into the new anti-British alliance. Paris
acted in part out of revenge at the loss of Canada in the Seven
Years War (1763), and even more for practical geopolitical and
commercial goals. Independence for the American colonies meant
that France's historic adversary would lose the richest, fastest
growing, and most strategically located colonies in the world.
Indeed, they would become French allies, permanently tilting the
balance of power in the North Atlantic and the flow of trade.
Holland joined with France, as did Spain. Madrid had only one
interest, the return of Gibraltar, which Britain had captured in
1704. Spain offered to join Britain in the war if it could get
Gibraltar; when London refused, she joined the allies, attacked British outposts in Florida, and
sent supplies to the Americans. (In the
end, Britain kept Gibraltar and gave Florida to the Spanish.)
In a stunning failure of diplomacy, Britain was unable to sign up
any allies anywhere on the globe, and most neutrals even took
hostile positions. This was a world war, but Continental Europe
was controlled by the enemy or neutral. Britain would have to
fight its war at sea, and the land battles in North America
assumed minor importance in the large picture.
Britain outnumbered
Britain now was outnumbered in population and wealth, and worst
of all, outgunned on the seas by an aggregate of 120 ships of the
line to 90. The potential threat of the French fleet forced
Clinton (now commander in chief) to evacuate Philadelphia in
June, 1778. Yankees threatened his rear guard at the battle of Monmouth, but
Clinton made good his escape to New York City. The Americans
were lucky to get a draw at Monmouth. Their commander, the
brilliant, experienced and erratic Charles Lee had lost control
of the situation and had to be rescued by Washington. Lee
complained bitterly, sought a court martial, was convicted and
disgraced. (Decades later it was discovered that before Monmouth
Lee had become a traitor who gave Howe a comprehensive plan to
defeat Washington.) Monmouth was the last major battle in the
North; for the next three years Washington positioned his army to
make sure Clinton stayed in New York City. Washington
could not talk the French into a joint attack on the well-defended
city. The threat of the French navy meant that the bulk of Royal Navy
had to be pulled out of North America and stationed near England to defend
against a possible French-Spanish invasion. (The invasion
was threatened twice, but never took place.) The alliance
involved risks for the allies: Britain might well defeat their
navies separately and capture one of the French West Indies, or
French holdings in India. Eventually Britain did accomplish all
that. Furthermore, Paris had a poor financial systems; the war
bankrupted the treasury, weakened the monarchy, and hastened the
French Revolution in 1789. What did the new allies contribute to
the American cause? The Spanish, operating from New Orleans,
cleared the redcoats out of the lower Mississippi Valley, seizing
Mobile on the Gulf Coast, Pensacola (in British West Florida) and
the Bahama islands. They also blockaded Gibraltar. These
actions diverted British resources, and helped neutralize the
pro-British Indians who were attacking patriot settlements along
the Carolina-Georgia frontier.
World War
In larger perspective, the
American alliance turned a tussle in a remote part of the globe
into the fifth world war; indeed, the United States became a
secondary theater. Britain would now have a very difficult time
defeating the rebels. The fragility of its long supply line, the
stretching of already thin resources, the continued corruption
and weak and vacillating leadership in London, and the grave
threats from every direction spelled doom. As the Earl of
Sandwich (head of the Royal Navy) lamented:
England till this time was never engaged in a sea war with
the House of Bourbon [France and Spain] thoroughly united,
their naval force unbroken, and having no other war or object
to draw off their attention and resources. We unfortunately
have an additional war on our hands [vs USA] which
essentially drains our resources and employs a very
considerable part of our army and navy; we have no one friend
or ally to assist us; on the contrary all those who ought to
be our allies except Portugal act against us in supplying our
enemies with the means of equipping their fleet.
British last hope: regain the South
With defeatism rampant among British officers and politicians, the
independence of the United States seemed inevitable. Britain
lacked a coherent strategy, or brilliant generals or admirals
with the genius to reverse the tide. London probably wanted
peace with the Americans, if it could keep, as King George
insisted,
Canada, Nova Scotia, [and] the Floridas...and the more they
are kept unlike the other [US] colonies the better, for it is
by them that we are to keep a certain awe over the abandoned
colonies.
However, there was one hope left: by fighting on perhaps the
British forces could hold onto Canada, the Great Lakes, and New
York City, and also chop off the most Loyalist, least developed
part of the United States, the lower South. Then if the peace
conference could confirm these holdings, the British Empire would
emerge tattered but with honor intact, and a great deal of
valuable territory as well. The US would be independent, but
would be weak and not a threat. The downside to fighting on was
that the alliance might win outright. France did send a large professional army which, combined with Washington's forces, had
the potential to overwhelm the British. With control of the sea
in doubt, the Royal Navy could no longer guarantee it could
reinforce or evacuate a British land army that got in trouble.
London realized that for all its corruption it was financially
stronger than the allies; perhaps by holding out it could push
the alliance into economic collapse. The new British strategy
therefore called for a stronger navy, and an invasion of the
American South. The navy was rebuilt successfully; the invasion
was a disaster.
click here for 1780 campaign map from West Point Atlas
8. The Southern Campaign, 1779-1781
The Southern campaign of 1779-81 marked the climax of the war.
London decided to "Americanize" the conflict by relying on
supposedly numerous Loyalists, backed by small, elite units of
the Royal Army commanded by bitter-end fighters who wanted
vengeance for their dead comrades. It would be a civil war of
Americans Loyalists against American patriots. British regulars
would provide strategic direction and cadres of shock troops; the
vast majority of silent Loyalists would rise up, take the arms
provided by Britain, and seize the land. The plan would start
where the rebels were weakest and Loyalists the strongest, the
South Carolina and Georgia. The region was notorious for its
large slave population, its discontented back country, and the
fierce Indian tribes ready to go on the warpath. The territory
was vast, lightly populated, flat, and open to the sea at every
point--perfect conditions for the British. Washington was tied
down outside New York City, and lacking transports he could not
easily move his main army south. Furthermore, East Florida, and
the nearby West Indies, provided bases for attack. The plan was
to capture the main cities, Savannah and Charleston, then
overwhelm Georgia, South Carolina and North Carolina. With the
lower South under control, the redcoats would finally march north
and conquer Virginia and Maryland. Loyalists would supposedly
flock to the Union Jack, and form regiments that would man a
series of forts, overpower their rebel neighbors and restore the
old royal governors.
The strategy was wholly fallacious at every point; London
lacked reliable intelligence reports from the field, a clear
understanding of its options, and the leadership and manpower
needed to do the job. It should have sued for peace in 1778.
One fallacy was the assumption that because few southerners had
fought so far, few supported the patriot cause. In fact the
individualistic Americans of the South would fiercely fight to
defend their homes, land, and slaves--and their dream of an
inland empire stretching from the Atlantic to the Mississippi and
beyond. The assumption of a large silent loyal force ready to be
mobilized at a trumpet call was simply wrong. The British
underestimated the anger and determination of the southern
patriots, their ability to control local government, provision
their own forces, and repress opponents. Some Loyalists did
fight, but they were seeking revenge, not a better world. The
patriots forced most Loyalists to flee or stay quiet by
threatening their property, slaves and families.
Role of slaves
The slaves proved not to be a liability to the patriots. In 1775
the Tory governor of Virginia Lord Dunmore had promised freedom to all slaves
who would flee and fight for the King. About 500 did come, but
most soon died of disease. The Americans saw military service as the highest ideal of
republican citizenship, and were very reluctant to allow slaves to fight.
They did employ slaves as non-combatant auxiliaries, and eventually most of the southern
states recruited slaves as soldiers, and emancipated them at the end of the war.
The northern states enlisted about 5000 free blacks into combat units.
Lord Dunmore's promise sparked fears of slave rebellions, which never took place.
Neutral and even Loyalist slave owners were so angered with the risk of a slave
revolt that they denounced Dunmore's move and forced him to abandon
the call for a slave uprising. Historians have not been able to accurately count the number of blacks who served on the British side, but estimate that a few thousand black "pioneers" had noncombatant heavy labor jobs in the British army, and about 800 served in combat roles. Thousands of slaves were rented out to work on
fortifications for both sides, but did not carry arms and were not
considered "soldiers". The British seized thousands of slaves belonging to rebel owners, but
they did not free them; they threatened to sell into slavery and
blacks caught in American uniforms.
For more on the role of slaves in the Revolution. See also Sylvia Frey, Water from the Rock (1993). Also, Slavery in Virginia.
The spirit of independence and freedom extended to slaves, Quakers in Pennsylvania argued. They formed The Pennsylvania Abolition Society in 1775, the first abolitionist organization.
Native Americans prefer King George
The British hoped to organize and arm Indians on the frotier to attack the Americans. While some Indians remained neutral, and some joined the patriots, the majority followed the British lead.
In 1779 and again in 1782 mounted militia raids burned the wigwams and destroyed
the corn fields of the Chicamagua and Creek tribes. The raids
ruined the tribes' military capability, and through threat of
starvation forced them to migrate west. The Cherokees,
meanwhile, carefully remained neutral. Furthermore, Spanish victories over the British and Indians in theMississippi Valley and along the Gulf Coast cut off most of the British supplies. As a result and the
Indians in the south and west only played a minor role in the war. (After the war, however, their lands were seized by the new nation and they were forced to rerlocate west, or south into Florida.)
British supply problems
Two silent factors further undercut the British strategy.
The vast, underpopulated countryside provided little in the way of
food for men or forage for horses.
Armies quickly ran out of supplies, and hunger was a factor. More ominous was the disease
environment. The South was an unhealthy place, especially in the
hot, wet summers. Americans who were acclimated could survive,
but the sickness rates were very high for the British and
Hessians--often 20% were hospitalized, with many others feeling
queasy from malaria. Morale suffered accordingly.
Finally, the assumption of control of the sea was false. The
French navy, of equal strength and more modern construction, had
the capability of seizing control of the sea at any place at any
time. Since supplies had to come by water, any British army in
the South was in a precarious position. The new British strategy
was doomed from the start.
9. Problems of the American Army
The Americans did not fully appreciate that the advantage had
swung their way. After long years of warfare their early
enthusiasm had worn thin. The solid farmer-citizens who signed
up in 1775 largely abandoned Washington after the British seized
New York in summer 1776, though many returned to temporary duty
in state and local militias (especially in the Saratoga campaign
of 1777). If patriotic appeal would not maintain a standing army,
maybe money would; Washington discovered that ever larger
bounties were needed to entice new recruits, and ever more
grandiose promises of land bounties after the war. To be sure,
there were penniless and poor men around who enlisted, plus
adventurous youth who wanted to escape home--Washington's army
was taking on the rag-tail appearance of the British regulars.
However, the failure of Congress to appropriate adequate funds
meant Washington's army was poorly equipped--and also meant the
army harbored growing resentments against the civilians who
failed to support them. The civilians, however, were convinced
that corruption and profiteering had replaced earnest patriotism.
Intrigues and cabals preoccupied Congress and the army high
command. They led nowhere, but they did sour the mood. The
treason of General Benedict Arnold, who tried to betray West
Point in 1780 to Andre, was a stunning shock to patriots
convinced of the higher morality of their cause. Inflation was
out of hand, as Congress printed so much money that "not worth a
Continental" became a catchword. The weak central government,
the bumbling state governments, and the independence of militia
units that quit and rejoined campaigns at will all cast doubt on
whether the Americans could really fight a serious war. The bad
commissary and quartermaster systems, and civilian indifference,
degraded army morale--as did its own inactivity. When soldiers
were ragged, hungry, wet, unpaid, and not doing any fighting,
they could become nasty. The winter encampment at Valley Forge,
Pennsylvania (December 1777 to June 1778) was horrible; 2,000 men
went barefoot, one fourth of the 10,000 there died of disease and
exposure. The encampment at Morristown, NJ, the following winter
was even worse. Northern regulars, who did little fighting
between Germantown (1777) and Yorktown (1781), mutinied several
times to voice their protest, but in every case were quickly
mollified. The southern soldiers, who suffered much worse
conditions but who were actively fighting, did not revolt.
10. Britain Invades the South, 1778-81
The South was highly vulnerable to a British invasion. The new British strategy opened smoothly with the capture of
Savannah in December, 1778. In February, 1780, Clinton brought
10,000 troops and 5,000 sailors in 90 ships to overwhelm
Charleston. The forts defending the harbor were in disrepair,
and the artillery no match for the British men of war. Worse,
General Benjamin Lincoln allowed his 5,000 troops to be trapped
inside the city. Clinton besieged Lincoln methodically, digging
parallel lines, maintaining a heavy bombardment, and zigzagging
forward to the next parallel. In accordance with classical rules
of 18th century warfare, the city surrendered before the final
assault. Lincoln's regulars were held on disease-ridden prison
ships, while his militia were disarmed and allowed to go home.
The Americans suffered the largest surrender in their history
before the Civil War.
Harsh British rule
It was one matter to control the
small city of Charleston, another to control the vast rural
areas. The British believed they could easily outnumber the patriots if they armed a Loyalist militia.
The British treated as traitors everyone who failed to
take the oath to King George. This harsh policy escalated
tension and pushed most of the neutrals toward the American
cause. The new British commander, General Charles Cornwallis,
established a chain of forts inland. He sent Colonel Banastre
Tarleton and his Legion of fierce Loyalist cavalry to hunt down
rebel militia. Small American detachments besieged or assaulted
the forts repeatedly, but were usually driven off. However, when
the redcoats pursued the Americans, they lost more men by ambush,
disease and desertion than they could replace. One British
general offered a generous reward of 5 pounds for the return of any deserter, or
10 pounds for just his head. Food and fodder was scarce in the first
place, but the Americans used a scorched earth policy to worsen
the British logistical dilemma. The redcoats seized the farms and
slaves of rebels, and installed Loyalists on them. Little food
was produced, but much hatred and revenge. The British could
hold the seacoast, the coastal towns, and a few inland forts, but
they could not control the decisive locale, the countryside
unless they hunted down the Americans. When small American
armies (of 1,000 or 2,000 men) were defeated, they reformed as
guerrilla bands. Terror and counter-terror were used. Tarleton
warned the rebels, "If warfare allows me I shall give these
disturbers of the peace no quarter; if humanity obliges me to
spare their lives, I shall carry them close prisoners to Camden."
His Legion whipped 300 militia at Waxhaw Creek, NC, and bayoneted
the prisoners. "Tarleton's quarter!" the rebels spat, and
promised to return the same. Old feuds resumed. Burned
villages, crossroads massacres, late night arson, sudden
assassination, slave stealing, rape and looting and desperate
flight destroyed the social fabric of the Carolinas. Everyone
realized that victory would go to the most ruthless men, with no
quarter to the losers; no one recognized "innocent civilians."
Fourteen-year old Andrew Jackson joined the North Carolina
militia as a messenger, and was captured after a skirmish at a
patriot's house. The raiders sacked and burned the house and
insulted the women. A lieutenant ordered the lad to shine his
boots. Jackson refused, and was slashed by the officer's sword.
He carried the scars for the rest of his life, getting his
revenge at the Battle of New Orleans in 1815. They took
Jackson's prized pistol, a smart little gun that would "kick like
sixty when loaded with a three-quarter-ounce ball or with nine
buckshot." A few days later a patrol captured a Loyalist with the
pistol--evidence that he had been one of the raiders. The
Loyalist was hung, and Andy got his pistol back. The Loyalist
who took Jackson's horse also was captured, but he was not hung
because he had been shot through the stomach before he
surrendered and was already dying. As Jackson later reflected,
we "did not lose many points in the game of hanging, shooting and
flogging." The British hard-line position indicated they had
abandoned their original aim of restoring the colonies to loyalty
to the Crown.
click here for 1781 campaigns from West Point Atlas
Battles Won and Lost
Washington sent General Horatio Gates to hold the South with a mere 1,400 regulars of the Maryland Line
and the Delaware Line, and all the militia he could raise. Gates
pushed his starved and sick troops through the swamps and woods
of the border region between the two Carolinas, and suddenly
encountered Cornwallis at the battle of Camden in South Carolina. Gates' frightened
militia fled without firing a shot, the regulars retreated, and
the American general personally set an all-time record by fleeing 180 miles on
horseback in less than four days. His replacement General
Nathanael Greene, by contrast, proved a sophisticated and
successful guerrilla commander. So did the subordinate generals
Francis Marion (the "Swamp Fox"), Thomas Sumter, and Andrew
Pickens. Greene realized that Cornwallis could not replace his
loses. The solution therefore was to fight a series of
engagements, none decisive but all painful to the British. If
there was a danger of defeat, the Americans would break off and
let Cornwallis and Tarleton pursue them further from the British
base of supplies. When the British split their forces to chase
rebel bands, they ran a severe risk. In October, 1780, 900
backwoods militiamen, with hunting rifles, chased 1,000 Loyalist
soldiers to King's Mountain. The rebels stormed the mountain,
capturing or killing the entire British force. At Cowpens in
January, 1781, Tarleton's 1,100 mounted troopers caught up with
Daniel Morgan and his 1,000 militia riflemen. Morgan put General
Pickens' raw soldiers in the front lines, told them to fire twice
then retreat. The redcoats, sensing victory, charged with fixed
bayonets, crashing into Morgan's second line, which wavered, then
held. The American cavalry counterattacked Tarleton's right
flank and the supposedly panicked Pickens' regiment suddenly
reappeared on the left. It was a classical double envelopment.
(Possibly Morgan knew about the similar action at the battle of
Cannae, Italy, where Hannibal encircled and demolished the Romans
in 216 B.C.) Tarleton lost 300 casualties and 525 prisoners out
of 1,100 men; he barely escaped himself. At Guilford North Carolina in
March, Greene tried to duplicate Morgan's tactics (every
ambitious general for 2000 years has tried for a double
envelopment), but Cornwallis drove him off the field. In the
process Cornwallis lost a fourth of his men; more victories like
that, London sighed, and they would lose their armies. The
British were able to break American sieges of their frontier
outposts, but realized they could not hold them forever. They
therefore pulled back into the ports of Charleston and Savannah,
giving the Americans control over the rural South.
11. War at Sea
To win the war the British should have used their navy much
more effectively than they did. After winning the Seven Years
War, London allowed its great fleet to literally rot--66 ships
sank because of rotting wood. Improvements were made during the
late 1770s, and by 1782 Admiral Hood was able to defeat the French
fleet in the West Indies to regain control of the seas. But in
the critical year 1781 the French, Spanish and Dutch allies had
about 168 major warships of 60 or more guns, versus 114 for the
British (and none for the U.S.)*
* A "ship of the line" was a main battleship, built from 2,000 oak
trees and flashing 74 or so guns, each effective out to 300 yards.
Battles had to be fought close in, with marines essential as
sharpshooters and boarding parties. Frigates were smaller ships
carrying 30 to 50 guns, used for reconnaissance, convoys and raids.
Sloops were even smaller and cheaper; their 20 guns were enough
to overpower any merchant ship, or control rivers and bays.
Britain's Transatlantic Supply Line
With a 3,000 mile supply line, it was imperative for the British
fleet to organize and guard convoys of food, fodder, money and
supplies. The results were fair; although 342 merchant ships were
captured in 1776, and 464 in 1777, many were recaptured and
enough got through to ensure the redcoats barely adequate
supplies. With the long coastline and numerous ports, the United
States was vulnerable to assault from the sea; the Royal Navy did
an effective job in capturing the major ports, New York City,
Philadelphia, Newport, Charleston and Savannah. Likewise it did
moved troops around smoothly and without loss, as in the
evacuation of Boston in 1775, the relief of Quebec in 1776 and
the attack on Philadelphia in 1777. In defensive terms, the
Royal Navy did protect the home island of Britain, the
possessions in the West Indies, and the occupied American cities.
Its efforts to blockade both the American and French coasts
overstrained its resources.**
** When a merchant ship was captured, it was taken to port, it and
its cargo were sold, and its sailors imprisoned. The victorious
sailors would divide the prize money according to a fixed formula.
A typical prize was worth several year's pay.
Problems of Royal Navy
The Royal Navy's main failures were its inability to destroy
a major French fleet (until 1782), its failure to support Burgoyne
at Saratoga in 1777, and its inability to defend or evacuate
Yorktown in 1781. Why did the much vaunted British navy perform
so poorly? The administration in London was heavily politicized,
thoroughly corrupt, and blind to the larger issues of strategy.
The officer corps was comprised of aristocrats more concerned with
status and honor than with expertise and excellence. They showed
timidity in battle and neglected to develop new tactics. Half the
seamen were paupers who volunteered for the poor pay, putrid food,
inhuman discipline and deadly scurvy and yellow fever of the navy
only because there were no other jobs for them. The other half
were merchant sailors who had been impressed (kidnapped) into
service against their will. "Our fleets, which are defrauded by
injustice, are first manned by violence and then maintained by
cruelty," admitted one British admiral. Morale was bad, but
mutinies of the sort that erupted in the 1790s did not come sooner
because the spirit of liberty first had to be sparked by the
American and French Revolutions. Thousands of American mariners
were aware of the bad conditions in the Royal Navy. In reaction
these "Jack Tars" became outspoken rebels, and signed up on the
privateers that raided British shipping throughout the war.
With its exposed position and slender resources, the United
States could scarcely afford a navy of its own. American ships were few. Congress saw a
need for prestige, however, and quickly authorized a navy and
marine corps. The Navy was unable to break the British blockade;
it could not dream of challenging a battle fleet ten times as
large. It did seize some merchantmen. A Scottish adventurer flying
the American flag, John Paul Jones in the Bon Homme
Richard, with 40 guns, raided a 40 ship convoy off the British coast. Suddenly
the Serapis, with 44 guns, intervened. In one of the most famous one-on-one battles in British or American naval history Jones
captured the Serapis just before his own ship sank; the convoy
escaped. The main mission of the Continental navy was to ferry
diplomats, supplies, money, and intelligence to and from Europe
and the West Indies.
Failure of State Navies
Most of the states operated their own little navies, but were
scarcely able to confront 74-gun men-of-war. When the British
started building a base in Penobscot Bay in Maine, Massachusetts
sent 1,000 militia in 40 ships. Unfortunately the commodore
commanding the fleet could not agree with the colonel commanding
the troops about who was to attack when and where. Delay was
fatal, for a more powerful British fleet arrived. The Americans
ran their ships aground and fled for home overland. Private
ship owners, unable to carry on normal business because of the
British blockade, obtained letters of marque from Congress or the
states and set out to attack the British merchant fleet anywhere
in the world. Some 2,000 privateers captured about 2,000 British
ships and 12,000 prisoners, and divided prize money totaling a
stunning 18 million pounds (worth perhaps one billion dollars today).
However, 10,000 American sailors were in turn captured and
imprisoned by the Royal Navy; they rotted away in stinking prison
ships dreaming of the fabulous prize money they almost had won.
The U.S. army set up a small naval force, manned by fishermen
militia. Arnold built a little navy on Lake Champlain which
successfully delayed an invasion coming down from Montreal in
October 1776. The British army suffered less damage from the
Continental Navy warships than it did from the army rowboats which
ferried Washington across the Delaware, and which raided British
foraging areas in Long Island.
12. Victory at Yorktown, 1781
See also Yorktown
Cornwallis originally planned to invade Virginia only after
pacifying the Carolinas. His plan was defeated by the
combination of small American regular forces, augmented when
needed by swarming bands of militia. "It is not the number of
troops Mr. Washington can spare from his army that is to be
apprehended," one British general finally realized. "It is the
multitude of militia and men in arms ready to turn out at an
hour's notice at the shew of a single Regiment of Continental
troops." The combination of regulars and militia, supported by a
fierce and successful determination to gain political control of
the population no matter how much bloodshed, destroyed
Cornwallis's plans to rally the Loyalists. He now gave up on the
deep south and headed into Virginia with 7,500 men, without
guarantees of supplies or reinforcements. His superior, General
Henry Clinton in New York, wanted Cornwallis to retreat
southward, which doubtless would have been wiser. The British
were slow learners; they finally realized that there was no real
help from Tories or Indians. As late as June, 1781, Clinton
reassured Cornwallis that he faced only 2000 regular
Continentals, plus a small body of ill-armed "spiritless"
"peasantry". In the event Major General Lafayette commanded
5,000 American and French soldiers who parried the redcoats.
Cornwallis finally retreated to the Yorktown peninsula in August.
Learning that the main French fleet was moving up from the West
Indies, Washington grasped the opportunity. In a brilliant
strategic move, he marched 6,000 soldiers from New York to
Virginia, while deceiving Clinton as to their destination.
Admiral Francois de Grasse brought the French fleet with 28 ships
of the line and 3,000 more troops to Virginia on August 30.
Washington had long appreciated that "In any and all
circumstances a naval superiority is to be considered as a
fundamental principle, and the basis upon which every hope of
success must ultimately depend." A British naval squadron, sent
to rescue Cornwallis, was challenged by de Grasse at the battle
of the Virginia Capes on September 5. The British for once were
outnumbered and outgunned, and had no choice but to retreat back
to New York for reinforcements. By the time the reinforced fleet
returned, it was too late.
Cornwallis Surrenders
At Yorktown Washington assembled 5,700 Continentals, 3,200
militia and 7,800 French regulars on loan as part of the alliance.
French siege experts used their standard techniques, forcing the
redcoats back while new trenches zig-zagged forward. By October
10, 46 heavy guns shelled all parts of the British camp, and
another 50 were in action a week later. Cornwallis, huddled in a
cave along the riverfront, knew it was hopeless. On October 19
his band played a melancholy tune (perhaps it was "The World Turned Upside Down")
as his 8,000 men paraded in surrender. Despite the size of the
contending forces, and the importance of the siege, there were
only 260 allied and 550 British casualties. The Americans were
annoyed when the French officers began fraternizing with British
officer-prisoners. The rustic Yankee officers and their upper
class French counterparts had always kept at arms' length. No
matter, the day of the European aristocracies dominating North
America was coming to a close. The battle of Yorktown was the
last action needed to guarantee independence.
British decide on Peace
London could at great expense have replaced the lost troops,
but it had no strategy left. Britain no longer controlled the
seas, and no longer could count on Loyalist support south of
Canada. Lord Germain and the pro-war ministers fell from power,
and the opposition took control in London with a peace program.
The Treaty of Paris (1783) provided surprisingly good terms for
the new nation. Britain recognized American independence, turned
the vast area from the Appalachians to the Mississippi River over
to the U.S., and gave the Floridas to Spain. France got nothing
but ruinous debt, because the Royal Navy had defeated de Grasse
at the Battle of the Saints (near Dominica, West Indies) in 1782.
Britain did keep Canada, and it illegally operated forts in the
Great Lakes region for another 30 years. It evacuated and
resettled 70,000 to 100,000 Loyalists, mostly to Canada. Some
returned in later years, as the wartime hatreds quickly subsided.
Those who stayed in Canada built a new nation, quite similar to
the United States but devoted to upholding the Empire and
resisting further intrusions from the damn Yankees. The great
majority of Loyalists remained in the United States and became
good citizens. The slaves who donned redcoats were freed, and
most settled in Canada. The British Empire survived--
temporarily smaller and permanently chastened by its humiliation
at the hands of upstart, poorly bred, individualistic, fierce
American volunteers.
Additional Links and On-Line Resources
- maps from West Point Atlas recommended
-
Bibliographies
- Re-enactments, historic sites & links
- original maps
- Documents
- Perkins, France in the Revolution
- Loyalists
- African American Loyalist soldiers
- Maryland Loyalists
- New Jersey Loyalists
- Quakers as Loyalists & Patriots scholarly article
- Loyalist history of war
- British Legion armed Loyalists in South; original documents
- Prisoners
- Brunswicker (Hessian) prisoners
- naval prisoners from 1913 scholarly book
- Spies
- Intelligence: by CIA
- spy letters from Clements Library
- States
- Georgia
- Maryland Gazette pdf format
- Political view from PBS
- Washington and his Army
- General George Washington ortiginal documents from Library of Congress
- The Continental army
- American uniforms
- Black soldiers
- Washington's supply problems scholarly article
- Jusserand, Rochambeau and the French in America 1916 essay by a French historian
- Battles
- Maps
- maps from West Point Atlas recommended
- Original Maps
- Lexington, 1775 from WPI
- Lexington British report
- Concord
- staff ride & background
- Bunker Hill from Massachusetts Historical Society
- Trenton, 1776
- Hessians at Trenton
scholarly study by Edward J. Lowell (1884)
- Brandywine 1777
- Saratoga, 1777
- Scholarly histories and guide to battle
- "The Campaign of Burgoyne," by W. L. Stone (1877)
- more Saratoga
- Bennington
- Gen. Stark at Bennington 1877 article
- Hessians at Ticonderoga and Bennington
- Hessians at Saratoga
bibliography
- Monmouth, 1778
- a British report
- Southern Campaigns 1779-81
- Camden, 1780
- King's Mountain & Cowpens, 1780-81
- Cowpens
- "The Patriot" Mel Gibson 2000 movie
- Cowpens, Guilford Courthouse, Yorktown
- Yorktown from PBS
- Naval
- G. W. Allen, Naval History of American Revolution 1913 scholarly study
- "Admiral Earl Howe," 1894 essay by Alfred Thayer Mahan
- John Paul Jones
- biography
- Jones, seen by Brits
- extracts from Jones journals
- The Ranger commanded by Jones
- Postwar
- "Social Roots of the American Military Profession: The Officer Corps of America's First Peacetime Army, 1784-1789," by William B. Skelton J Military History v 54 (Oct 1990) pp. 435-452 available in JSTOR
- "St. Clair's Defeat," by Theodore Roosevelt 1791 epsode in West
- "America’s First Limited War," [Quasi War with France, 1798] 2000 article by Gregory E. Fehlings
- "American Indian Military Leadership: St. Clair's 1791 Defeat," by Leroy V. Eid
; in The Journal of Military History in JSTOR, Vol. 57, No. 1. (Jan., 1993), pp. 71-88.
revised 2/12/2002Copyright (c) 2002 Richard Jensen. This Guide was prepared with support from the Robert H. Michel Civic Education Grants sponsored by The Dirksen Congressional Center. Scholars are invited to post the complete Guide to campus WWW sites and distribute it to students.
Jensen's Online Guides
By Richard Jensen, covering humanities, American history, demography, political science and related topics
Write me at RJensen@uic.edu